

**TEXT FLY WITHIN
THE BOOK ONLY**

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_154389

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 323.44/M37L Accession No. 27582

Author Martin, E.D.

Title Liberty, 1930

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.



LIBERTY



LIBERTY

By EVERETT DEAN MARTIN

Author of THE MEANING OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION, THE
BEHAVIOR OF CROWDS, PSYCHOLOGY, ETC.



NEW YORK

W. W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC., *Publishers*

Copyright, 1930
W . W . NORTON & COMPANY, INC.
70 Fifth Avenue, New York

First printing in America June 1930

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE PUBLISHERS BY THE VAIL-BALLOU PRESS

CONTENTS

REFACE	PAGE vii
AFTER	
I. THE CONFUSION OF AMERICAN LIBER- ALISM	I
II. THE STORY OF LIBERTY IN ANCIENT ATHENS	13
III. CHRISTIAN LIBERTY	40
IV. FREEDOM AND THE RENAISSANCE	75
V. LIBERTY ENLIGHTENING THE WORLD	111
VI. ROMANTIC IDEAS OF LIBERTY	138
VII. LIBERTY AND TOLERANCE	193
VIII. FREEDOM AND POWER	239
IX. HOW FREEDOM BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE	271

PREFACE

The word "Liberty," which I have with some reluctance chosen to stand as the title of this book, means so many things that it often means almost nothing. I have attempted no abstract discussion or definition but have endeavored to show what those who have most thoughtfully considered the subject throughout the ages have meant by Liberty. I have also discussed the subject in the light of the general philosophy of life and of the psychological and historical facts which form the background of such discussion.

My first thought was to publish a book with the title "A History of Liberty," but many histories of liberty have been written and they are usually dull legalistic discussions, or are rhapsodical accounts of heroic battles for freedom. The impression given is either that liberty exists as a thing in itself in a sort of vacuum or else that an innocent and a pressed humanity knowing well what liberty meant has progressively emancipated itself from unjustifiable tyranny. Humanity once having gained a victory for the rights of man, it is assumed that the crowd has persisted in the love of freedom and has sought only to secure its blessings to the future.

Some such view appears to be taken for granted by most Americans. This is a "free country" as a result of the heroic feats of our ancestors. Liberty has been achieved once for all. The cause of freedom is that of the

masses against real or possible alien oppressors. Liberty and popular government are much the same, and the idea of liberty has become so associated with patriotic emotion that it has become more a matter of pride in history,—or in popular fictions about history—than a clear, rational concept.

We are inclined as a people to substitute emotion for thinking in dealing with most of the important concerns of our common life, and our attitude toward liberty is no exception. We persuade ourselves, for instance, that we entered the late war in order to make the world safe for democracy and were thus true to our historic rôle as a nation, fighting for liberty. As a matter of fact, many thinking people among us have long entertained certain misgivings about democracy. They knew the motives which prevailed in the average legislative assembly, local and national. We were already critical. We knew the "hysteria" of crowd behavior in our democratic society. We had reason to suspect that now since ancient tyrants had been overthrown the emergent enemy of human freedom is the crowd itself. We had seen evidence of its susceptibility to catch word, half understood ideas, and to designing propaganda of all sorts. Epidemic outbreaks of mob violence and quixotic crusades of alleged moral reform were not unknown among us. The extent of the venality and corruption in our political life had disturbed many who knew the facts and had meditated on their significance.

Since the war, we have had to witness a widespread cynical tendency to subordinate many of our traditional American ideals to the end of material prosperity. We have seen orgies of intolerance and we have noted too

often the degrading influence of popular prejudice and ignorance on many of the values of our civilization. We have seen more than one of our traditional guarantees of individual liberty shrink before the well meaning attempts at reform and the organized activity of groups inspired by profit seeking motives. Many have consequently been inclined to dismiss the cause of liberty as a popular illusion. Upon the majority, however, those who have tried to warn the public of the danger of loss of our inherited freedom have made little impression. Somehow, such warnings have appeared, and in fact often have been, little more than irritating criticisms of our ways of life and have offended against popular patriotic sentiments. Notwithstanding such warnings, we as a people feel still that we are dutifully patriotic when we give lip service to traditions of freedom which are seldom honored in daily practice. Warnings put forth as emotional appeal, often made in a spirit of denunciation and of partisanship, are worse than useless in the cause of liberty.

The time appears to have come for Americans to think dispassionately about this matter. We have long needed a rational and critical understanding of our philosophy of freedom. As I have pointed out in the ensuing chapters, it is ironical that in a "free country" where public education is maintained at great cost, to prepare our youth to live in a nation dedicated to liberty, so little concern has been given to the understanding of liberty that great classics on the subject, like Milton's *Areopagitica*, Locke's essay on *Toleration*, and Mill's essay on *Liberty*,—documents which should and could be known and understood by every high school student—are almost never taught.

Our people have little of the philosophy of freedom. Even our professed liberals are commonly confused, striving as they do to reconcile the classical understanding of liberty (as a rational achievement) with the romantic notion of freedom as a natural right. Little serious attention has been given to the conflict among the varied traditions of liberty we have inherited from the past, or to the problem of valuing them, noting their irreconcilable differences and striving to apply what might be most suitable in them to present conditions.

This book is an attempt to call attention to this situation and to point out what wise men of the past have meant by liberty, to make clear the incompatible presuppositions which lie behind the various traditional uses of the term "liberty," and to show that liberty has certain necessary relations to a definite and growing type of culture. I trust I may have succeeded in making it clear that the dangers to liberty against which we today must stand guard do not come from a traditional or master class, or from an alien tyrant, but lurk in precisely those impulses in the nature of all of us which are commonly manifest in crowd behavior.

EVERETT DEAN MARTIN

New York
May, 1930.



LIBERTY

CHAPTER I

THE CONFUSION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM

Liberty is one of the outstanding problems in modern civilization. It is an ironical fact that one hundred years after Andrew Jackson's victory swept the common masses of America into supremacy in political power we still find liberty an issue in the United States. What have Americans been doing with their freedom since the year 1828?

Every time the question of freedom is seriously raised in this country it would seem to be considered a challenge to certain "one-hundred-percent" American groups, such as the fundamentalists, the Ku Klux Klan, the Anti-Saloon League, various Protestant and industrial organizations, and even the Daughters of the American Revolution. It is a striking fact that these people on the whole are descended from the early British immigrants. They are the people whose ancestors believed that they were establishing here the world's first great experiment in achieving a society of free people. They are the children of the men who in the crisis of American history pledged their property, their lives and their sacred honor to make America free. They are the descendants of the people who, when they had realized their independence, wrote and adopted a constitution in order that they

might secure the blessings of liberty to their descendants forever.

It is a significant fact in American history, too, that most of the present liberals are of the newer immigration, who bring to this nation a recent European heritage, and that most of the reactionaries in America seem to be the descendants of the men who risked their lives to make America free. It is further ironical that the reactionaries, who seem to have abandoned all interest in securing freedom, honestly believe that they are the defenders of American liberty and of our free institutions. Here we have an instance of a situation in which the populace must be liberated from its liberators. This is an old, old story, for it has happened many times in history.

Perhaps the present issue of liberty in America is not really a struggle for liberty at all, but merely a rationalization of the attempt of industrial workers and city dwellers to claim their place in the sun of American prosperity, social prestige and political power. And this, too, would be an old, old story, for many times in European history a class of men has rationalized just such interests and purposes as the struggle for the emancipation of all men. However, there is here something much more profound than any such view of the situation. The problem of liberty is deeply imbedded in the difficulties and conflicts of Western civilization. The French scholar, André Siegfried, in his book, *America Comes of Age*, says that in America many of the magnificent material things have had to be achieved at the

CONFUSION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 3

sacrifice of individual liberty, the sacrifice of things which in the Old World are regarded as the greatest victories of civilization. He further says that in America the profit motive dominates everywhere and that under the spell of this motive all intellectual activity which does not contribute to profit is discouraged. As a result, we Americans have set up conformity as the greatest requirement of our lives. This demand for conformity in the interest of profit, says Siegfried, is not imposed on the American people by the upper classes, nor by the government; it is imposed by the great masses themselves. This is a thought that ought to make us pause and think about ourselves. Just how is liberty an issue and against whom is it primarily a challenge?

One hundred years ago the struggle for liberty was a struggle of the average individual against the tyranny of a nobility, a monarchy, a priesthood. Now the enemy of liberty seems to be the crowd itself, operating through the instrumentalities of the Machine Age and its social organization. If this view is correct, then the problem of liberty must be recast in new terms of social psychology. It becomes a challenge to men to understand themselves and to master themselves in new ways in order that they may retain some vestige of their inherited freedom.

We men of the Twentieth Century are less keen about our freedom than any generation in modern times; certainly less concerned about human liberty than people were in the days when they were striving to achieve it. This is a psychological situation which is common enough.

The things which we take for granted are the things for which we no longer fight. But when a populace becomes indifferent to its freedom, it begins to lose it.

It was ten years ago that the Armistice was signed, ending the Great War, and if you look back over the ten years you will find that there has been an astonishing revival of illiberalism in the United States. Most of the great illiberal movements which now torment us have had their victory, and many their origin as well, during the last decade. For instance, militarism has vastly increased. To-day it is a disgrace to be a pacifist in the United States. Prohibition is another fruit of these last ten years. We have witnessed in Massachusetts the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti, the tragic result of conflict between radical and conservative mob movements. More recently a similar conflict in a Southern state makes mockery of both civilization and our inherited liberties. Fundamentalism has grown stronger, during this decade, and religious bigotry has again raised its ugly head among us. It is altogether conceivable that the fundamentalist, anti-evolution mania may in the next ten years achieve a victory in America similar to that which prohibition has achieved during the last ten. The same people are behind both movements, the same religious fanaticism has inspired them both, and there is no assurance at all that we shall not have another amendment to the Constitution forbidding Darwinism.

So, all along the line, we see a slump in liberty and, curiously enough, we see it among professed liberals themselves. This generation sees its liberals more futile

than liberals have been at any time since the Seventeenth Century. They are bewildered. They have no followers. They speak a confusion of tongues. One would think, if one watched the way in which people behave to-day, that the great liberators of human history had never lived. We have forgotten what the lot of the common man was before our Bill of Rights was wrested from the hands of unwilling monarchs. We have forgotten what it means to live in communities where there is no constitutional provision against cruel and unusual punishments. Compare to-day with the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries! Think of the fact that almost uniformly in human history the great benefactors of the human race have had to live in exile because they have given humanity new truths and have challenged its old beliefs. We have forgotten what liberty has cost. We no longer have even a very clear conception of what we mean by liberty.

Men have had at least two things in mind when they have talked of liberty. The first is concerned always with concrete issues and the attainment of concrete rights. For instance, the men of the Renaissance, when they spoke of liberty, meant freedom to study classic literature in opposition to religious obscurantism. To men of the Protestant Reformation, liberty meant the right of private interpretation as opposed to the existing hierarchy. In the English Revolution it meant the immunities of the subject in opposition to the aggrandizement of an over-reaching monarch. In Nineteenth Century England it meant free trade in opposition to government-

avored monopoly. In every instance there was a concrete, definite issue. The trouble with this conception of liberty is that it is always paradoxical. We are conscious of it only when we meet its opposite.

Our modern ideas of liberty are confused by theories derived largely from the teachings of Rousseau. This second philosophy of liberty, as distinguished from the first, which is specific, envisages liberty in general, as a state of human happiness. It is vague, the outcome of philosophical discussion. The first is realistic and is based upon experience; the second is idealistic and is based upon emotion. The first stands for self-discipline, the second for spontaneity. The first holds that liberties are a human achievement; the second that liberty is a natural right, a gift of nature. The first conceives of liberty as an outcome of culture and a means to culture; the second maintains that liberty is an escape from the burdens and artificialities of civilization. The first stands for individual responsibility; the second says, Let the people rule. The first philosophy usually prevails when men live under a government in which they do not participate and from which they must wrest their rights. The second philosophy prevails when men think they own their government. Men who hold the first view demand a guarantee of individual liberty with which to secure their rights. Those who incline to the second base their hope of freedom on the natural good will and increasing power of the masses. When the first philosophy prevails, men are careful and critical of custom and law. They would keep these things in their control in order

CONFUSION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 7

that individuals may be free to vary. The second philosophy enfranchises the mass and makes crowd domination possible.

The history of liberty in our times is the story of the transition of our modern thought from the first philosophy to the second. There are three causes for this transition. The first was economic. It began in the Eighteenth Century and was greatly accelerated in the Nineteenth, when the Industrial Revolution brought opportunity to individuals to exploit their fellowmen. Individualism became the slogan of industrial magnates. They resented and resisted all legal control over their behavior. But industrialism had created great changes in social conditions—overwork, long hours, city slums—abuses which made the workers as a class demand that something be done to bring under the law the men whose economic power was putting them into the position of tyrants above the law. The situation was so bad that it necessitated a program of social legislation.

The second cause for the transition from the old liberalism to the new was religious and had to do with the degradation of three ideas of Protestant Christianity in the United States of America in the Nineteenth Century. The first of these was the idea of salvation, the second the idea of evangelism, and the third the idea of the church militant. When the Puritans came to America they were Calvinists, and the Calvinists were tremendously interested in the salvation of the soul. Salvation was the chief and most important business in life. But the Puritans did not believe that salvation was for every-

body. It was for a small proportion only, for the elect of God. Calvinism was broken up in this country partly by deism, which swept away vast numbers of the educated masses, and partly by Methodism, which, with its promise of free grace for all, won many thousands of converts. As the Calvinistic idea of salvation of the elect in the world-to-come became degraded and popularized, it was transformed into salvation of the citizens of the American Republic in this world. This led to the prophecy frequently expressed by reformers in the Nineteenth Century, that the millennium was at hand and that the Kingdom of God was to be set up in the Republic of the United States. Thus the State, with its program of legislation, was burdened with the task of the perfection of the individual.

The second idea, which suffered degradation, was that of evangelism. When the Puritans established their theocracy in New England, the preaching of their doctrines was kept in the hands of a few relatively well-educated men, but later the situation got out of control. Jonathan Edwards was largely responsible for this. He started a great religious revival in the United States in the Eighteenth Century. He held that when a person is converted he has an intense emotional experience, which transforms him from a state of sin to a state of grace. When men are saved and have a sure sign of grace, they have something to say and they need no theological training in order to say it. Therefore the converted masses gave rise to vast numbers of uneducated and unadjusted preachers. Everybody preached. We became, and have

CONFUSION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 9

remained, a nation of evangelists, each occupied with preaching social salvation to his neighbor. Hence each citizen became the keeper of his neighbor's conscience.

The idea of the church militant was the third to suffer degradation. The church has always been militant, always at war. Christianity is a crusading religion. And so the idea of the church at war with the world came to America, and to the evangelistic reform psychology were added an impulse to crusading and an attitude of intolerance. Liberty cannot prevail against such an attitude, for we get from it a sanction for manipulating and regulating our fellowmen. We Americans, of all nations on earth, are the most obsessed with regulatory ideas.

The degradation of these three ideas—salvation, evangelism, and the church militant—constitutes the second reason for our having changed from the old liberalism to the new, to the idea of the sanctified and glorified liberty not of individuals but of the mass.

The third cause for the change was political. The old struggle for liberty was, as has been pointed out, a struggle of common men against a sovereign. For several hundreds of years that struggle went on. Every clause in our Bill of Rights, every right that we enjoy was wrung from an unwilling sovereign who sought to impose his will upon the people. When the sovereign is no longer a king but the sovereign people itself, the situation is entirely changed. When the mass becomes sovereign it immediately announces: The voice of the people is the voice of God; and, The people can do no

wrong! There is no longer the same reason for protecting the individual against the sovereign when the sovereign happens to be ourselves acting as Mass. The question is, How are we going to protect the personal self of ourselves against the public self of everybody?

There is a myth that the rank and file of humanity, acting as a mass, want liberty. There is a legend that it is they who have achieved what liberties we have, that all that has made for human progress has been won by great, nation-wide, spontaneous uprisings of the people. Is this legend based on fact? Historically, it is not. It is doubtful whether liberty has ever been won permanently by a mass movement. Furthermore, the masses on the whole have persistently been indifferent to their own liberty. Take the American Revolution as an example. It seems to have been a mass movement. Careful analysis by no less an authority than James Truslow Adams results in his saying that more men in America fought on the English side during the Revolution than on the Colonial side. He says that one-third were utterly indifferent to the whole matter, numbers of whom were bullied or forced into service to the Colonies, that one-third of the people were Tories, and that only one-third actually participated.

The psychological fact is that to the mass of men, acting as a whole, liberty is primarily the removal of restraint on crowd behavior, and what crowds call liberty is not liberty for the individual: it is liberty for the crowd to act without considering the results of its behavior on other people.

CONFUSION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 11

There are four or five psychological characteristics of crowd or mass behavior that we need to remember. The crowd or mass tends to act on what we call the "all or none" principle. If a crowd gets angry, it is angry enough to kill. If it is amused it laughs at everything. Every emotion is overdone. All of a sudden, usually over some utterly trivial matter, a crowd goes mad and wrecks everything. A crowd never stops to consider the means, never asks whether the thing it wants done could be done in a better way.

The second characteristic of the crowd is opinionated obstinacy. The less a man knows the more strongly he is convinced that he knows it all. The reason for this is that most of us get our beliefs from the people about us. Nothing so supports us in the delusion of infallibility as the fact that all the people around us believe the same thing, and crowds are essentially obstinate because each member is bolstered up by everybody else about him. In such an atmosphere it is difficult for freedom to survive.

In the third place, crowds think almost entirely in terms of propaganda. Very seldom does truth come to them clean. Popular propaganda supports us in our conceit and in our prejudices and we like it. It frees us from the necessity of thinking for ourselves. But it lays us open to tremendous insincerity. It was once said "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." But the truth that comes to crowds is a tainted thing. If our freedom depends upon truth it is discouraging to look to the mass of mankind for it.

Not only is the crowd opinionated and credulous of

misrepresentations, but it is intensely factious. A faction is a group of people who act without regard for the results of their behavior on others. Factionalism itself means not only intolerance but ruthless indifference to the thoughts and wishes of people outside the faction. The social bond, which is consideration of one for another, is broken. This is a characteristic of mass behavior.

Finally, mass behavior is essentially conservative. It resents variation and nonconformity. There is a tendency on the part of everybody to try to reduce everybody else to an automaton. The crowd governs not by reason but by the force of taboo, which is no more valid to-day than was the ancient tribal taboo. Even the idea of liberty itself has become taboo. There are vast areas where people think there is something queer about you if you tell them that you believe in liberty.

Shall we despair because few men love liberty? It has always been so. Liberty is not a natural gift. The problem of freedom involves the whole problem of civilization. We can no longer fight a king to obtain our liberty; we have to fight for civilization in ourselves and in our communities. No people can remain free now who are not civilized. In the Twentieth Century, every person who achieves self-criticism or discrimination in matters of thought, intellectual honesty, and skepticism of popular slogans, is really a friend of liberty.

CHAPTER II

THE STORY OF LIBERTY IN ANCIENT ATHENS

One reason why people cherish the delusion that they are still free long after they have lost or destroyed the liberties won by their ancestors lies in the boundless vanity of man when acting as mass. The mass in modern times believes it is sovereign. As sovereign it is free. The exercise of the collective will may mean tyranny for every individual, but men will hardly resent it while each man believes that his will is part of the collective will. Men are sensitive about their freedom when the sovereign is another. They are less so when "the people" is sovereign.

Another cause of the delusion of the survival of lost freedom is the modern idea of progress. There is a popular philosophy of history which holds that all creation is working steadily and inevitably toward the ultimate perfection and happiness of man. The masses are being progressively emancipated. Each succeeding generation sees the human race throw off some ancient bondage. The complete triumph of liberty is the fixed goal of history and men are uniformly, progressively, advancing toward that goal. I do not find any such universal trend in history. There is nothing fixed or

determined about the achievement of freedom. There has indeed been little general agreement as to what it is. Liberty has meant different things at various periods, always disputed, often whimsical and elusive, depending on accident, on economic conditions, on conflicting psychological factors and cultural ideals. In any case liberty must be achieved, struggled for and jealously guarded even in the house of its friends. The history of liberty is not the story of the progressive emancipation of mankind; it is the revelation of the fact—almost the monotonous repetition of it—that every kind of freedom is achieved with great struggle, and may be lost so easily that men often do not miss it when it is gone.

In general it may be said that men have pursued freedom on at least four divergent paths. Sometimes, as at present, the paths seem to cross and there is confusion. We may think first of liberty as a cultural achievement. According to this new view liberty is not a gift of God or of nature. There is no liberty in general; there are rather a number of concrete rights, immunities, abilities, guarantees of the individual. These liberties are possible only in a civilization of a certain type; they cannot exist apart from law, reason and self-discipline. In this sense liberty may be said to be a "function" of the virtues, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. It proceeds from certain behavior patterns of civilized people and becomes an accepted set of social adjustments. People learn to exercise a measure of restraint over their own predatory tendencies, to respect one another's independence, grant one

another opportunity for self-development and personal responsibility. In other words, people have liberty when on the whole they are intelligent enough to create a social order in which both the individual citizen and the government mind their own business and refrain from meddling with others in matters which concern only themselves. Mankind in general has never possessed the intelligence and virtue requisite for such freedom, but there have from time to time been attempts to achieve it, especially on those rare historic occasions when a liberally educated minority found itself temporarily in a position of leadership. Perhaps the first to hold this philosophy in the Western World were the Ancient Athenians. Some of our modern ideas of liberty have thus been derived from the ancient Greek thinkers, through the Renaissance and the classically educated liberals of the Eighteenth Century.

Secondly, we may think of freedom as a return to nature. Since human behavior must, unless it is to end in chaos and destruction, conform to the laws of nature, why not recognize nature as the criterion of the right? Let human law be the expression of natural law. To understand and obey the laws of nature is the highest wisdom. It is also the only way to be free. To live in conformity with nature is to obey the laws of one's own being. Nature imposes no other bond. All bonds are imposed on man by man in the course of civilization. The more complex civilization becomes the greater the burdens, the more numerous the rules, the more galling the restrictions. Our artificial way of life is the mess of pot-

age for which man has sold his birthright. It is moreover vanity; its joys are illusory when they are not, as they usually are, vices. The true happiness of man is to be found in the simple joys of nature. Civilization corrupts and weakens man as it enslaves him, in fact it is hardly anything more than a foolish system of mutual exploitation all for the sake of empty appearances and for possessions which are really unnecessary and worthless. Man in the state of nature was free because he had not yet imposed upon himself the burdens of civilization. When man obeyed only nature he was not only free but healthy and good. He would be all this now but for the evil influence of our corrupt civilization. To be free, be yourself, be natural. Do not try to crush out your instincts and emotions as civilization demands. You have a natural right to live your own life. Your instincts will guide you to the good life once they are no longer corrupted by the vices of civilization. Unfortunately the vices and slaveries of civilization have become the vested interest of the master classes. Liberty therefore means the emancipation of the masses, the overthrow of the rulers, the reassertion of the natural rights of man. The great apostle in the modern times of this philosophy of freedom was Rousseau.

A third view of the pursuit of freedom appears to many moderns to be no philosophy of liberty at all. Nietzsche in fact always spoke of it as "slave moral." Psychologists would call it an "escape mechanism." But many good and wise men in the past, in many parts of the world, have sought freedom by this third method,

and various elements of their teaching survive, at least as professions, in America. This is the method of self-sacrifice, of denial of the enthrallments of nature and the world, of mastery over desire. Surely I am free when I do and have what I want, and if I have overcome the desires of the flesh and worldly ambition, my wants may become so transformed that I shall be in possession of all I desire. Certainly our desires and their objects are in such conflict that in a sense no one can ever be really free in this world. Hence there are those who say the way to be free in the world is to be free from it. Cease to desire things and they have no longer any claim on you. This view has always prevailed among those who believe that man is a spirit temporarily enchained in the flesh. The flesh itself is bondage. It hampers our every effort to rise to our true estate, or, as Plato said, to attain true knowledge. It causes us to perform acts we condemn, impelling us to ways of madness and destruction in the deluded hope of gaining an impossible lasting happiness in a world of matter, change and death. Thus the term freedom implies an essential negation. I am free when I am *out*, when my work is done, I am free of a burden when I am rid of it, of a disease when I am over it, of the servitude of the world when I no longer live unto this world. As we shall see later the Christian idea of liberty has a large element of this teaching, but such a philosophy of freedom is by no means confined to that religion, nor do all professed Christians seek freedom in this way.

Finally there is the idea of liberty as a "new start." This is the hope of liberation by means of a sudden social

or cosmic transformation. Emphasis is placed on the relation of the problem of freedom to the existing social system. Society is so organized that liberty for all but the ruling minority is impossible. Partial reforms are of no avail. There must be a wholly new beginning, a new social compact based on radically different principles of human association. This is the view of most revolutionists, but in essentials the doctrine is as old as the Christian hope of the millennium of the Ancient Hebrew prophecy of the Day of the Lord. Why talk about freedom when the many must be the servants, the wage-slaves of the few? Freedom without economic and social justice is freedom chiefly to exploit. Hence it is said that Nineteenth Century liberalism was merely the special pleading of predatory industrialists who demanded the right to prey upon labor and the consuming public unhampered by governmental regulation. For the toiling masses there must be a different kind of freedom—freedom from precisely the system of liberties and economic opportunities of the privileged classes. Those who hold this view ground their faith in the future. In modern times this faith is expressed in terms of scientific economics. In earlier ages it was expressed in religious terms. From the standpoint of psychology this hope of the imminent destruction of an unsatisfactory environment and the re-creation of the world as one of universal happiness is related to the ideas of death and rebirth which play an important rôle in the religious dramatization of life. It is essentially belief in the miracle of redemption or renewal of life. This was one way in which the ancients expressed their hope of sal-

vation. There must be a day when the mighty and the wicked shall be put down and the patient, the long-suffering and the lowly vindicated, and those who have been in bondage set free. God will yet establish his Kingdom and there shall be no ruler but God. Freedom must wait for the Day of the Lord. Now, for the Day of the Lord, say the Revolution; call the long-suffering saints the Proletariat, and The Kingdom of God the Coöperative Commonwealth, and you see this faith in its modern form. The fact that this faith can so adapt its expressions to a changed and more scientific view of the world, and that it persists in spite of hope long deferred, should encourage the liberal in these days when the masses seem to be so indifferent to their liberties. Perhaps the desire for freedom is more deeply rooted in human nature than most people themselves consciously realize.

It will be seen that each of these four views of liberty is part of and presupposes a certain philosophy of life. The various principles presupposed are in logical conflict, and it is inconceivable that anybody except a modern liberal should try to believe them all at once. Moreover from any point of view the idea of full and complete liberty is more or less illusory, a wish fancy, rather than a program of action or an end actually achieved in history. It is for this reason that definitions of liberty are all unsatisfactory and most discussions of the subject are at bottom mere rationalizations belonging to the world of abstractions and a priori concepts.

Of all these views of liberty that which had its origin among the ancient Greeks appears to me the most ra-

tional. In fact it is the only one in which freedom and reasonableness are necessarily related. In making freedom depend on the exercise of intelligence it demands too much for us ever to hope for a free human race. We can, however, hope that men may have freedom in varying amounts and that all reasonable men may enjoy some measure of it. The other three views all proceed on the "all or none" principle. Freedom is something complete, universal, unmixed, wholly in contrast with the present condition, and one may have it altogether or not at all. The Greek idea is both modest and practicable. Liberties exist in the concrete. They are the specific rights of mature persons with independent and responsible intelligence, rights justified by experience and the logic of the situation, which the sovereign power has been forced to recognize and guarantee for the future by constitutional authority. Thus liberty means definitely limiting the power of the sovereign, whether that sovereign be a king or a majority, and leaving to the intelligence of the individual the control of such behavior as concerns primarily himself.

Many American principles of liberty are of this type—or were before our guarantees of freedom were whittled away. The Eighteenth Century English view of liberty was the same. Since many American principles of liberty were of this Eighteenth Century origin, it may seem fanciful for me to attribute such ideas to the ancient Greeks. I do not mean that every English and American liberty can be traced back historically to the Athens of Pericles. I mean that the general understanding as to what

is, is essentially the same. It is true that the *Magna Carta* dates from the Thirteenth Century, but it would be difficult to overestimate the liberalizing influence of the Greek classics on the British thinkers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. If the Renaissance was primarily an artistic movement in Italy, it resulted in a movement for civil and political liberty in England. Even the Reformation in England was subordinated to the Revolution. The influence of Aristotle was especially strong. More, Hobbes, Bacon, all wrestle with questions first raised by the Athenians. Milton in the *Areopagitica* cites the example of the Ancients as an argument for intellectual liberty. As late as the middle of the Nineteenth Century, Americans at Charleston, South Carolina, could persuade themselves that their state was another "Athenian Democracy."

In many ways the Athenians of the Fifth Century were different from other peoples of antiquity. So far as we know they were the first people to live under a constitution which specified and limited the powers of rulers. They were the first to attain the status of citizenship for any considerable number of people or to give all freemen a voice in determining general policies; the first to see the relation of liberty to law, general culture, and education. It is no accident that Aristotle's *Politics* contains a discussion of this last. They were the first to turn to natural science in explanation of the phenomena of nature, the first to declare that human intelligence is man's best guide to right living. They were the only people of antiquity, so far as I can learn—perhaps the only people in

history—who attained so large a measure of intellectual independence of any priestly class or book of divine revelation. Greek literature is secular. Greek thought is amazingly free of theological bias or dogmatism. The average Greek was undoubtedly as superstitious as his barbarian neighbors; his life was surrounded by myth, mystery, oracles, public sacrifices, temples. But he kept his religion in its proper place. He was not intemperate about it. On occasion he enjoyed his religion, and permitted his neighbors a like enjoyment, each in his own way. It seems not to have occurred to him to require uniformity of belief or practice, or to use religion as a weapon of the lower middle classes in their resistance to culture or to enhance their will to power. So far as I can learn, the legislative assemblies of Athens were not molested by professional religious lobbyists, self-appointed censors, or sectarian boards of prohibition and public morals. As religion was but one among many interests there seems to have been no danger that the church would destroy the liberties of the state. Aristotle's treatment of government is wholly sectarian and humanistic. The state exists not as a divine institution, for the glory of the gods, but for the welfare and happiness of its citizens. He is concerned about ethics, but his morality is not a matter of keeping the Commandments. It is the temperate and rational pursuit of the good life. Plato, with all his religion, does not dedicate his ideal republic to God, but to Justice; his rulers are not to be priests, but philosophers.

In Aristotle's account of the Athenian constitution we have interesting evidence of the position institutional re-

ligion held in the life of these people. "The franchise is open to all who are of citizen birth by both parents." He then proceeds to describe the various officers of state and tell how they are elected and what their duties are. The magistrates are chosen by lot. There is a Council of five hundred elected representatives which meets daily and, among other duties, arranges the program for the meetings of the Sovereign Assembly of the people. At certain meetings of the Assembly "anyone is free on depositing the suppliant's olive branch to speak to the people concerning any matter, public or private." Thus free speech was guaranteed. Certain meetings of the assembly are by law required to discuss "three questions connected with religion, three connected with heralds and embassies, and three on secular subjects." After mentioning the courts and their procedure, he gives a list of public commissions which are appointed by the Assembly, a commission on ship building, a commission on Public Contracts, a commission of Receivers General of Taxes, a commission of Auditors of public accounts, a commission on the horses belonging to the state, a commission on public buildings, and one whose duty it is to keep the temples in repair, a commission on wages paid to female flute, harp, and lute players. This commission also acts as a Sanitary Commission and provides "that no collector of sewage shall shoot any of his sewage within ten stadia of the walls; they prevent people from blocking up the streets by building or stretching barriers across them or making drain pipes in mid-air so as to pour their contents into the street, or having doors that open outwards; and they re-

move the corpses of those who die in the streets. . . .” Then there is a commission on markets, one on Weights and Measures, one on Arbitration, and finally,—“the Assembly also elects by lot ten Commissioners of Religion, who offer the sacrifices appointed by oracle and in conjunction with the seers take auspices whenever there is occasion.”

I have not tried to give here a detailed account of this amazing constitution. But this will show the official status of religion in Athens. It could scarcely overshadow the other interests of life when it was officially placed in the same status as sanitation, weights and measures, ships, and horses. In Thucydides' report of Pericles' great *Funeral Oration* we have a clear indication of the place religion held in the thoughts of the people. This address was made in the year 431 B. C. at the close of the first year of the Peloponnesian War. The occasion was the public burial of those who had perished in battle. Athens was in a most critical situation, comparable in many ways to the darkest days of the Confederacy in our own Civil War. The plains of Attica had been invaded by a Spartan army. The city was crowded with refugees. From its walls people could watch the burning of their homes, the destruction of their crops, and in the long winter of conflict many Athenians had been slain. It is in such hours of crisis and emotional strain that people turn to the consolations of religion. Surely Pericles would have made much of these consolations had religious faith been supreme in the thoughts of his people. But the consolation he gives them is the fact that they in Athens have

more liberty than have others. His only mention of religion is in the passage where he points out the advantages and joys of life in free Athens, "While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts. . . . And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year, at home the style of our life is refined; and the delight we feel daily in all these things helps to banish melancholy."

Of the dead he says, "Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a man's worth. . . . Even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valor with which they have fought for their country. . . . Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness do not weigh too nicely the perils of war. . . . Wherefore I do not commiserate the parents of the dead who stand here; I would rather comfort them. . . . Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have more children; and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. . . . To those of you who have passed your prime, I say congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honor alone is ever young, and not riches, as

some say, but honor is the delight of men when they are old and useless."

To moderns this speech seems heartless; there is no evidence that it seemed so to the Athenians. My point is that it practically ignores the consolations of religion at a time when one would expect just the opposite. Now people who take their religion rather light-heartedly and keep it as one of many wholesome human interests, are likely to retain a certain mental equilibrium and sense of proportion. They will be liberal in matters of belief, and hence tolerant with respect to many other matters. I am convinced that the Athenians' religious liberalism had much to do with making possible their many other liberties. Had they been a nation of evangelists or crusaders they doubtless never could have developed nor have long retained their free institutions. A people eaten up with religious zeal easily pass from spiritual ecstasy to a dead orthodoxy, and from meekness to the practice of coercion. They may attain an inwardness of life which the Greeks did not have, but the outward expression of their life will be less beautiful and free. There must be religious liberty if there is to be freedom for thought, and there must be intellectual freedom if there is to be any liberty at all.

The Athenians enjoyed a measure of intellectual liberty unique not only in antiquity but in all history. It is true that they condemned Socrates for corrupting the youth and introducing strange gods. Protagoras' skeptical book was burned and even Aristotle was accused of atheism. But such persecution was infrequent if com-

pared with that of subsequent Christian ages. The mob-mind once aroused is always actually or potentially homicidal and is destructive of liberty. Even the Athenians could easily be turned from civilized beings into turbulent mobs, and in the end it was the behavior of the crowd which brought about the loss of Athenian liberty. But the ordered life of Athens was civilized. As Milton showed, there was no established censorship, or Index, such as exist to-day in Rome, Boston and Washington. In the Assembly speech seems to have been absolutely free, although if I remember rightly there was a law that anyone who proposed certain kinds of restrictive legislation should be ostracized—a wise law for any democracy—and one which our fathers unfortunately forgot to incorporate in the American Constitution.

Greek philosophers were on the whole untroubled with the necessity of intellectual conformity, and often freely questioned everything, even the most sacred beliefs. Plato, in some ways the least liberal of the great Greek thinkers, shows undisguised contempt for the whole system of popular beliefs and ideas. The masses do not possess knowledge but only "opinion." Furthermore he does not hesitate to criticize severely the traditional legends about the gods and to express views about marriage which might easily get him into trouble if he were alive now and teaching philosophy in an American college. R. W. Livingstone, in his book *The Greek Genius and Its Meaning to Us*, shows what tolerance and freedom of speech could exist in Athens when during the Peloponnesian War the playwright Aristophanes could on the

Athenian stage condemn the war, advocate peace, and characterize the Athenian public and its statesmen and military leaders in terms of abusive ridicule.

But the Athenian loved his freedom; it was one of the chief sources of his pride in his city. Let me again quote a few sentences from Pericles' *Oration*. "We have received from them [our ancestors] a free state. . . . We do not copy our neighbors but are an example to them. . . . It is true that we are called a democracy. . . . But . . . the claim of excellence is also recognized. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him. . . . Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. . . . We are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse. . . . And in the matter of education whereas they [the Spartans] from early youth are always under laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease and yet are equally ready to face the perils which they face. . . . If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers? . . . The great impediment to action is in our opinion not discussion but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too,

whereas other men are courageous from ignorance, but hesitate upon reflection . . . I say that Athens is the school of Hellas."

Pericles, unlike all Puritans, is not afraid that amusements will undermine the moral strength of the individual and the state. He glories in the tolerance which exists in Athens. He is opposed to the notion that men may be made virtuous by law. He sees that the very security of the state lies in the freedom and happiness and good taste of its citizens, and in their intelligence and education. And notice the liberalism of his theory of education: it is not routine drill, the aim of which is conformity, but discussion and the pursuit of knowledge, the aim of which is to develop ability to think before acting. Pericles is simply telling his fellow citizens what it is to be civilized. Here is no suggestion of the delusion which has long persisted in American democracy that people may enjoy the liberties of the civilized man without having first attained the civilized man's attitude toward life.

It will be said that all this freedom and culture existed along with slavery, that after all liberty in Greece was for the few. That is true. Even Aristotle accepts slavery as natural and inevitable. Liberty in Athens was not for all men; it was nowhere so in the ancient world. Nor for that matter did Christianity abolish slavery—notwithstanding the fact that that religion seems to have had its origin among the ancient lowly. But I am not at present discussing the *extension* of liberty to all, but the Greek idea of *what liberty is*. My point is that there were men in Athens who understood the essential relation between

liberty, no matter who or how many have it, and reason and culture.

We may wonder just what traits or qualities in the nature of the Athenians enabled them for a brief moment to become perhaps the most civilized and free people in history. They were in no sense a race of supermen, although they were exceptional in that during the Fifth Century B. C. there lived in Athens an extraordinary number of individuals who possessed in the highest degree the qualities we call original genius. The history of Athens is really the story of the achievement of these men. The Greek genius was not a recluse, like many of the holy men of Asia and the Middle Ages. He was tremendously interested in public affairs. And for a time he not only had an audience, but until after the franchise was extended to all free men and the popular assembly was supreme, his leadership was welcomed and followed. I believe this fact of intelligent and gifted leadership is the great secret both of the excellence of Athenian civilization and of the unique freedom enjoyed by that people. Such leadership popularly accepted is unique in human history, and even in Athens it did not long continue. But how did this accident of history happen? The Greek drama was staged before the whole public and the prize for the best was awarded by vote of the audience. How was it the average Greek preferred Sophocles and Euripides, whereas similar elements in the American population prefer the kind of thing they see in the movies? I doubt if we can answer this question. Perhaps the desperate crisis through which Athens passed at the time of the

Persian War frightened the public into recognizing for a time the fact that intelligent leadership was not a mere cultural luxury but a matter of life and death. Moreover the Athenians seem to have had very little tribal government, hence custom and tradition had a less strong hold on their minds.

The Athenians appear to have had a kind of intellectual curiosity somewhat like that characteristic of the east side of New York. They were disputatious, given to argument rather than to preaching. They were adventurous, very active, imaginative, yet realistic and free from sentimentality. They had a sense of humor, which gave them immunity to the Bryans, Anthony Comstocks and Wayne B. Wheelers of those days, and doubtless was of no little aid in the cause of liberty. It is no accident that great liberals like Erasmus, Montaigne and Voltaire shared this trait with the Athenians of the days of Aristophanes. Humorless people naturally tend to bigotry, to participate in moral crusades and legislate liberty out of existence. A like end awaits a people who lack the Greek sense of good taste; their liberty becomes mere vulgarity, from the exhibition of which they seek to protect themselves by law. The Greek was governed by a sense of proportion—nothing in excess—and it is possible that his good sense in this respect made certain legislation unnecessary.

But the Athenians also had certain characteristics disadvantageous to a people striving to be free. They were quarrelsome and ambitious and it can hardly be said that they excelled in honesty. The courage and resourceful-

ness displayed at Thermopylæ and Salamis were on more than one occasion rendered futile by treachery. Alcibiades was not the only disgruntled politician or military leader to plot with the enemy against his own city. There was corruption then as now in the state, the taint sometimes reaching men of the highest standing. It was said that many friends of Solon borrowed large sums of money when they received secret information that all outstanding debts would be cancelled by the new government. Miltiades, hero of Marathon, died in disgrace, having used to avenge a private grudge a fleet put in his command ostensibly to fight the Persian King. Pisistratus made himself tyrant over the city by resorting to the most obvious and shameless deception of his fellow citizens. Cleon and even Pericles could on occasion play the demagogue. Themistocles enticed Xerxes into giving battle at Salamis with lies which, for ingenuity, should rank him among the leading propagandists of all time. It is not difficult for us to understand the old saying "Beware the Greeks bringing gifts." So they had always to beware of one another. People who cannot be trusted make poor guardians of liberty. It was this unfortunate trait in the Greek character as much as anything else, which in the end led to the failure of the Athenian democracy and enabled Philip to gain mastery over the country.

By whatever means liberty may be won, it can be preserved only in a state which is deliberately organized to that end. Even then its existence, as our own experience shows, is precarious in the hands of the inferior men who inevitably rise to power in a democracy. The state in

Athens lacked stability and permanence. The Athenians were a turbulent populace. It was both an advantage and a disadvantage to them that they lacked the Roman genius for large organization: an advantage because it kept the state relatively weak and hence unable to crush the individual: a disadvantage because the general lack of coöperation of the citizens kept the state too weak to protect their liberties. Partisan groups with ambitious leaders ever threatened to abolish the constitution and establish a dictatorship over the Republic. As a matter of fact Athens always oscillated between mob rule and tyranny. And although tyrannicide was held to be a virtue, the Athenians lived for a great part of the glorious Fifth Century under the rule of tyrants. Any revolution is likely to end in a dictatorship. Aristotle says that in one hundred and fifty years there were eleven revolutions, each resulting in drastic changes in the constitution. A study of these changes in sequence shows that what was happening was a gradual transfer to power from the aristocratic class to the whole mass of free citizens. Shortly after this process was complete, Athens began to suffer reverses, the crowd exercised its will unrestrained and with little consideration of results. The unscrupulous and incompetent, the type democracies seem always to prefer, became leaders of the state. Then the Greeks gave away their independence and with it their liberty.

The Fifth Century began in a struggle of the people against an aristocracy, a struggle for liberty led by the great Solon. It reached its climax about 460 B. C. in the generation of the contemporaries of Pericles, with a

leadership in the arts, in literature, in education and philosophy and in affairs of state, of men of the highest type. As the century drew to a close such men became less popular, their places were taken by men more typical of the masses, educators and philosophers coming more and more into conflict with the populace. The condemnation and death of Socrates in 399 B. C. marks the repudiation of the leadership that had made Athens free.

In the condemnation of Socrates the Athenian democracy condemned itself for all time. In rejecting knowledge it sealed its own fate. Certainly no society is free in which a man like Socrates cannot be at home. There is a popular fiction that all that is necessary for liberty is to let the people rule. This is nothing but the self-flattery of the crowd. As many despotisms have been established by the common people as by the privileged class. There is no form of tyranny more intolerable than that of the mob. The only thing to be said for it is that it never lasts long. It usually spends itself in an orgy of suspicion and homicide. It has no permanence because the free people lack the requisite foresight and continuity of purpose.

We condemn the Athenians for the death of Socrates, yet I doubt if any democracy in history would have tolerated him. But, it will be said, why single out democracy with this charge? Would any other type of society have tolerated Socrates? Perhaps not, but I happen at present to be discussing the question whether democracy means liberty. The fate of Socrates is a case in point. He was a "free thinker" if ever there was one. He set people questioning when what they wanted was to be told what to

believe. The things he said about the popular gods offended and hurt people. Of course they believed in free speech; there was no quarrel between religion and science, properly understood, but this man was no fit influence for persons of tender years. Moreover Socrates did an unforgivable thing: by his embarrassing questions he had often exposed the ignorance of his neighbors. Now there is nothing about which ignorant men are more sensitive than the exposure of their ignorance. The Athenians were particularly sensitive to criticism after their humiliating defeat in the year 404 B. C. It did not add to their good will to remind them that the disaster was the result of their own folly. And Socrates had long opposed the Athenian democracy. He plainly told its free-born citizens that they were unfit for the exercise of the franchise and ought not be allowed to vote. Socrates had lived too long. Already the philosophers had lost their influence in a democracy bent on destroying itself. This was a different Athens from that which had defeated Persia a half century before. After that amazing victory there was public confidence. The Greeks suddenly found themselves in the position of world leadership. They wanted education, were eager for guidance, and welcomed the leadership of the wisest.

The decline of Athenian democracy was rapid after the popular Assembly gained supreme power. First, in an outburst of patriotic "one-hundred-percent" Athenianism the franchise was denied to all aliens and their descendants, and limited to full-blooded Athenians of free native parentage. Then from fighting on the defensive, Athens

took the offensive and began to dominate and exploit her neighbors. The state became imperialistic. Through her leadership in the Delian League, Athens transformed this Confederation of Greek communities into an empire, appropriated the funds it held in trust for the members of the League, and used these funds to strengthen, beautify and enrich the city. The Athenians then denied freedom and citizenship to all other Greeks, sent armies and navies to other cities and reduced them to subjection, and even presumed to bring those accused of resisting such domination to Athens for trial before a jury consisting of the members of the popular Assembly. By such practices the Athenians brought upon themselves the hatred and opposition of other Greek city-states, who naturally seized the first opportunity to combine and attack Athens. The result was the fatal Peloponnesian War.

It was the over-reaching folly of the Athenian populace which invited this attack. In their mad desire for empire they equipped a great expedition, placed it under the command of Alcibiades, and with much rejoicing sent it across the Adriatic to conquer Sicily. The venture was a disastrous failure from which Athens never really recovered. The Spartans and their allies at once took advantage of her weakened condition to invade the plains of Attica. Meanwhile Athenian democracy pursued a course which democratic communities have often pursued. It became involved in relentless partisan conflict. After the overthrow of the tyranny of Pisistratus and his family the popular party adopted the policy of ostracism, or

banishment from the Republic, of those who sympathized with the opposition. This custom, which had been used by the popular leader Clisthenes after the revolution of 508 B. C., now became a regular practice. Thousands of people were thus exiled without trial. All that was necessary to expel anyone was that six thousand votes be cast against him at a meeting of the Assembly. Ostracism was the expected fate of the defeated candidate for popular favor. It was the possible fate of anyone whose eminence aroused popular suspicion, or the envy and cupidity of the demagogue and sycophant. It is said that the practice was discontinued after 418 B. C. when the people strangely enough ostracized a really worthless person named Hyperbolus. This was regarded as a degradation of the institution. The list of the ostracized could no longer be seriously regarded as the social register.

Another practice common to democracies was the growing tendency of the free citizens to live on the public treasury. The people, once they have a voice, demand bread and circuses, and popular governments, politicians especially, tend to respect this demand when made by powerful minorities. Hence the remarkable generosity of popular governments in the matter of bounties, bonuses, doles, protective tariffs and pensions which are the democratic substitutes for the privileges, monopolies and other grants given royal favorites by absolute monarchs. Athens was no exception. It is said that at one time there were twenty-five thousand citizens in the pay of the government. At the beginning attendance at the Assembly was the privilege of the best citizens. At the end the other-

wise unemployed could always draw a day's wages for performing this or a similar service to the Republic. All this must have had an effect on the quality of attendance at the town meetings, and may account in part for the ease with which Philip of Macedon overcame the obstacles to the surrender of political independence. In another generation the sons of these Athenian aldermen were following Alexander to Asia in the somewhat illiberal enterprise of trying to conquer the world.

The Greek idea of liberty survived in the teaching of the philosophers. They continued to be deeply interested in law and government and in the pursuit of liberty. Both Plato and Aristotle wrote much on these subjects. But Plato's essay in the *Theatetus*, on the Philosopher as contrasted with the Lawyer, shows how remote the philosopher had become from any possible career of public influence. In contrast with the distasteful spectacle of the existing state, Plato constructed an ideal republic in which philosophers are kings and kings philosophers. In the Parable of the Cave, in the *Republic*, he shows how completely the populace is self-deceived by a world of empty appearances. All its beliefs and ideas are mere opinion, not knowledge, and it even decrees that no one shall ever again turn away from its world of shadows and face the light. Plato's continuance of the Socratic tradition was itself an evidence of the conflict of the educated with a democracy which had repudiated the leadership of intelligence.

Aristotle is not content, like Plato, to meditate on the perfect imaginary republic. In the *Politics* he makes a

study of many existing constitutions to learn how the state can most practically be organized for the ends of freedom and happiness. In the *Ethics*, he shows that the good man, the educated man and the free man are one and the same. The aim of education is the training of the free man. The "good life" of this man is possible only with the exercise of "right reason." That is, virtue itself is just intelligent behavior; and there can be no liberty without virtue. Men are of two kinds, he says: first, those who govern themselves by reasoned virtue; these are the free; and second, those vast numbers who are moved by mere desire, by prejudice or unreasoned belief; such men must always be restrained by force, they can never be free. And I might add that they cannot be free even when they rule the state, for they forthwith destroy all constitutional guarantees of liberty both for themselves and for everyone else. If men are to be free they must be reasonable. There must be independence of judgment and judgment cannot long remain independent unless it is good judgment. The Greek philosophers understood the difference between thinking and herd opinion and on this distinction they based the hope of freedom. Would you be free? Then first become civilized. To understand this bit of ancient wisdom is to distinguish the true liberal from his vociferous imitator.

CHAPTER III

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

Concerning everything about Christianity, opinions differ so violently, so uncharitably, that it is difficult, even hazardous, to write anything about it. Whatever statement one may venture someone is almost sure to deny, proving conclusively that the very opposite is the Law and the Gospel and the teaching of the Fathers. One might conclude that Christianity offers a synthesis of utterly incompatible ideas and irreconcilable principles: love and hate, pacificism and militarism, voluntary poverty and property as reward for well-doing, optimism and pessimism, individualism and self-denial, institutionalism and nihilism, childlike faith and pursuit of truth, the strength and weakness of human nature intertwined with the idea of the Eternal. But such a statement would in itself be an attempt to answer the question, What is Christianity? which probably would please nobody.

I shall make no such rash attempt. But I would point out that this *double meaning* of everything Christian pertains also to its teaching about liberty. Christianity is freedom, and it is submission to authority. It would render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's. But just what properly belongs to Caesar and what to God? On this important

matter there is little agreement. The apparent conflict of loyalties has been resolved with various compromises, Christianity has inspired men to defy the princes of this world; it has also put crowns on their heads and commanded obedience to them. It has made the individual conscious of himself as an immortal soul, and has persecuted him when he has asserted that self-consciousness as individual independence and responsibility. No doubt all this can be logically reconciled by theologians, but the historical facts are interesting phenomena to the social psychologist. In spite of these contradictions in Christianity, I believe it has contributed something to the modern man's idea of liberty. It would be strange indeed if this were not so, after all the centuries of influence of organized Christianity.

But, it will be said, any such contribution has been purely negative. Christian liberty is a contradiction in terms. It means nothing more than the liberty to be a Christian, and a conventional rather than a genuine one at that. And even this could scarcely be called liberty, for it has never been left to choice when the church has had power enough to coerce men into conformity. Look at the history of the Christian centuries; compare the condition of man when the church was supreme with the liberties enjoyed by the ancients—intellectual, civil, personal liberty. Has not official Christianity been almost uniformly on the reactionary side in the struggle for freedom and progress? Has it not time and again instigated bloodshed and persecution? Has it not sought to give the authority of God to precisely the most op-

pressive governments in Europe, and divine blessing to armies marching out to kill and oppress? Why, there is not a single freedom modern man enjoys that he has not won in defiance of the churches! Consider the history of the freedom of science, for instance. In the matter of intellectual freedom in the pursuit of truth, organized Christianity has been, as in other matters, the great obstacle to progress. It has brought about stagnation wherever it has been supreme. The type of mind which its educational institutions, both Catholic and Protestant, produce is dogmatic rather than liberal, obedient to authority rather than adventurous or self-assertive, liable to delusions of infallibility, and not infrequently inclined to resort to intimidation. Look at America to-day: What are the most active, best organized, most persistent forces in the country working day and night for illiberal ends? Who are they who instigate laws against the teaching of evolutionary biology, and support the Comstock laws, censorship, prohibition? Who are they who most commonly lend aid to insolent professional propagandists secretly and openly urging on the officers of government, national and local, to resort to extreme measures, even to homicide, in the desperate attempt to force upon the entire population their sectarian ecclesiastical discipline, in other words their religious taboo?

On the other hand, have not the outstanding champions of freedom in the modern world been predominantly men who got their inspiration outside Christianity—for instance Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, Gibbon, Paine, Ingersoll, Jefferson, Spencer, Mill? Moreover, there

is astonishing agreement among such men as to what institution should be ranked among the chief enemies of liberty.

This argument is doubtless something of an exaggeration. It is an oversimplification to see nothing but evil in organized Christianity. This is the view of those who hold that religion is a hoax imposed upon an otherwise rational humanity by clever ecclesiastics. I think such a view unpsychological. Many of the beliefs and practices which are offensive to the non-believer have survived because they meet real human needs, and I think that even the illiberal tendencies in Christianity have their source in the rank and file rather than in any will to rule imposed from above. Although the historical facts mentioned above speak for themselves, so far as they are established—and unfortunately many of them seem to be—nevertheless I maintain that Christianity has made a positive contribution to the history of liberty.

In the preceding chapter I said that men had sought liberty along four paths. For the sake of brevity I will call these, although the terms do not exactly apply, the Humanist way, the Naturalist way, the Christian way, and the Hebraic way. The Christian way has something in common with each of the others. With Humanism it maintains that no one may be made free by purely external forces. The mind and heart of the individual must first be free of the appetites and prejudices of the natural man. Beyond this point the two differ. Humanism would accomplish this end by developing the powers of intelligence until true insight and

self-mastery are attained. Christianity by miracle of regeneration through the Grace of God. Again it has this in common with Rousseauist Naturalism: both are unworldly in the sense that they renounce the pomp and power of the world and assert the vanity of man's civilization. But Rousseau turns to nature and Christianity to the Spirit. And again with the Hebrew it despairs of human effort alone to attain perfection and looks to divine intervention in the course of events. To the Hebrew Prophet the Day of the Lord is a miraculous social change, with the reestablishment of the Kingdom in justice and peace; the Christian, while he may retain something of this Messianic hope, lays emphasis on personal experience of redemption from sin through fellowship in Christ.

There are professing Christians who will dispute every point I have been making. They will say that, far from renouncing civilization—of course I have been using the term in the sense in which the Greeks used it—Christianity has given us our civilization. Yet if you suggest that it is responsible for certain evil practices of contemporary civilization they are likely to answer either that true Christianity would remedy these but it has never been tried, or that Christ has not yet conquered the world, but will in the fulness of time. Many Protestants especially will deny that Christianity teaches renunciation of the world. But we should remember that Protestantism is the conventional faith of vast numbers of people who possess, or aspire to, industrial leadership in an age of unprecedented prosper-

ity, development of natural resources, and commercial enterprise. It is natural that men should see in their religion the ground of those practical virtues which make for success and responsibility, and it is not surprising that they should be unaware of certain tremendous differences in perspective between historical Christianity and that which they profess to-day. I will deal further with this doctrine of renunciation later when I consider the psychology of the Christian idea of liberty.

The contribution which it seems to me Christianity has made to liberty is a certain *inwardness* or subjectivity of the sanctions of behavior. The Greek also said that freedom must proceed from within outward, but by "right reason" he meant insight into situations, intelligent solution of problems, moderation of judgment, self-mastery. Man is a free agent if he can use his own reason to see what are the implications and necessities of the situation in which he must do something and can then act accordingly. But the Christian has something else. He has an inner *criterion*. Being reconciled with God, he has made the will and purpose of God his own, and in certain situations he must obey God rather than men. Think what that means for the individual, what in fact it has at times meant in Christian history! It has meant that the Christian has felt himself perfectly justified in disobedience of law and authority when such have been in conflict with the Christian conscience. This is what I mean by the contribution of this religion to liberty; it is the setting of conscience above human law. Conscience is not to be judged by the law;

it judges the law. With the Greek philosopher, reason also passed judgment on the law; and both Socrates and Aristotle condemned certain laws of their time as foolish. But Christianity goes further: it makes *disobedience* of the law under certain circumstances a *moral duty*. Nothing could be more ironically unchristian than the statement of certain prohibitionists and churchmen that law as such is sacred and must be obeyed simply because it is the law. This may be a good legal argument, for from the legal standpoint the enacting of a custom, let us say, into a law means that behavior in this respect is no longer voluntary; the individual must do the thing required or meet the sheriff. But this is not to say that the law as law is sacred in the sense that Christians mean the term sacred. It is no argument to a Christian to tell him that he has a moral obligation to obey law simply because it is law. To him there is always *something above the law*. To him all laws are not equally binding morally. He is under the spiritual necessity of discriminating among laws and this necessity is a primary moral obligation upon even the humblest child of God.

Now this matter of placing the individual conscience above the law and the authority of government is something for which I think we should give Christianity credit. And this in spite of its repudiation by many contemporary Christians. I have no doubt that it was this principle in the Christian tradition which made our ancestors so stubborn in their resistance to stupid and unjust rulers. It was this which gave them moral support in their revolutionary struggles for liberty and

their defiance of authority, from which defiance and disobedience of law the American traditions of liberty were derived. Without such moral justification I doubt that the Puritans of the Seventeenth Century would ever have taken the field in rebellion against Charles I, or that American Colonists would have made themselves outlaws at Lexington and Concord. This is also the principle which underlies our constitutional guarantees of liberty. For what is a constitution but a polite way of telling governmental authorities that their powers are limited, and that if they exceed these powers and enact certain laws we will not obey them? This principle of making the individual conscience the judge of law, and in last resorts the final justification of disobedience, is psychologically necessary for any free people. No people can remain free unless they can make their authorities clearly understand that there are some things they may not attempt, that is, they may not offend the moral sense of responsible citizens.

It would not be correct to say that the church was ever whole-heartedly committed to this principle. Its own interests as an organization are in conflict with it. Perhaps one reason why it has so persistently clung to the dogma of authority has been the necessity of always standing guard against a half suppressed antinomian tendency in its basic tradition. This antinomian heresy, a species of anarchism, has tended to appear whenever the authority of the church has weakened. For instance, at the time of the Reformation such doctrines were held by extreme Protestant sects like the Anabaptists, and

in early Nineteenth Century America by the Perfectionists.

The general social conditions in which Christianity had its origin and those which later prevailed during a great part of its history would naturally tend first to give rise to this principle and later to suppress it. Christianity had its origin among the oppressed masses of the Roman Empire. After three centuries of conflict with imperial authority, it conquered Rome. For the succeeding two hundred years it was the official religion of the Empire. And after political Rome perished its imperial spirit survived as the Church. In the social chaos which followed the invasion of the Barbarians ancient civilization declined, and the Church represented about all the order and culture there was. It is inevitable that its attitude toward spiritual independence should have been modified by the changing conditions through which it passed.

I think insufficient emphasis has been given to the psychological effect on Christianity of the fact that it was given to the peoples of Western Europe by Romans. Not only in their genius for organization, but in various other of their psychological traits the Romans were in a sense Catholics—or at least Presbyterians—before they were Christians. Even in the days of the Republic, one finds among serious minded Romans behavior patterns and points of view which later make their appearance among Christians. Official state religion held a position of importance in pagan Rome that it did not hold in Athens. The idea that there should be a

graded hierarchy with a Pontifex Maximus at its head was taken for granted. Although they did not seek to impose their religious practices on the peoples they conquered, and although all sorts of secret mystical cults finally made their appearance in their city, nevertheless the Romans could on occasion be very intolerant in matters of religion, and, as we shall see, they had practiced religious persecution long before they persecuted Christians—a practice which the Christians themselves adopted later.

Official Christianity moreover absorbed something of the *moralistic* attitude of the Romans. It is generally understood that the Christian ethic was evolved chiefly from the Jewish, and so that of the New Testament appears to have been. But this New Testament ethic is more voluntary, less legalistic, less a disposition to impose moral restrictions on the individual from without than were either the Romans or the Church. We read so much about the licentiousness of the Romans that we sometimes forget how puritanical they could be. The two extremes frequently belong together, are horns of the same dilemma. Many years before Christianity the Romans had established a moral censorship. In fact the idea of trying to make people good by legislation was not unknown to them. Their ethical ideas so far as they were philosophical were, as we know, influenced by Stoicism, a school of thought which was largely occupied with negation and control of desire and passion. But it seems to me that the real secret of their attitude lies in the Roman character itself. Compared

with the Athenians, the Romans were not a very artistic people. They were less intellectual, more politically minded, more practical, with greater sense of responsibility and much less sense of humor, less like the Eighteenth Century French, and more like the middle class English of the Victorian age. This is what they were at their best; at their worst they were beastly. Such people are naturally afraid of liberty, and they make good reformers.

Since, then, the Romans ruled the world during the formative period of the history of the Church and undoubtedly influenced its official attitude in questions involving the freedom of the individual, the story of liberty in Rome should help in a measure to explain this attitude. We find the Roman point of view set forth with greatest intelligence and breadth of vision perhaps in Cicero's *Essay on the Principles of Law*. Cicero was doubtless the most cultivated Roman of his generation. He was greatly influenced by Greek literature and philosophy, especially that of Aristotle. And he was a liberal. He spent the last years of his life in a futile attempt to preserve the traditional liberties of the Republic. In this essay he has some things to say about law and liberty and also about religion and its relations to morals and to the state. His spirit in this essay is very like that of many Christian statesmen. He says:

"Let this, therefore, be a fundamental principle in all societies, that the gods are the supreme lords and governors of all things—that all events are directed by their influence, and wisdom, and divine power; that they deserve very well of the race of man-

kind; and that they likewise know what sort of person every one really is; that they observe his actions, whether good or bad; that they take notice with what feelings and with what piety he attends to his religious duties, and that they are sure to make a difference between the good and the wicked."

"No man should be so madly presumptuous as to believe that he has either reason or intelligence, while he does not believe that the heaven and the world possess them likewise."

"And as we can not say, without impiety, that anything is superior to the universal Nature, we must therefore confess that divine reason is contained within her. And who will dispute the utility of these sentiments, when he reflects how many cases of the greatest importance are decided by oaths; how much the sacred rites performed in making treaties tend to assure peace and tranquillity; and what numbers of people the fear of divine punishment has reclaimed from the vicious course of life; and how sacred the social rights must be in a society where a firm persuasion obtains the immediate intervention of the immortal gods, both as witnesses and judges of our actions? Such is the 'preamble of the law,' to use the expression of Plato."

"Let men approach the gods with purity—let men appear before them in the spirit of devotion—let men remove riches from their temples; whoever doth otherwise shall suffer the vengeance of heaven—let no one have private gods—neither new gods nor strange gods, unless publicly acknowledged, are to be worshiped privately." . . .

"It is clear, then, that magistrates are absolutely necessary; since, without their prudence and diligence, a state cannot exist; and since it is by their regulations that the whole commonwealth is kept within the bounds of moderation. But it is not enough to prescribe them a rule of domination, unless we likewise prescribe the citizens a rule of obedience. For he who commands well, must at some time or other have obeyed; and he who obeys with modesty

appears worthy of some day or other being allowed to command. It is desirable, therefore, that he who obeys should expect that some day he will come to command."

"With respect to the army, and the general that commands it by martial law, there should be no appeal from his authority. And whatever he who conducts the war commands, shall be absolute law, and ratified as such."

"Let the censors take a census of the people, according to age, offspring, family and property. Let them have the inspection of the temples, the streets, the aqueducts, the rates, and the customs."

"Let them guard the morals of the people. Let them permit no scandal in the senate."

We have an excellent example of the censorship in pre-Christian Rome, also of the type of man who at any time finds the duties of this office most congenial, in Cato the Elder, as pictured in Livy's account. This is the same Cato who in a treatise on agriculture, written about the year 150 B. C. advises the farmer to be sure to sell "the old and sick slaves and if anything else is superfluous you should sell that." Cato was a man of plebeian origin who made money, held high offices in the state, and in his old age achieved his ambition by having himself elected Censor. Livy says his candidacy aroused some opposition among prominent people and that "they anticipated a severe censorship that would endanger the reputations of many." For even while soliciting the office he uttered frequent menaces saying that he would "correct modern profligacy and reestablish the ancient morals." Once in the office Cato did his best to keep

his word. Comstock could not have shown more zeal in such work. Seven senators, all of noble rank and one an ex-consul, were speedily put out of the senate on charges of immorality in their private lives. Numerous knights were demoted on similar charges, and the censor undertook to regulate the daily habits of all by means of sumptuary legislation, requiring people among other things to give an account upon oath of the money spent on women's dress, ornaments and carriages. "This was indeed a remarkable censorship" says Livy, "and the origin of many deadly feuds, it rendered Marcus Porcius [Cato], to whom all the harshness was attributed, uneasy during the remainder of his life."

We have an insight into the workings of this censor's mind in an oration which he delivered when it was proposed to repeal the Oppian Law. This law provided that "no woman should possess more than half an ounce of gold or wear a garment of various colors, or ride in a carriage drawn by horses in a city or in any town, or in places nearer than one mile; except on occasion of some public religious solemnity." When it was proposed that the law be repealed, there was violent opposition including that of Cato. While the senate was debating the matter a great throng of women filled the capitol and Cato was moved to speak. He said the behavior of these women who dared thus appear in public was outrageous. "It was not without painful emotions of shame that I just now made my way into the forum through the midst of a band of women. . . . I should have said to them, 'What sort of practice is this of run-

ning out into the public, besetting the streets, and addressing other women's husbands? . . . Are your blandishments more seducing in public than in private, and with other women's husbands than with your own? Although if the modesty of matrons confined them within the limits of their own rights, it did not become you even at home to concern yourselves about what laws might be passed or repealed here. Our ancestors thought it not proper that women should perform any, even private business, without a director, but that they should be ever under the control of parents, brothers or husbands.' "

"Will you," he asks the senators, "give the reins to their intractable nature, and their uncontrolled passions, and then expect that themselves should set bounds to their licentiousness when you have failed to do so? . . . they long for liberty, or rather to speak the truth, for unbounded freedom in every particular." He says there is no cause of shame in the simple dress of Roman women enjoined by the law, and "Be assured that when a woman once begins to be ashamed of what she ought not to be ashamed of, she will not be ashamed of what she ought." If the law is repealed, he says, women will make ever increasing demands. "Unhappy is the husband, both he who complies with the request and he who does not, for what he will not give himself, he will see given by another."

How like are some of the ideas in this speech to those expressed by many of our contemporary moral reformers. I have heard similar speeches at legislative

hearings on the proposed repeal of certain laws of the State of New York, speeches which might have been made by Cato the Censor and which suggest that there is an historical connection between him and his modern successors.

In this speech Cato expresses fear of the immoral effect of the importation of Greek and other foreign beliefs and customs. This fear was for a long time common in Rome. Even the books and teachers of Greek philosophy were at one time suppressed; and it was not until about the time of Cicero that educated Romans began to acknowledge their indebtedness to the Greeks for their civilizing influence. In the middle of the Second Century B. C. Chaldean astrologers were banished from Italy. There was intense intolerance of secret religious mysteries and of strange and unofficial forms of sacrifice offered to the gods.

I said that the Romans practiced religious persecution long before Christianity. Livy gives a vivid and detailed account of this on the occasion of the prohibition of the Dionysian cult in 186 B. C. Euripides at Athens wrote a play about this cult and I do not recall that he saw anything sacrilegious or scandalous in the rites connected with it. The Romans were utterly outraged and terrified by the discovery in Rome of this cult with its weird practices and clandestine nocturnal meetings. It may be that the things which went on at such meetings were all that Livy somewhat vaguely charges. But it must be remembered that some of the leading people in the city were accused of membership in the cult. It should be

further remembered that similar accusations of torture, witchcraft, gross immorality and blasphemy of the gods were also later made against the Christians, and seem to have been believed by some of the best educated men of that time. Although at the "Bacchanalian revels" of the Dionysian cult the members were said to have indulged in sexual promiscuity and perversions and other (horrible) crimes which when revealed shocked the moral sense of the community, it appears from Livy's account that what really stirred the Romans up to an orgy of persecution was suspicion and terror of the alleged heretical belief and blasphemy of the gods. The psychology of the crowd on this occasion is very revealing. It is strikingly like that of a heresy hunt in the Middle Ages, or of the Inquisition, or of the followers of Cotton Mather during the witch trials at Salem, or of certain other religious crowd movements of more recent date.

A Greek of mean condition came to Etruria, "a low operator in the sacrifices and a soothsayer . . . a priest of secret and nocturnal rites. These mysterious rites were at first imparted to a few, but afterwards communicated to great numbers, both men and women. To their religious performances were added the pleasures of wine and feasting to allure a greater number of proselytes. When wine, lascivious discourse, night and the intercourse of the sexes had extinguished every sentiment of modesty, then debaucheries of every kind began to be practiced. . . . From the same place too proceeded poison and secret murders so that in some cases even

bodies could not be found for burial. Many of their audacious deeds were brought about by treachery, most of them by force; it served to conceal the violence, that on account of loud shouting and the noise of drums and cymbals, none of the cries uttered by the persons suffering violation or murder could be heard abroad." Accusations like this are not uncommon in the history of religious conflict. Note that it is carefully explained why there was want of evidence—the bodies of the dead not found, the screams of these in torture concealed by loud shouting—in other words we are to believe these religious devotees were committing secret murder under cover of "loud shouting and the noise of drums and cymbals."

Brought from Etruria to Rome, the cult remaining secret attracted several thousand members. The government first learned of it through the aunt of a young man, Publius Aebutius. It was said that the mother and step-father of this wealthy youth plotted to destroy him and gain possession of his property. They could think of no more certain method of accomplishing this end than of having him initiated into the Bacchanalian rites. Publius was warned in time by a freedwoman, Hispala, who confessed that she had once been a member of the cult. He told his aunt of the plot, she induced the consul, Postumius, to send for Hispala and force her to confess everything, saying there was nothing wicked that had not been practiced among the members of the cult. "The men as if bereft of reason, with frantic contortions of their bodies, uttered predictions"; the women

dressed in the habit of Bacchantes carried blazing torches; the affair was a dreadful sin against the gods.

Postumius was greatly disturbed. He laid the whole matter before the senate. "Great consternation seized on the senators." It was voted that henceforth no religious ceremonies should be performed in private; also that the consuls conduct "an inquisition extraordinary concerning the affair, to search out and punish those guilty of participation in this offense to the gods." The people were commanded to be ready to carry out whatever orders they should receive. A reward was offered to all who would furnish information or bring the guilty before the magistrates. It was further decreed that no one should be permitted to leave the city, that if any accused person should flee, he would be condemned in his absence, and that no person whatever should purchase or sell anything for the purpose of leaving the country, or conceal or by any means aid the fugitives.

"Great terror spread throughout the city," and during the following night "great numbers attempting to fly were seized and brought back to triumvirs who had posted guards at all the gates, and informations were lodged against many, some of whom, both men and women, put themselves to death." Above seven thousand people were accused; the inquisition was extended to neighboring towns. Many were imprisoned, a greater number executed. "Indeed the multitude of men and women who suffered in both ways was very considerable." The consuls delivered the condemned women to their relatives and guardians who were ordered to execute

them in private, and "all places where the Bacchanalian meetings had been held were demolished."

In the midst of the excitement the consul addressed the assembled masses. After solemn prayer he reminded them of "the deities whom your forefathers pointed out as the objects of your worship, veneration and prayers, and not those which inflated men's minds with corrupt and foreign modes of religion." He tells them that an abomination exists in Rome which, while he would prefer not to leave them ignorant of any particular, is so dreadful that if he disclosed the whole he would too greatly awaken their fears, "How often in the ages of our fathers was it given in charge of the magistrates to prohibit the performance of any foreign religious rites; to banish strolling sacrificers and soothsayers from the forum, the circus, and the city; to search for and burn books of divination, to abolish every mode of sacrifice that was not conformable to the Roman practice." He tells his hearers each to pray that none of his own kindred have been seduced by this foreign lust and madness, and urges them in case any such have been dragged into this abyss, to regard them no longer as their own kin.

Thus we have an insight into the psychology of the Roman people and their attitude toward religious and moral problems. The Roman would regulate his neighbors by the power of the state, and would persecute and stamp out heresy with the fury of the mob. When, two hundred years after this affair, Christianity was introduced into Rome, the Christians were reviled and

persecuted in very much the same way. And when Christianity became the official religion of the Empire, the Church necessarily took into itself vast multitudes who were quite prepared in behalf of the new religion to enter upon moral crusades and persecute heretics. Moreover these people by the year 300 A. D. had been living so long under the rule of the Caesars that many of them simply did not know what liberty of conscience meant. They could hardly be expected to have had a liberalizing influence on subsequent Christianity.

During the last century before Christianity, the Roman people lost whatever love of civil and even political liberty they had ever had. Their armies had conquered both the barbarians of Western Europe and the peoples of the Mediterranean countries. The upper classes were given to luxury, corruption, venality and ambition. The city was crowded with a vast proletariat composed of landless peasants, indigent plebeians, freedmen and slaves gathered from the ends of the earth. This proletariat, led by desperately partisan politicians, who to gain its favor fed it at public expense out of the spoils of war and the proceeds of the public sale of captives into slavery, furnished the human material for a long series of revolutions, which ended in the dictatorship of Augustus and his successors.

Tacitus says that when the last army of the Republic had fallen and Augustus was left sole leader of the Julian party, he assumed the powers of both consul and tribune "*for the protection of the plebs,*" that is, he set up a dictatorship in their name. "But when he had won the sol-

diery by bounties, the populace by cheap corn, and all classes alike by the sweets of peace, he rose higher and higher by degrees and drew into his own hands all the functions of the senate, the magistrates, and the law. *And there was no one to oppose*; for the most ardent patriots had fallen on the field, or in proscriptions, and the rest of the nobles advanced in wealth and place in proportion to their servility, and drawing profit out of the new order of affairs, preferred the security of the present to the hazards of the past. . . .

“Nor did the provinces resent the change; for the rule of the Senate and the People had become odious to them from the contests between the great leaders and the greed of the magistrates. . . . Thus a revolution had been accomplished. The old order had passed away; everything had suffered change. The days of equality were gone, men looked to the Prince for his commands, having no anxiety for the present.”

Tacitus continues the unhappy story of Roman life at the close of the First Century A. D. The results of despotism were everywhere apparent. Note the despair with which the passage closes: “The sea swarmed with exiles and the island cliffs were red with blood. Worse horrors reigned in the city. To be rich or well born was a crime; men were prosecuted for holding or refusing office. Merit of any kind meant certain ruin. Nor were the informers more hated for their crimes than for their prizes; some carried off a priesthood, or a consulship as their spoil, others won offices and influence in the imperial household; the hatred and fear they inspired worked uni-

versal havoc. Slaves were bribed against their masters, freemen against their patrons, and if a man had no enemies he was ruined by his friends.

"However the period was not so utterly barren as to yield no examples of heroism. There were mothers who followed their sons, wives their husbands, into exile; one saw here a kinsman's courage and there a son-in-law's devotion; slaves obstinately faithful even on the rack; distinguished men bravely facing the utmost straits and matching in their end the famous deaths of older times. . . . Indeed never has it been proved by such terrible disasters to Rome or by such clear evidence that Providence is concerned not with our peace of mind but rather with vengeance for our sin."

It might be well for those modern "liberals" who idealize the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to meditate on this picture. The absolute despotism of the Caesars was in fact the robbery and enslavement of the public by low-grade politicians, who, by whatever means, were able to gain imperial favor. The revolution which made possible this state of affairs was the result of the victory of the popular or *proletarian* party. It was the inevitable end of the rule-or-ruin spirit which prevailed during the last decades of the Republic. Julius Caesar had been a popular idol, the hero of the hour, for the Roman proletariat because he dared oppose the aristocratic senatorial party; because he was victorious; because he brought many captives home to Rome "whose ransome did the general coffers fill"; because he gave free public dinners to ward politicians; because he made Rome grand and glorious.

The masses transferred this idolatry to his successors and gave them divine honors. The populace is at all times more fascinated by victory and grandeur than by liberty and tolerance. The reigns of Augustus and his successors dazzled the multitude, provided many of its members with military and bureaucratic careers and gave them a vested, as well as a sentimental, interest in the dictatorship. Whatever the abuses and tyranny of the Caesars, their rule was still popular with the groups that had helped them establish it. This was one of the things which made the situation so hopeless. A revolutionary dictatorship is a different thing in fact from what it is in idealistic anticipation.

The despair expressed by Tacitus was shared not only by many of the educated minority but by vast numbers of the enslaved, the expatriated, the outraged. Many were filled with fear and disgust and world-weariness. There was widespread feeling that life was not worth living; there was talk of suicide, a growing conviction of the vanity of the things of this world and of the sinfulness of humanity. People sought consolation in thoughts of death and an after life. They turned to magic and mysticism and to oriental asceticism. C. O. Ward, in *The Ancient Lowly*, says that at about this time there existed among the suppressed classes all sorts of fantastic cults, each with its special divination, its oaths of secrecy, its rites of initiation, its tutelary deities, its miracles, its hopes of the millennium, its promise of salvation. It would seem that in the beginning, Christianity was but one among many similar cults. It gradually outgrew its rivals in numbers

and either absorbed them or crushed them. In the Second Century this cult made a strong appeal to people of all classes and became a sort of mass movement, characterized by intense emotionalism, its rapidly increasing numbers finding ecstasy in self-sacrifice and glory in martyrdom. During these years, Christianity was a kind of epidemic psychological outbreak. Every effort of the government to suppress it only increased its numbers and its intensity. Children forsook their parents, and men their homes, to live the lives of hermits. People publicly humiliated themselves by confessing their sins, or invited death by confessing their faith. Wealthy youths gave away their property, and turned to the life of voluntary poverty, hardship, chastity, prayer and fasting.

Thus early Christianity made rigorous demands. But if it demanded renunciation of the world, it was of a world which was felt to be corrupt, sinful and lost. And there was the promise of the life to come. Free of the lusts of the world and the flesh, the Christian attained to a vision of liberty. It was a peculiar kind of liberty, very different from that of the Greeks; but it was perhaps the only freedom possible in a world such as he lived in, and at least *it was a vision of liberty* at a time when it seemed that freedom had utterly vanished from organized society. Christian writers comforted their readers with the assurance that they were freed from bondage and had entered into the "glorious liberty" of Christ. Where the Spirit of Christ is there is Liberty; Saint Paul urges his followers to stand fast in that liberty, which he boldly contrasts with the servitude of the Law. As I said, earlier

in this chapter, Christianity transferred the seat of authority from something external to something within the individual conscience—a transference which is absolutely necessary if men are ever to be free. Thus the Christian set up an inner standard, or law of right and wrong, and declared that this for him took precedence of the law of Imperial Rome or of any man-made law. If he did not openly defy the power of civil authority, he certainly offered it effective passive resistance. He denied its every claim unless supported by his conscience. In fact he denounced and condemned the whole existing order of society. Christians stubbornly challenged and disobeyed Roman authority in refusing to bow before images of the emperor. Christianity did more: it proclaimed a set of values so radical as to be positively revolutionary and subversive of the established institutions and ways of life of the ancient world—perhaps also of the modern world. In this connection, it is perhaps no accident that most of the revolutionary movements in Christian history have been inspired by ideals of primitive Christianity. And even modern revolutionism, with all its rationalism and materialistic philosophy, retains many of these ideals in thinly disguised form. It can scarcely be denied that early Christianity was communistic, pacifistic, equalitarian, and inspired by hopes of a miraculous social cataclysm which would exalt those of low degree, overthrow the seats of the mighty, and establish a society in which the last should be first and the first last, and there should be no king but Christ. The documents of the New Testament have been so carefully, and so many times edited,

that it is very difficult to form any notion of the man Jesus—assuming that he was a historical person and not a myth. But there would seem to be abundant evidence that he must have been one of the most disturbing non-conformists in human history. Perhaps it was inevitable that men should kill so free a spirit—and thus make a god of him.

But revolutionary enthusiasm is not necessarily love of liberty. My point is that there is in Christianity a strong sense, not only of the value but of the *moral necessity* of freedom. The Christian not only demanded liberty; he took it. In taking the forbidden step of joining this outlawed sect, and thus cutting himself off, in daring to be an outlaw for conscience' sake, he did a decisive thing, made a vital decision of his own, and for once became free. He gained freedom for his spirit, by risking imprisonment, even death of his body. People who cannot do this can never gain, nor long keep, even the freedom of the body.

In their associations with one another, the early Christians seem to have enjoyed much freedom of conscience, of inspiration and opinion. There seems to have been much difference of belief, variation of practice, much that was purely idiosyncratic. The leaders were content to exhort to virtue and piety rather than command. The Church seems to have been relatively free from authority, dogma and institutionalism until it went into partnership with the Empire of the Caesars and became subject to Roman influence.

But why should the Church ever have condescended to enter into partnership with Imperial Rome? What has

it to do with policemen, armies, law courts, systems of ownership of property, the coercion of man by man? Why was not the Christian content to live his own life and grant the same freedom of conscience to all other men? Indeed many have done so, but such tolerance would appear to most Christians to be a compromise with sin. We might ask, why was the churchman in the Middle Ages ever ready to invoke the secular power of the state against the schismatic, the heretic, the infidel? Why even in so-called free America to-day are churchmen notoriously intolerant and illiberal, projecting their sectarian quarrels into our political campaigns in their jealousy and suspicion of one another's political advantage, always urging the government to more and more restrictive legislation and to merciless measures of enforcement in the determination to drive non-churchmen to conform to the churchman's ideas of what is right? Whence does the churchman derive the conviction that he alone is right, and that it is his duty to act as guardian of men outside his own household of faith? I have suggested that the answer in part may be found in the psychology of the Roman mind through which Christianity was brought to the peoples of Western Europe. But this cannot be the complete answer, for why did not Christianity, with its insistence on the freedom of conscience, have a more liberalizing influence on the Roman character? The reason is that there is something paradoxical in the Christian idea of liberty itself. Christianity asserts the freedom of conscience, *but it is only the Christian or regenerate conscience that is free*. Conscience is not free in itself, not free by its own

nature, nor by human wisdom. It is the conscience of the regenerated man which is free, and it is free only when acting in conformity with the law of God. And the law of God is not a law of nature or a principle of logic to be apprehended by mere human intelligence; it is the *revealed Will of God*. Christian liberty is therefore obedience, submission to the authority of divine revelation. The natural man has not surrendered his will to the divine will and therefore cannot be free. He is still under the law. He is nevertheless under obligation to obey the revealed Will of God. If he refuses assent or denies the authority of the revelation, he is not only in error, he is living in sin, and to compromise with him in a matter of moral principle is to compromise with evil.

Thus the Christian, in placing his conscience above the law, does not place all consciences above it, not even his own by natural right or by reason. In obeying God rather than men, he sets his own dramatization of the cosmos behind his will. Thus supported by the Eternal he can and must challenge all powers which are in conflict with it, and if possible capture and use them in its service. It is not his personal desires or convictions which justify such a daring challenge, it is the conflict of the Christian dramatization of the cosmos, the Christian sense of the meaning and end of existence itself, with any opposing dramatization or way of life. Without the support of the sanctions of this cosmic romance the Christian's conscience shrinks to mere moral sentiment like that of unregenerate mankind, having no more validity than that of social convention and doubtful human reason. This

drama cannot function unless it is enacted on the stage of reality. It cannot remain a mere wish-fancy or imaginary escape. It is a challenge to reality. It assigns a definite meaning and end to the whole of existence, and the Christian must strive with all his might to realize these and make existence conform to them. It has always been said that Christianity must either conquer the world or be conquered by it. Christian life is one long crusade until every knee shall bow and every tongue confess that Christ is Lord. Christian liberty is then in one sense the liberty to make the whole world Christian and to rule it to that end. The Church in grasping the sword of Caesar converted the Roman genius for government to a servant to its cause of the freedom of the Spirit. Paradoxical indeed, but the spirit of man is an ironical spirit.

Perhaps concentration on the inwardness of the source of freedom has made many Christians relatively indifferent to what they may regard as the temporary external conditions of liberty. I do not mean merely that people imagine they are free and are content to enjoy the illusion. Just now I mentioned the Christian cosmic romance. In this, imagination is creative. It is romance, not realism, which creates value, moulds human destiny, gives living its meanings and extends the sphere of experience beyond the limits of biological necessity. It is in this sense that dreams come true. Men stage them in the world of experience. As Cabell says, man imagines himself a cosmic hero and plays the ape of his dreams. The Christian drama of the New Creation is no impersonal fantasy. The Christian participates in it, experiences it immedi-

ately in the miracle of *his own regeneration*. This is the central transaction of the Christian religion, and the basis of liberty and salvation. If any man is in Christ he is a new creature, old things have passed away, all things have become new. It is held that a man can become free only as the result of a psychological (or spiritual) transformation of his nature. This transformation, or "change of heart," is something much more profound than merely changing one's mind; it is changing one's nature. It is said to be the result of a direct and free act of God, a miraculous act of divine creation, as truly so and as wonderful as His creation of the world. The Christian is not natural man; he has a new nature, he has been literally made over. The chains that bound him are broken; he is free from the law of sin and death and from the slavery of spirit to the flesh, which is the cause of all servitude. He is in this world, but not of it. Thus according to Christianity man is free, not primarily by human effort and acquired self-mastery, but by the grace of God he is born again, given a new start. Thus conflict is removed; which is to say, liberty is attained because the conflict is sloughed off in the old life which has been left behind.

The cosmic drama becomes the drama within the soul, and the imagery with which it is staged is the symbolism of death and rebirth. Psychologists say that the reality behind this symbolism is a wish-fancy. They call it "the infantile return." There are many forms of expression of this wish-fancy besides those of religion. In Christianity the individual finds freedom, escape from conflict by be-

coming a child again, realizing himself a child of God. Newness of life comes after the surrender of that which now is. He that loseth his life shall find it. The spirit lusteth against the flesh and the flesh against the spirit. Let us present our bodies a living sacrifice . . . If we live after the flesh we shall die . . . This world is corruption . . . I have died unto this world, I have been crucified with Christ . . . We are buried with Christ in baptism. Note also the projection of this death fancy on the world. There is the expectation of "the end of the world": The world passeth away and the lusts thereof.

Baptism, however, is the symbol not only of death but of birth, being drawn out of the water. Hence ye must be born again, of water and the Spirit. One must enter the Kingdom as a little child. And now are we become the sons of God whereby we cry Abba, father. And when you pray say, Our Father who art in Heaven. Thus man attains newness of life; thus is proclaimed freedom from bondage, and the opening of prisons to the captives. This is the resurrection from the dead of those who have died unto this world and come up out of great tribulation. If ye then be risen with Christ, seek the things which are above. In such highly symbolic imagery does the cosmic romance become the psychological drama of the individual soul.

Such emphasis as Christianity has given to the individual soul has done much to create that spirit of individualism in the modern world which is the basis of our freedom. But organized Christianity frequently finds it-

self in conflict with this individualism. For it may mean a demand for personal liberty which interferes with the Christian program for conquering the world. It may come to substitute the idea of an *enlightened conscience* for the Christian *regenerate conscience*. Individualism leads to the emancipation of reason, to free thought, to the freedom of scientific research and experimentation. It may lead to a tolerant skepticism of the Christian dramatization of the cosmos. It may be a demand for freedom on the part of a more grown up type of mind than that which can express its emotional needs in the symbolism of the child-father relationship.

Modern individual liberty must therefore bring to Christianity much trouble and confusion. If it tries to accept the results of free intellectual inquiry it will so distort the imagery of its world drama as to make it unrecognizable and precipitate new emotional situations which will plunge the regenerate again into conflict and doubt. But no one is likely to lose his faith, nor can another rob him of it so long as he needs it; hence there must be violent resistance on the part of many Christians to the culture which is being developed by the new individualism. If churchmen resist, they try to strengthen their positions with authority, dogma, censorship; they become intolerant and lose the freedom of the Christian conscience in the effort to deny freedom of conscience to others. I have no doubt that much of the intolerance and illiberalism in America to-day is the result of the fact that traditional Christianity is on the defensive; and I think that the fact that it is so is a result of the paradox of the

Christian idea of liberty itself which furnishes men sanctions in their struggle for power as well as for freedom.

Christianity, therefore, both proclaims and repudiates the truth that freedom is first of all freedom of conscience, that if men are to be free they must be enlightened, that the free man must first win a victory over certain forces in his own nature. There can be little freedom of conscience without freedom of thought. To think freely, the individual must, in a sense, become disinterested even with regard to matters that concern him vitally. He must be able to *endure freedom of thought*, in other words, as James said, be able to "stand this universe" as honest thinking reveals it to him. He must not substitute a comforting cosmic romance for what he knows to be the truth. Or he must at least be hypothetically willing to give up his romance if truth should demand such renunciation. He must be prepared to let things be what they must, to admit to himself that they are so, however disturbing the admission may be. Above all, he must learn to live without the artificial certainties which most men zealously care about. Yes, the free man too must make his renunciation. Christianity demands renunciation of the world, but gives back these certainties and consolations and holds out the assurance of salvation. The path of life is charted and the wayfarer guarded. Conscience is free, but it need enter on no more voyages of discovery, it need only keep the Commandments and fear God, for this is the whole duty of man. Perhaps the free man must make a further renunciation, one which believing man seldom seems called upon to make: he must

give up his assurances and recognize his wish-fancies and dramatizations of reality for what they are, for the sake of his intellectual integrity and maturity. He must learn to endure freedom.

CHAPTER IV.

FREEDOM AND THE RENAISSANCE

In almost every struggle for liberty we find men on both sides shouting the battle cry of freedom. In the abstract the term liberty has no generally recognized content, for liberty is always the right to enjoy some specific condition, or to do, say, or think something to which it is presumed somebody else objects. Since the struggle for liberty is always resistance to those who want to interfere with certain of our enjoyments or actions, it follows that the meaning of liberty must include all the things which anyone would prohibit us or deprive us of. It may be, as some say, that all men want liberty, but they mean such different things by it that one man's freedom is another's slavery and a third man's destruction. People will agree about the meaning of liberty only in so far as they can agree as to what shall be considered right and wrong, what are the best methods of encouraging the one and discouraging the other, what objects and forms of behavior give greatest satisfaction, what are the aims of civilization. In other words, what people will allow themselves and one another depends largely on their peculiar culture and philosophy of life. The meaning of liberty varies with the different meanings and values men assign

to their existence. Behind every view of freedom in general there is a philosophy or prevailing culture.

The great issue of liberty which is now bitterly contested in America is basically a cultural conflict. Our country is passing through an interesting cultural transition. The America of the past has been predominantly agricultural and evangelical, its cultural leadership almost exclusively that of people descended from early immigrants recruited from the nonconformist classes of the British Isles. Thus our cultural traditions and ideas of liberty have been largely determined in their development by British Colonists of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. In recent decades, however, there have been important changes in population in this country. There has been rapid increase, and the distribution of this increased population has tended to decrease the relative numerical strength of rural America and add to that of the large cities. In certain regions not greatly affected by immigration the cities grow in size while the rural population may remain stationary or decline in numbers; which means that there is a shift of population from the farms and small towns to the cities. Now the conditions of the city life tend to modify one's point of view. The city man adopts city ways; his manners and philosophy of life change. The population of the big cities is moreover a cosmopolitan one consisting very largely of families of recent arrival from Europe. The Europe from which the newer immigration comes is a very different Europe from that out of which the early British Colonists emigrated. Inevitably both waves of immigration deposited on these

shores something of the cultural spirit of the communities from which they came.

The result of such changes in population is a growing cultural conflict between the older agrarian America and the newer urban America. And this is beginning to assume the nature of a struggle for liberty. Representatives of both sides in this conflict believe they are contending for the historic traditions of American liberty. Those of the older America see our institutions menaced by an alien influence and suspect there is something un-American even when their opponents reaffirm the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. Representatives of the new urban America accuse their opponents of breaking down our constitutional guarantees of freedom, and of resorting to usurpation and even tyranny in the effort to turn American civilization into a puritanical pantomime.

The term "puritanical" is something of a misnomer, but it is roughly suggestive of the point I have been making that the conflict about liberty is really one between contrasting philosophies of life. What caused the older America to be culturally so different from other peoples of the modern world? Once it would have been said that the difference lay in the outgrowth of our free democratic institutions. But we are no longer, to say the least, peculiar in these respects. The difference lies in the psychology of the people who gave direction to American cultural traditions. I said that the people who came to the American colonies before the Revolution were largely English and Scotch of the nonconformist classes. That is,

the great majority belonged to the lower middle class and the proletariat. Political independence, and later the success of the movement led by Andrew Jackson, gave these classes opportunity and leadership such as similar elements of the population have probably never enjoyed elsewhere. They were unrestrained by the power or even the example of such traditional leadership as still holds sway in European society. They were not obliged to defer to superiors or compromise with rivals. They had no need of entertaining doubts as to the righteousness and sufficiency of their ways of life. Thus the ideals, standards, and prejudices of a single element of society could here become those of an entire country. Immigrants from other lands being in the minority were induced so far as possible to leave their own cultural traditions behind and adopt those of the Anglo-American; that is, they became, or tried to be, Americanized. This accounts in part, I think, for the general impression that Americans all think and say the same things.

The nonconformist mind both in England and America has certain characteristics. It will resist authority on principle, if that authority happens not to be to its liking. It is suspicious of priests and aristocrats. Its great charter of freedom has always been the English Bible. It is literal and practical rather than imaginative. It cares little for beauty or gaiety, and frowns on amusement and idleness. It is very susceptible to the appeal of religious revivalists, and is inclined to take up any public question in the evangelistic spirit, that is, with more heat than light. It prizes simple goodness above either art or intellectual achieve-

ment. It emphasizes the virtues of thrift, responsibility, sobriety, chastity. It regards sex and alcohol as the deadliest of all evils. It is not very tolerant of the weaknesses or the opinions of others, and is likely to regard mere differences of opinion or custom as moral issues.

Ordinarily we call this type puritanical although it is even more prevalent to-day in the South than in so-called Puritan New England. It is strongest wherever the population is most nearly pure Anglo-American. Vast numbers of Americans have grown up amid such cultural conditions as this type would naturally create. Isolated from any other cultural influences, they have never known any other way of life or thought and would regard any variation from their own as evil.

Now this leads us to an historical fact of the greatest importance. Coming to America when they did, our Colonial ancestors who gave the country its traditions of culture and liberty *missed the liberalizing influences of the Renaissance*. This movement had made some headway in England before the time of the Stuarts, Erasmus having visited England in the reign of Henry VIII, and it really brought into existence the Elizabethan era. But it was shared by only the few, and before it could bring about much change in the life and thought of the country the Reformation supplanted it, checking its advance for generations. Although Milton and Roger Williams and a few others had caught the spirit of the Renaissance, the Puritan party was as a whole strenuously opposed to it. This was one reason for their resistance to amusements and to art, the theatre, and even music in the churches. All

such things were "worldly" and tended to immorality. Moreover, they were part of the pagan trumpery of the Papacy. Very little of this sort of thing was therefore brought to New England. Nor was it encouraged there. American tradition was established on the basis of the Reformation rather than on that of the Renaissance. And so it for the most part remained. Isolated on the frontier, whole communities grew up little influenced by cultural changes which were liberalizing the thinking of many Europeans.

It would be incorrect to say that Americans felt nothing of the spirit of the Renaissance, for it is this spirit which more than anything else differentiates modern life from medievalism. And in many ways America is the least medieval of nations. It is new; one misses here the picturesque ruins, the castles and cathedrals and old convents, the statues and wayside shrines which in Europe are daily reminders of an age that has passed. There are no such symbols of the continuity of life here. American life is sharply cut off from the past. We have no peasant class among whom ancestral customs survive. Compared with the nations of the Old World, our country has no living past. There are few reminders of other days outside our museums and antique shops and a bronze tablet here and there of some historical society. The industrialism with which we are preoccupied is a wholly secular interest and is like the newspaper, concerned with the events of the day. If to have broken with the past is to be modern, America is not only modern, it is futurist.

It is possible however to break with the past without

having consciously achieved a hierarchy of values in the place of those left behind. Have not the American people sailed away from medievalism rather than thought their way out of it? It seems to me that as a people the Americans of the preceding generations renounced the tutelage and traditions of the civilization of medieval Europe, but were not greatly influenced by the philosophy of life which supplanted the medieval and is the basis of whatever is distinctively modern in the culture of the Western world. To most Americans to be modern simply means to be progressive, up-to-date, democratic, to have a radio and a new model automobile, to frequent the night clubs and read the book of the month. It does not necessarily mean to understand and sympathize with what Erasmus tried to do for education or to grasp at all the significance of the issue he raised. It does not mean that one has lived through with Hume and Voltaire the spiritual transitions of the Eighteenth Century. One would hardly suspect that Hobbes, Milton, Montaigne, Rabelais, Locke, Gibbon, Shelley, John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Nietzsche, or even our American Emerson or James, had ever written a line, so little have their liberalizing messages influenced the serious thinking of the average American. Recently I talked with two graduates of eastern colleges; we were discussing the censorship of books in Boston, and I learned that neither of them had ever heard of the *Areopagitica*. They had studied Greek and did not even know what the word meant. This is not at all unusual. American colleges were not established to acquaint students with unconventional literature; their

original purpose was to train candidates for the ministry. They have now modified that original aim; they emphasize scientific research, and prepare students for successful business careers. But they have not conceived of education primarily as initiation into post-Renaissance culture or the humanist philosophy of life. Somehow to do so would seem just a little un-American.

Our public has come to hold the expert in high esteem, but it has not always done so. In Jackson's time the expert was no more popular than the "high-brow" is to-day. In the first half of the Nineteenth Century the fear was sometimes expressed that the populations which were gathering in the region now known as the Middle West were so remote from civilizing influences that they would actually revert to barbarism. It was here, among Americans of purest British stock, that the religious revival reached its highest pitch of emotional intensity. Once the stronghold of Jacksonian democracy, the region is to-day the stronghold of the Anti-Saloon League. Just one hundred years ago numerous colleges began to be founded in this old frontier land, most of them through the missionary activities of New England churches. To-day the traditions of the older America are probably more dominant in this section than in any other part of the country, unless it be certain parts of the South.

That education has not had a more liberalizing and cultural effect on the American mind, is I think to be attributed to the traditions of life and education inherited from the early Colonists. For generations the dominant American tradition and philosophy of life was Calvinistic

rather than Humanistic. When Calvinism declined it did not so much yield to a more critical, intellectually respectable, urbane and æsthetic philosophy, as might have been expected; it just slumped, intellectually and spiritually, into literalistic bibliolatry, moralistic intolerance, Rousseauist humanitarianism, evangelistic enthusiasm with scarcely any intellectual content whatever. It would seem that almost the only thoroughly educated and philosophically grounded intellectual leaderships the American masses have to any considerable extent yielded to were those of the Calvinistic theologians of the Seventeenth Century and the Deistic revolutionists of the close of the Eighteenth. From the former we derive our prevailing philosophy of life so far as it is a philosophy and not mere sentiment; from the latter we derive the formulation of our traditions of liberty. The two are not in perfect harmony. They are expressions of widely divergent cultural movements. The former has its source in an intense resistance to the Renaissance. The latter is an expression of belief in man and in reason; that transfer of interest from the future life to the improvement of conditions on this world which characterized the thinking of Eighteenth Century Englishmen and Frenchmen largely as a result of the Renaissance. This is why prohibition, fundamentalism, the Ku Klux Klan and the like, find their adherents almost exclusively among Americans of British descent; why Protestant churchmen can be instigators of illiberal legislation. It is why constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and assembly are so easily forgotten, why censorship is not

resented, why even illegal search and seizure are resorted to on occasion by people who would give their lives in defense of the Constitution, and whose ancestors wrote into our Constitution the Bill of Rights to guarantee civil liberty to all. Culturally we are a house divided against itself.

I do not mean that we have not had here anything of the culture of the Renaissance, or of humanistic scholarship. We have. Indeed I think that in our cities and among our younger people there is a growing and intelligent liberalism. Classical philosophy and literature are taught in our universities and colleges, but evidently most of the teaching of these subjects fails to give the student any real grasp of the meaning of the humanities. Natural science is taught, but its liberalizing influence is widely resisted. The very word "liberal" is now for many a term of reproach. We have our share of liberal scholarship and humanistic culture, but it is outside our basic traditional philosophy of life. The same would seem to be true even of our Eighteenth Century ideas of liberty. The menace to liberty in our country lies in the fact that we have tried to maintain civil and political liberty without the cultural values and philosophy of living which historically and psychologically accompany such liberty and support it. We shall have trouble until certain issues which have remained unsettled ever since the Renaissance are understood and settled.

Those men with whom the modern world had its beginning did not as a rule talk about political and civil liberty. It is doubtful if they ever thought of themselves

as "modern." For the most part they were fascinated by antiquity. Many of them ceased to be medieval without quite realizing what had happened to them. They did not at once set out to reform existing institutions. They simply gave their thought and imagination to new interests. It is significant that this movement, destined as it was to change the point of view and hence the way of life of millions, had its origin among artists, scholars, and literary men. Few of these men abandoned their old loyalties. Many remained faithful members of the Church, yet they confronted historical Christianity and the civilization over which it presided with the most serious issue they have ever had to face. Renaissance scholars simply lost interest in the sacred and the supernatural and began to turn their attention to the secular, and to seek the guidance of human reason and intelligence in an effort to give beauty and meaning to living. In this they found precedent and example in the writings of wise men of pre-Christian times. It might seem to be a purely academic matter for these men to have begun substituting "human letters" for the "knowledge of divine things" of medieval scholastic education. But it profoundly affected the ideas of life and destiny, of liberty and the duty of man, in succeeding generations. It set the mind free to explore the wisdom of the ages without bias or fear of losing faith. It led to dependence on unaided human intelligence instead of submission to authority. It prompted men to try to understand and master the forces of nature; to express their human interests in the arts with unprecedented freedom; to

engage in manifold new activities; it led to new discoveries and inventions, new appreciations of the true and the beautiful; it brought back to the minds of Europeans the daring, critical, questioning habits of thought of ancient philosophy and education; it emphasized personal independence and self-discipline; and it led men to see the maximum development and excellence of the individual as the great aim of human effort. I would not say that the Renaissance achieved all these things for anybody, or that it has achieved any fraction of them for more than a minority of mankind. But where they have been achieved in any measure we are indebted to it. In contrast with a general way of life that had held sway for a thousand years or more, it marked the beginning of another way, the Humanist way, which has been the inspiration of the creative genius, of cultural achievement and the progress of liberty ever since.

In order to grasp its significance for our discussion of freedom, let us try for a moment to see this beginning of the modern era in the setting of its historical background.

At the close of the Thirteenth Century the peoples who had once spread terror and destruction throughout the Roman Empire were again in the power of Rome. Gradually this power had emerged from the ashes of the ruined empire, had been extended far beyond the regions formerly governed by the imperial armies. A spiritual dominion more absolute than any military dictatorship, it ruled over the consciences and through the fears and hopes of millions. Peasant and prince alike were humbled

before it. It had wrought order out of anarchy, established the reign of law, taught barbarian peoples the arts of peace, sent them as crusaders to Eastern lands, called them to worship, heard their prayers, given them a faith and a rule of life. During the thousand years that had passed since the Vandals had ravaged the city of Rome, Western Europe would without doubt have acquired the arts of civilization in one way or another. It happened that the culture of the Middle Ages was largely the work of the Roman Catholic Church.

With what diplomacy, compromise, and distortion of the original aims and ideals of early Christianity, the Church gained the mastery of Europe and created there a civilization, is a question into which I do not wish to enter. It has long been a matter of dispute. From one point of view it is an astonishing spectacle to find the Church professing a doctrine which renounces the world, commands poverty and humility, regards the wisdom of this world as foolishness and for conscience' sake defies the powers that be, and at the same time exercising princely authority, enjoying the glory of empire, rich with worldly possession, acting the schoolmaster to the nations, crushing dissenting opinion with persecution.

As to the excellence of the civilization of the Thirteenth Century, there is still much debate. It was not however the age of darkness that some imagine. Restricted and supervised as were the interests and activities permitted to the men of that age, many of their achievements are of surpassing excellence. Although the New Testament reveals a way of life which is indifferent, if

not hostile, to art and scholarship, Medieval Christianity contributed much to both. Mankind has never created anything more beautiful than its Gothic architecture nor more inspiring than some of the pre-Renaissance paintings. Benedictine monasteries were genuine seats of learning even in the darkest centuries that followed the decline of Roman civilization. Later scholastic education produced men of great scholarship, among whom were to be found some of the most learned and subtle minds in the history of European thought. Great as this scholarship was, however, its scope and interest were necessarily limited. Scholarship had ceased to be an open-minded voyage of discovery; it was brought under authority; it was in the service of, and bound to support and make rational, an established institution and a required system of beliefs. It had ceased to be secular and had become sacred.

It was this sanctity which the Catholic religion imparted to everything it permitted men to do which made medieval civilization what it was, gave it unity and harmony of purpose, and made it a definite and specific culture. A culture comes into being when the manifold interests and activities of a people can be made to derive their deepest significance from a common understanding of the meaning and value of human life. It is a coöperative answer which men give to the riddle of their existence. Without culture a civilization is but a conglomeration of unrelated activities. The religion of the Middle Ages was not one among many conflicting interests. It had drawn everything into itself. Under its hegemony

it might be said that nothing was secular. It was not only the bond which united men in a common brotherhood, it was also that which gave them a continuity of purpose. Its sacraments and services circumscribed human life. The circle was small and restrictive, but within it there was a center in which all radii met. Here the peasant toiling in the field, the soldier in distant lands, the king on his throne, the artisan at his bench, the pilgrim begging alms, the scholar with his books, and the artist among his paints, had fellowship with one another and with the saints in Heaven. Each brought his contribution to the altar and found there inspiration in that which united and gave meaning to the lives of all.

Thus religion created a culture. I believe this to be the greatest task and function of religion. And when a religion is a living faith, it is so by virtue of the fact that it is the nucleus of a culture. When it becomes just one among many human concerns, and exists on the same footing, it has ceased to be a religion in the true sense, and has become an idiosyncrasy. Many cultures have been based upon religion, but cultures have been and are possible in which human life derives its values from meanings other than the supernaturalistic meanings of religion. There was ancient Greek culture; we have seen that this was secular in nature, frankly humanistic, and that with it men achieved excellence and the good life through the cultivation of virtue, intelligence and good taste.

Many will not agree with me when I say that the day must inevitably have come when the restricted and com-

pact circle of medieval life would be broken. The tutelage under which that civilization lay became in time inadequate. Civilizations, like individuals, have a way of coming to maturity. An independence of mind emerges which sees that other cultural aims are possible. The Renaissance was such a psychological change. It was the beginning of a process, by no means yet completed, of the secularization of the cultural values of civilization. Symonds in his monumental study of the Renaissance says :

“During the Middle Ages man had lived enveloped in a cowl. He had not seen the beauty of the world, or had seen it only to cross himself, and turn aside and tell his beads and pray. Like St. Bernard travelling along the shores of the Lake Lemán, and noticing neither the azure of the waters, nor the luxuriance of the vines, nor the radiance of the mountains with their robe of sun and snow, but bending a thought-burdened forehead over the neck of his mule; even like this monk, humanity had passed, a careful pilgrim, intent on the terrors of sin, death, and judgment, along the highways of the world, and had not known that they were sight-worthy, or that life is a blessing. Beauty is a snare, pleasure a sin, the world a fleeting show, man fallen and lost, death the only certainty, judgment inevitable, hell everlasting, heaven hard to win; ignorance is acceptable to God as a proof of faith and submission; abstinence and mortification are the only safe rules of life: these were the fixed ideas of the ascetic mediæval Church. The Renaissance shattered and destroyed them, rending the thick veil which they had drawn between the mind of man and the outer world, and flashing the light of reality upon the darkened places of his own nature. For the mystic teaching of the Church was substituted culture in the classical humanities; a new ideal was established, whereby man strove to make himself the monarch of the globe on which it is his privilege as well as destiny to live. The

FREEDOM AND THE RENAISSANCE 91

Renaissance was the liberation of humanity from a dungeon, the double discovery of the outer and the inner world. . . .

"Thus what the word Renaissance really means is new birth to liberty—the spirit of mankind recovering consciousness and the power of self-determination, recognising the beauty of the outer world and of the body through art, liberating the reason in science and the conscience in religion, restoring culture to the intelligence, and establishing the principle of political freedom. The Church was the schoolmaster of the Middle Ages. Culture was the humanising and refining influence of the Renaissance. The problem for the present and the future is how through education to render culture accessible to all—to break down the barrier which in the Middle Ages was set between clerk and layman, and which in the intermediate period has arisen between the intelligent and ignorant classes. Whether the Utopia of a modern world in which all men shall enjoy the same social, political, and intellectual advantages be realised or not, we cannot doubt that the whole movement of humanity from the Renaissance onward has tended in this direction."

The beginning of this movement is sometimes arbitrarily said to have occurred in the year 1453, the year of the fall of Constantinople. At this time a number of Greek scholars migrated to Italy. Undoubtedly many students began the serious study of Greek literature shortly after, and its inclusion in the educational curriculum created much controversy. Men not only wanted to study the New Testament in the original, they wanted to know about a kind of human excellence which men had achieved who had never heard of Christianity. Knowledge of Greek philosophy and literature did aid them in their search for the values of a secular culture. But the Renais-

sance was not confined to any such academic interest. It was an outburst of genius along many lines of activity. And it modified and gave new perspective to the whole cultural pattern of the times. It brought a new quality into achievements of all sorts. It set men studying nature in a new spirit. It released new energies of the mind and body, gave versatility to their efforts. It was a time of invention and discovery. It created new conventions in the arts, inspired new ambitions and new intellectual freedom and daring. It was as if the center of gravity of the spiritual world had shifted.

No such cultural earthquake appears to have occurred in Constantinople during the long Christian centuries when the literature and language of the ancient Greeks had been known for centuries. In fact, there were signs in Western Europe of a coming change long before the fall of Constantinople. Men like Arnold of Brescia had already called attention to the shortcomings of the spiritual leadership of the Church. There had been social unrest as far back as the days of Wyclif and Jerome of Prague. Thinkers like Abelard and Occam had long previously introduced the critical spirit into medieval philosophy. Roger Bacon had made studies in natural science. Aristotle's writings had been in use by theologians since the Tenth Century. Padua and perhaps other universities were showing increasing hospitality to non-Christian scholarship.

But it is the indirect results of the Renaissance which are important for our study of liberty. Some of these

results were hardly apparent until long after the close of the Fifteenth Century. Many of the issues raised continue to reappear in new form and remain still unsettled. What the Renaissance really brought to Europe was wider human sympathy and understanding, hence open-mindedness, tolerance, urbanity, and that skeptical independence of judgment which is at once the mark of the truly civilized man and a condition of progress in the pursuit of truth. While the Renaissance did not at once give rise to liberalism of political philosophy it did so in the end, for it set men thinking about the republics of antiquity, caused scholars to be skeptical of such dogmas as that of the divine right of kings, and to be critical of the usurpation of power by magistrates and the clergy. It is interesting to note that from the time of Hobbes onward many political philosophers were engaged in the attempt to offer a strictly human and naturalistic explanation of the source and nature of the authority of the state.

Machiavelli's essay on *The Prince*, the product of a Renaissance scholar, is from our point of view hardly a liberal document. But its idea of the enlightened ruler had marked liberalizing influence on certain monarchs of the Eighteenth Century. He who poses as an enlightened prince must naturally appeal to reason and try to justify his behavior to other intelligent men, and when commoners are encouraged to pass judgment on princes the day of civil and political liberty is not far distant. The preoccupation of Eighteenth Century writers with the

problem of liberty was largely a result of the Renaissance. And it is no accident that the outstanding liberals of both that century and the Nineteenth were most of them men who had felt strongly the secularizing influence of the Renaissance, the religious liberals and Deists, the followers of John Locke, Rousseau and Voltaire. The progress of liberty in the modern world has been closely associated historically with that of freedom of thought. It was the spirit of the Renaissance, rather than that of Protestantism, which challenged dogmatism and authority, separated church and state, and made "Appeal to Reason" a slogan of popular struggles for liberty.

Naturally the excess and diversity of activity which came to the modern world with the Renaissance created a demand for increased opportunity of expression of genius. The new secular spirit was experimental rather than traditional. Literature, science, philosophy, industry were less and less content with ecclesiastical censorship, less inclined to await the sufferance of traditional authority before proceeding with their work. They set up their own criteria of excellence and truth and were not to be deferred if they ran afoul of aged prejudice. From the very beginning the culture of the modern world has developed in conflict with the medieval spirit. Erasmus' literary works brought him the bitter antipathy of the "obscurantists" of his times. The theatre has more than once been suppressed by puritan medievalists. One need only read the titles of the books which even in present-day America are prohibited by the censorship of local

police and the postal authorities at Washington to see that the ghost of the Middle Ages still walks abroad.

The story of modern science is also that of the broadening and deepening of the influence of the Renaissance in spite of opposition. The Revival of Learning is so commonly associated with art and letters that we do not always associate with it the revival of scientific learning which occurred at about the same time. Science was added to the educational curriculum much later than literature and secular philosophy, and not without some resistance on the part of teachers of the humanities, but there should have been no opposition, for the culture of Humanism properly includes both. Natural science had its beginnings in ancient Greek philosophy. Its progress was practically discontinued after the rise of Christianity, and it made no further significant advance until the Seventeenth Century. But the work of Kepler, Galileo, Francis Bacon, Newton, Descartes and their successors is truly a result of the reawakened interest in nature and man which came with the Renaissance. Whitehead says that in its early period modern science was able to pursue its course relatively unmolested and unnoticed because the attention of theologians was occupied with other matters. However, Galileo was not the only scientist whose work has met with hostile reception. The theories of Darwin are still outlawed by American legislatures; those of Eddington, Bohr and Einstein probably would be if more people saw their implications.

Who can deny the great liberalizing effect of scientific knowledge on the minds of modern men? The history

of its achievements is an essential part of the story of human freedom. The spirit of science is necessarily liberal, and undogmatic. Scientists can be very dogmatic, but they are admittedly unscientific when they are. Although the scientific information of most men extends only to certain fruits of science rather than to its methods and thought processes, I believe the popularization of science to be one of our strongest guarantees of freedom—unless there should be a violent reaction against it, such as a rapid spread of the Fundamentalist movement, before a sufficient number have time to attain the scientific habit of mind. This habit of mind is a vital element in the culture which is essential to liberty. It is experimental rather than authoritarian. It communicates itself by reason rather than by coercion. It demolishes the world-view in which medieval tradition has its setting. It discourages delusions of infallibility and the substitution of irrelevant ends in the pursuit of truth, and all external compulsion or regulation over the processes of thinking. In a word, it finds with Aristotle that the free mind and the reasonable mind are the same.

As an agency, however, for the freedom of mankind in general, the culture we have derived through the Renaissance has the serious disadvantage of its very richness and difficulty of mastery. Unlike the culture of the Middle Ages with which it is in conflict, one cannot be initiated into it with ritual and ceremony, or have it on the authority of another, or profess it as a system of beliefs inherited from one's ancestors and uncritically accepted. It demands personal and laborious effort, self-

imposed discipline, patient inquiry and intellectual courage to stand alone. Its precepts and revelations are not canonical: and there is no saw-dust trail leading to it. Hence there are many imitations. Many lose their way; still greater numbers do not start at all. The culture of the Middle Ages could in large measure be participated in by all; there was a common symbolism and a universal sense of spiritual brotherhood. The modern may hope that the new culture may someday enjoy a like universality. Indeed it was this hope which inspired efforts for universal education. But few are so deluded as to imagine that this end is in process of speedy achievement. And since the achievement of liberty in the modern world is conditioned upon the nearness of our approach to this end we may say that the Renaissance not only inspired the will to freedom, but made it a problem.

By setting free a multitude of secular interests the Renaissance brought into culture a spirit of individualism, segregated its finest values from the masses and at the same time gave them power such as they did not possess in the Middle Ages. Medieval civilization kept power in the hands of the appointed few, but the values of that civilization were those of the common man. Modern life has reversed this situation. Cultural values are the possession of the initiated, power passes into the hands of the many. Democracy is all-powerful, but in precisely the measure that it influences the values of civilization it tends to cheapen and vulgarize them, as witness politics, the tabloid newspaper, the radio, the

motion picture, and popular music. Excellence on the other hand, like classical music, requires more than common interest and knowledge on the part of those who appreciate it. This is not because of any snobbishness. Culture becomes the cultivation of something special. It ceases to have the common appeal or strike the universal note as did the culture of the preceding age. It has become individualistic. We have but to glance at various aspects of the Renaissance to see this. It may be regarded as an artistic movement, a literary movement, a revolution in scholarship, and a scientific awakening. Now in each of these, a similar thing took place. Let us note first what happened to art when it became secular. To just the extent that it ceased to be occupied with commonly accepted religious themes, or even began to treat these subjects in an unconventional manner, it withdrew itself from the masses, and became an interest of specially cultivated groups.

You enter a wholly different world when you step into a gallery filled with pre-Renaissance paintings and images. Not only are the subject matter, the inspiration and the treatment different from the modern, but there is a wonderful sameness about medieval art. Everywhere the saints and the personages of the Christian legend tell over and over the same great story of the wonder, the suffering, the piety, the aspirations which were the common experience of humanity. This art is very conventional and impersonal; the artist seems to depict attitudes rather than people. There is nothing obtrusive of the artist's personality or of his peculiar experience.

These paintings do not give us men's reaction to their environment. This is a dream world we have entered, and the dream is a folk-dream, the same for prince and peasant. In an historical museum in Finland there is preserved a little rural church built in the Middle Ages. All the carvings and paintings were done by the peasants themselves. Compared with what one sees in the great cathedrals of Europe the workmanship is crude, but it has a like dignity and reverence, and it presents precisely the same themes and in very much the same manner. Evidently there was not in the Middle Ages that difference in appreciation of art which characterizes the various social groups in present-day America. One need not become sophisticated to understand this art. The common man needed no critic to explain it to him; it was his art. He did not have to become "cultured" in order to participate in the culture of his age.

The break came with the Renaissance and curiously, just when painting and sculpture became more human and personal and began to deal with men's reactions to the external world. Painters of the Fifteenth Century and afterward used human models; they introduced real living people into their pictures of sacred subjects. Numerous Madonnas painted at this time are really conventional portraits. The old conventions were soon left behind. Art became secularized; it depicted any subject which appealed to the artist's fancy. It dealt freely with ancient pagan mythology, with nature, with individuals and their experiences real or imaginary, with the ordinary objects of daily life, with the unique and the

concrete, with love and warfare and adventure, with ideas and feelings which are essentially personal.

The change was both a gain and a loss. The gains in freedom, in the mastery of technique, in richness and variety of subject-matter are everywhere apparent. But in becoming unconventional, art lost its official status and much of its universal appeal. Its very becoming conscious of itself as art, makes it a separate and special interest. It becomes a cult, a specialty, a luxury. It becomes exclusive. It is now for those who have some special aptitude for it, who have been taught to appreciate it, who can afford it. Instead of gracing and expressing the common life of men, it becomes something added on. No longer a quality of the constructive activity of the people, or an expression of their common beliefs and hopes, they know it chiefly as a curiosity which is kept in a museum. Or they think of it as something which adds grace to the existence of the privileged classes. We might almost define modern art as that which pleases the gentleman; for the masses there are jazz and the motion picture and the Sunday supplements. And now we must have missionaries of culture who strive to reintegrate art and life by improving public taste. The response is not often very enthusiastic. It is not exactly "refinement" that people want. They want some great common human interest vividly expressed, as they have it in the motion picture or the popular love song, and they are commonly indifferent to both bad craftsmanship and downright insincerity. Millions are content with inanity and shoddy sentimentality if only they may have the spectacular.

It has probably always been so, but the conditions of modern life, which make it possible for the public to get what it wants in these respects, strip this fact of any disguise it may have worn in the past. Before modern civilization can secure its liberties, it must establish its cultural leadership.

The tendency of modern culture to become isolated from the masses is not so evident when we consider literature and scholarship. Apparently there has been a trend in the opposite direction. Before the Renaissance, wandering bards sang the adventures of kings and heroes; those of the common man belong to later democratic times. The masses were illiterate. The classic literature of antiquity was little known even to scholars. Educated men wrote for one another and in the Latin language. Even the Bible was not translated into the languages of the people. Then, beginning with writers like Chaucer and Dante, the modern languages were made the vehicles of literary and scholarly communication. With the Renaissance, literature and scholarship became secularized. Petrarch and Boccaccio wrote of the loves and joys and sorrows of the natural man. Humanistic scholars began disseminating knowledge of a rich literature and of a way of life which lay wholly outside the official Christian system. With Shakespeare, Rabelais, Montaigne, Voltaire, and the Eighteenth Century dramatists, poets and novelists, literature became more and more free and independent of the spirit of medievalism, often frankly hostile to it in its reflection of the spirit of modern life.

Yet in spite of all this, good reading matter has not a wide popular appeal. The number of those who read the classics is doubtless greater than that of those who appreciate modern art, but it is disappointingly small. Classic literature does not reflect the sentiments and prejudices of the average man. He considers it "high-brow." People have the idea that literature is exclusively for the highly educated, and that the classics were written primarily to give college professors something to lecture about. Thus there has come to exist a chasm between classic and popular books, similar to that which exists between classic and popular art and music. It was thought when the public became literate through universal education, that it would seek and become acquainted with the wisdom of the ages, and would consequently modify the whole intellectual tone of our common life accordingly. The experience of the public libraries, the statistics of publishing houses and the circulation of tabloid journals and cheap fiction magazines would seem to belie this hope. In recent years there seems to have been an increasing demand for good books, but there has doubtless been a proportional increase of the demand for the opposite. And what, for instance, is the sale of two hundred thousand copies of a good book (a thing that rarely happens) in a country of over a hundred million people? Even such a sale means that only one person in five hundred buys the book. Our people can read, and it is not from want of capacity for mental application that they have not better reading habits. Nearly every person one sees in the New York subway has a newspaper in

his hands, and he will spend more time and effort mastering the details of baseball scores and memorizing the batting averages of heroes of the diamond than would be necessary to give him a knowledge of the works of Shakespeare or Aristotle. Publishers find that if they are to sell even selected and abridged editions of the classics (they call them "easy reading courses") to men really above the average, they must resort to sensational advertising and appeal to cupidity and the desire to show off, with promises that a superficial appearance of familiarity with the great writers will remove social disability and smooth the path of ambition to positions of influence and financial success.

It would seem that the average man avoids good books largely for the same reason that he is embarrassed in good company. He finds himself in the presence of minds whose culture values are not those of his own daily habits and interests. He does not feel at home. In this particular the civilization which existed before the Renaissance was different. The masses were woefully ignorant, the gap between them and the educated was wider than that which exists to-day, but not so deep. The difference was one of degree rather than of kind. The educated man thought like the man on the street, only he thought more. Both held the same illusions: both inhabited the same spiritual world. They had the same hopes and expressed them in the same symbols. Scholastic learning was really the official scholarly rationalization of the common man's way of life and thought. The erudition of a Saint Thomas could not even be conceived by the peas-

ant mind, but both held similar ideas about the universe, about the human soul and its destiny and duty.

Now it is precisely concerning such important matters that the modern educated mind differs from popular opinion. The two play different games, strive for different objectives, have different reverences and duties. Obviously an Einstein or a William James cannot inhabit the same intellectual world with the late Mr. Bryan. Words in common usage do not mean the same things to these men, who do not mean the same thing even by such basic terms as doubt, belief, truth.

I suppose that science has more nearly succeeded in popularizing itself than any other of our heritages from the Renaissance. To the half educated it is a new gospel. Its wonders and miracles make strong appeal to popular imagination and gain credence along with surviving medieval superstitions. I have known men to try to prove the credibility of the latter by showing their likeness to the marvels of science. To many it is a new magic and a new dogma of finality. It is an evidence of the progressive temper of our multitudes, and of the intellectual superiority of the average man. It is often said that the ordinary school boy to-day knows more than the wisest men of antiquity. Science is the triumph of human reason, and do we not all contribute something to this great advance by our purchase and daily use of the results of applied science? We all welcome scientific research so long as it has utility and does not disturb popular beliefs and prejudices. I recently saw an excellent illustration

of this popular attitude: it was a photograph of some clergymen blessing an automobile.

When scientific discoveries, or the generalizations made from them, run counter to accepted ideas about the world and its origin, or the principles whereby the phenomena of nature are governed, the conflict is either denied or scientists are denounced as enemies of the faith of the fathers. We forget that nearly every step in the progress of science, including even some that were purely utilitarian, has met with popular resistance. The public is still wrangling over the teaching of the doctrine of evolution and has never yet got into its head the very first and most important thing about science—that it is not a system of beliefs and doctrines to be taught to the young. It is not a rival to religion in this sense because it is not, as the public imagines, a rival religion. It is not its function to indoctrinate. Science really teaches nothing; it merely equips the student so that he may learn something for himself. It is a method of inquiry, a habit of mind. The scientific mind holds its conclusions to be hypotheses which it is equally prepared to verify or disprove. It subjects its generalizations to the severest scrutiny, invites criticism and difference of opinion, seeks to give full weight to opposition, holds judgment in suspense, and is cautious about making statements without giving reasons for them. The Twentieth Century scientific spirit in particular is skeptical and self-critical even of its own basic concepts. Those who are working with the problems of mathematical physics, a science which to-day

seems to be bringing an intellectual revolution, are skeptical of such time-honored and useful concepts as those of mechanism, space, cause, the laws of motion; and many scientists are frankly doubtful whether they have succeeded at all in escaping from the universe of discourse and intellectual convention to knowledge of reality.

Now the man on the street seldom reveals a disposition of this sort. He is always opinionated, always for or against something. To his mind, skepticism is sinful, self-criticism an admission of weakness, suspension of judgment an irksome inhibition. He wants to be told positively what to think, and to be able to tell others. His idea of a discussion is to take sides, line up and make a show of strength. And he leaves the fray with the same opinion with which he entered it, strengthened by opposition. His idea of the pursuit of truth is to seek plausibilities and effective partisan appeals to support his prejudices. To say that the average man possesses the scientific habit of mind in his thinking about anything important is outrageous flattery.

I said that whereas the values of medieval culture were those of the common man, the culture of the modern world is different in that the common man does not share its values in the same way. I have tried to give my reasons for this apparently undemocratic statement. I also said that whereas, in medieval civilization, the directing power was in the hands of the privileged few, modern civilization tends to transfer it to the many, a many, be it noted, who share its cultural values not at all or only to a limited extent. To be sure, it can be said that in one sense

power is not and never was in the hands of the multitude. We used to hear more about "invisible government" than we do now, but is not the will of the people commonly defeated by powerful minorities and ignored by the servants of the government? There is the tremendous purchasing power of the public, the power of public sentiment and of the electorate, but in the exercise of these powers the public is constantly confused and manipulated by propaganda put forth in the interest of the few. Granted that there will always be leaders, my point is that in contrast with the older civilization, leadership in modern democratic society is seldom that of the educated minority, and that our present types of organization tend to minimize the importance of individuals and increase that of man acting as mass. To enjoy power or even maintain your rights, you must be a member of something, join a multitude, march in a parade, think like the others, talk the same propaganda. It is chiefly as a numerical unit in a mass that you count. The power-seeking group must make its appeal always to the average member, just as the newspaper is edited to reflect the sentiments of its average subscriber and seldom contains anything that offends him or is above the level of his intelligence. Hence a civilization in which everything tends to be determined by the power of numbers is one which is in the end ruled by its most mediocre and commonplace minds. The greater the number of interests and activities brought under organization, the more complete and exclusive becomes the tyranny of the commonplace. Organize everything, and the dilemmas of mediocrity

become the only issues which gain recognition or consideration. Democratic societies can save themselves from the tyranny of mediocrity only by limiting the number of things which may be organized—that is, by leaving as much of life as possible to individual initiative. The trend of modern civilization is in the opposite direction. The bearing of this situation on the problem of liberty is obvious. The dominance of the average man is not that of the liberal spirit of post-Renaissance culture. What mediocrity means by liberty is “let the people rule”—in other words, further extension of its own powers, the subjugation in all things of man as individual to man acting as mass.

If we are to include among the practical achievements of science the great discoveries and inventions of the modern world, then science, although its spirit is not very characteristic of the average man, has greatly increased his powers, through the organization of life which necessarily follows. But even before the age of machinery two important inventions had enabled the multitude to defy its traditional masters and declare itself supreme. These were gunpowder and printing. I doubt if democracy would ever have been possible without them. Gunpowder is both historically and psychologically associated with popular traditions of liberty, so intimately that our revolutionary ancestors did homage to it by declaring that the right of the people to bear arms should never be taken away or abridged. Gunpowder put an end to the age of knighthood, unseated the man on horseback, broke down the feudal system, made possible modern senti-

ments of nationalism and patriotism. Not everybody could make effective use of the battle-axe, the sword or spear; superior strength and training were needed. In the Middle Ages fighting was done mostly by professional soldiers and mercenaries; armies were relatively small. But a weak and untrained man can shoot a gun, and this explosive made it possible to call a whole people to arms; hence the revolutionary citizen soldiery of the late Eighteenth Century. Gunpowder transformed the subject into the citizen, gave the multitude a consciousness of itself as The People, and brought about Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and universal manhood suffrage.

Printing was as effective as gunpowder in the accomplishment of these ends. It put the English Bible in the hands of Cromwell's soldiers, and it had much to do with the Protestant principle of the right of private interpretation. It not only made possible increased scholarship and popular literature; for many it also served another purpose. It created that powerful weapon, publicity. Before and during the revolutions of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries the public was deluged with pamphlets. It has lived ever since in a flood of printed propaganda of all sorts and is itself largely a creature of the printed word. Publicity and propaganda give it a cause, regiment it, increase its power and numbers. Mobs have been created by oratory, but The Sovereign People came into existence with the printing press.

Any thought of putting the sovereign people again under any compulsion other than its own is intolerable. It would be to return to a medieval condition with power

in the hands of the few and liberty lost. But to encourage this sovereign people to organize and regulate everything and everybody is also to return to a medieval condition in which the only cultural values which are permitted to exist are those of the average man. In this case, liberty is again lost. This latter possibility is a serious danger. There is no immediate danger that the power of the people will be taken away from them—unless they should of their own will establish a dictatorship. But there are many evidences that the very spirit of freedom may perish under the power of the democratic mass.

I have tried to show that the struggle for freedom is really a conflict of cultural values, that the truly liberalizing force in the modern world is that spirit of the cultural freedom with which the Renaissance supplanted medievalism. It is this very liberalizing force which the organized mob-mind of America is bent on destroying through the extension of the power of the people over the individual. Once the lover of liberty was obliged to resist the tyrant and set up in defense of freedom the rule of the people. To-day the growing enemy of liberty is precisely this rule of the people. The lover of liberty must struggle against it and make it keep its proper place. Or to put it differently, the future of freedom in America depends on whether the friends of culture can hold out against its natural enemies in maintaining tolerance, open-mindedness, individual responsibility and the supremacy of intelligence and good taste over prejudice and vulgarity.

CHAPTER V,

LIBERTY ENLIGHTENING THE WORLD

To anyone entering New York harbor these days the Statue of Liberty appears somewhat dwarfed by the tall buildings on lower Manhattan. In the old days before the financial center had towered above it, the figure of Liberty loomed larger. Situated where it is, with its back incidentally turned to the mainland, the statue doubtless symbolizes the place liberty now occupies in American life and thought, but it appears incongruous with its surroundings. The replica in Paris which overlooks the river is better located. But Liberty should stand on some lofty hill top from which her torch could send its gleam afar, for she is a goddess who enlightens the world.

Accustomed as we are to the phrase "Goddess of Liberty" the words no longer conjure up visions of the French Revolution. But this is the divinity who presided on that occasion, and whose cult arose in the Eighteenth Century. I do not find that liberty had before been deified in just this way. It now became a popular idol, something to be worshipped by millions. This worship was proclaimed as a new evangel of liberty, equality, and fraternity, the rights of man, the emancipation of

humanity. And to the worshipful, the gospel of liberty seemed the enlightenment of the world.

The idea of liberty enlightening the world deserves more than passing notice. Aristotle would have said that enlightenment, the life of reason, made men free. But to the French Revolutionists it was freedom which made men enlightened. This is true in the sense that liberty of thought and expression are necessary to the attainment and spread of culture. But it does not follow that men necessarily become enlightened because they are free. Liberty itself needs enlightenment before it can spread enlightenment. Intellectuals of Eighteenth Century France idealized the natural man. Their own scholarship had brought them into conflict with the old order surviving the Medieval Church and the Monarchy. They naturally concluded that the Church and State were twin powers of darkness, responsible for the ignorance of the masses. Destroy infamous institutions, therefore, and all men automatically become free and enlightened. Voltaire, though in the name of reason and justice he demanded liberty and particularly the destruction of the existing ecclesiastical order, seems to have had no illusions about the masses. But there were others who believed that the unspoiled wisdom of the uneducated was closer to nature than the wisdom of the learned classes and therefore superior. Give this natural wisdom of the masses freedom to express itself and everything would be beautiful. This was good news to the revolutionary crowds of Paris. The crowd mind is always conceited, and successful crowds are easily convinced of their own intellectual su-

periority. Hence the enlightenment of the world is the same thing as the rule of the sovereign people.

It was in the Eighteenth Century therefore that The People created itself. A new gospel of emancipation supplanted the old gospel of salvation. This was the "Age of Reason." Its rationalism was largely a rationalization of the motives of crowd behavior. Reason was now, like liberty, deified. It was worshipped; it reigned over all, thinking and unthinking alike. One need not necessarily be logical to become its devotee; one need only be converted to the new and Utopian cult of reason. As Ingersoll later expressed it, "Reason enthroned upon the brow of man is King of Kings and Lord of Lords." It had come to a world of darkness and pain and had said "Let there be light." The Eighteenth Century did not invent reason, but it put it to the service of new ends, chiefly those of eradicating medieval superstition and reconstructing political institutions. To the ancient Greeks reason meant reasonableness, clarity of ideas, temperance of judgment, self-control. It had to do with personal excellence, the good life of the individual free man. In the Eighteenth Century it expressed the will of the emancipated multitude, revolutionized its institutions, and assured all men the material benefits of applied science. In other words, whereas Aristotle had said that one might be free only by being reasonable, the liberty of the Eighteenth Century consisted largely not in personal exercise of reason, but in external and environmental conditions which the age of reason was to bring to all men equally.

Two very different philosophies of life are mingled in

the Eighteenth Century idea of liberty, the one represented by Voltaire, the other by Rousseau. The first is a reassertion of the spirit of the Renaissance. The second is a revolt against the culture of the modern world and an idealization of the natural man. Since this same confusion exists in the liberalism of to-day, I want to disentangle if I can these two lines of thought.

When the intellectual awakening of the Eighteenth Century occurred, Europe was very different from what it had been in the Fifteenth Century. Two great reforming movements had swept over the Church. One had increased the power of princes, the other that of the common people. It had divided the nations of Christendom, and set them one against another. There had been a century and a half of bitter warfare which had exhausted the feudal system and had strengthened everywhere the feeling of nationalism. The middle classes were rising to a position of power and leadership. The long reign of Louis XIV in France had left the nobility greatly dependent on the Crown, and had broken its relationship with the peasants and working classes, who were desperately poor, without leadership and restless. Commercial supremacy had moved from the nations of the Mediterranean to those of the North Sea. England had already become the dominant maritime power in Europe, and two revolutions in that country had established there a large measure of democracy and constitutional liberty. The overthrow of the Puritan Régime had been followed by an excess of personal liberty. There was great progress in natural science. A skeptical, empirical philosophy de-

veloped which attacked the very foundations of scholasticism and dogma. Literature, largely inspired by ancient classic models, reached high excellence and was secular in spirit and free. The close of the Seventeenth Century witnessed in England a modified recurrence of the Italian Renaissance, making that country the dominant influence in the thought of the Eighteenth Century. English ideas of representative government, of constitutional liberty, of the basis of authority in the social compact, English tolerance in matters of religion, the rationalism of English science, and English philosophy with its Deism, its sensationalist theories of knowledge and skepticism of dogma, gave rise to a new liberalism at home and on the Continent, and in far away America, which did much to cause the revolutions at the close of the century. This is not to say that other influences were wanting, or that this liberal culture was shared to any great extent by the masses. The British masses were still Calvinistic, the middle classes puritanical. Official education was a strange mixture of humanism and scholasticism. The public was still capable of burning the house of Joseph Priestly because of his political and theological heresies. Unmoved by the Humes, Drydens, Swifts, and Addisons, indifferent to the liberalism of Burke, it was swept off its feet by the Wesleyan revival. What the common man both in England and elsewhere seemed to get from the new cultural spirit was a kind of self-righteousness which emboldened him to resist tyranny and stubbornly insist on his rights. In America, and on the continent of Europe, the public either retained its medieval values or vulgar-

ized them into a kind of romanticism. It did not become converted to the philosophy of Humanism and has never really accepted the new cultural leadership. But it did strike down the old traditional leadership and call its own supremacy liberty.

In achieving this last it was animated by a mixture of motives, some of which were derived from the Reformation rather than from the Renaissance, some from the teaching of Rousseau rather than of Voltaire or the English liberals. The leadership of the English liberals gave popular liberty certain forms of expression, but it was followed only in so far as it aided in overcoming old rulers and setting up democracy. The intellectual liberalism of the Eighteenth Century, like that of the Renaissance, was not a popular movement, and beyond a certain point it met with popular resistance.

To understand Eighteenth Century liberalism we must see its relationship to the whole Reformation movement within the Catholic Church, both the Protestant Reformation and the Counter Reformation. We can then detect certain logical weaknesses in it which enabled Rousseau to turn it into a new gospel of liberty by mass action. To what extent are we indebted to the Reformation for the liberties of the English speaking peoples? Many believe that this was the greatest liberalizing event in all history. If so, it would seem that freedom is an indirect rather than a direct result. Protestants, when they have had power, have frequently shown that they can be quite as intolerant and illiberal as any Catholic. It is an interest-

ing psychological fact that it is usually those Protestants who themselves menace American liberty, with censorship, prohibition and laws against the teaching of science, who are most disturbed by the fear that the Catholic hierarchy is about to rob us of our freedom. The crowd mind has the habit of projecting its suppressed wishes upon its enemies—that is it accuses others of trying to do the very things it intends to do itself. And Protestants are continually subjected to crowd appeal by revivalists and reformers. Neither Protestantism nor Catholicism is truly represented by its extremists, and among peoples where a spirit of moderation prevails, there is to-day about the same degree of liberty, regardless of the religion they profess.

There is a sense in which the Reformation, which took place in both Protestant and Catholic Churches, was a reaction against the liberalism of the Renaissance and represented the average man's rejection of the new cultural leadership. The Reformation led by Loyola was historically quite as important as that led by Luther. It served among other things to check the extravagances and confusion and paganism which came into Christendom with the Renaissance. The Jesuits saw the issue which Humanism had raised. They were very wise, but I think wrong, in the manner in which they met it. They established a system of scholastic education which could be controlled. In their institutions of learning, the ancient languages and the new human letters were ably taught, but taught in such a way that they strengthened, rather

than weakened, Catholic faith. Thus the scholastic mind captured Humanism, and imposed its own restraints upon it, rendering it innocuous.

What the Counter Reformation did deliberately, the Protestant Reformation did intuitively. It is often said that the Reformation followed the cultural awakening of the Renaissance and preserved its spirit. It was rather a reaction against that awakening which reached its extreme expression in the Puritan hostility to art, amusements, worldliness, and what it regarded as the paganism of popery. Luther in these respects was more liberal than the Calvinists. But from the beginning, he expressed the moral indignation of the plain people against the "heathen abominations" of Medician Italy. We cannot doubt that there was flagrant vice and corruption in the Rome of the Renaissance. Erasmus also attacked it. But Erasmus showed a spirit of hospitality to the new learning which Luther and his followers did not. It was for this reason that many Humanists declined to take part in the Reformation. What the Reformation did was to nationalize the churches and give laymen a voice in their government. It concentrated attention on theology rather than on secular learning, and the conflict which it precipitated frequently resulted in intolerance rather than in liberalism.

If it checked and delayed the flowering of the Renaissance in England until after the Puritan Commonwealth was overthrown, it did, however, help prepare the conditions which made the Eighteenth Century possible, and to cause the intellectual awakening, when it did come, to be

different from what it probably would have been had not the Reformation intervened. For one thing, it doubtless caused the Eighteenth Century liberals to be more interested in questions of political and civil liberty than were the men of Eramus' time. As the Reformation was itself a kind of religious revolution, an uprising of the people against the rulers of the Church, it did much to put the idea of revolution in men's heads, and to suggest popular revolt against the rulers of the state.

Although the Reformers were not necessarily liberal-minded men, their movement had certain indirect results for the idea of liberty. The Reformation was in part an attempt to return to the primitive Christianity of the New Testament. This was of course impossible, and the attempt led to endless controversy. Men could not agree about New Testament Christianity, and their sectarian disputes made Protestantism a house divided against itself, weakened its authority, and deprived it of any concerted power over people's thinking. It was thus unable to prevent the spread of heresy, free inquiry, doubt and skepticism. "Free Thought" therefore early made its appearance in Protestant England. Naturalism began with Hobbes and Bacon, and Rationalism with Seventeenth Century science.

Moreover, various antinomian sects appeared and reaffirmed the early Christian doctrine of absolute freedom of conscience and of a state of grace *above the law*. Levellers cited Biblical authority for their demands for universal equality, the abolition of class distinction, and socialistic attacks of wealth and privilege. Quakers ac-

knowledge no superiors, refused to bear arms, or take oaths of allegiance, forsook the clergy, discontinued all religious forms and ceremonies, and gave obedience only to inspiration and the inner light. Whether the Quakers most nearly approached New Testament Christianity is a matter of opinion, but there is little doubt about the extraordinary freedom, friendliness, and spiritual equality which characterized their fellowship. We shall see presently what a profound impression this sect made on the mind of the liberal Voltaire. Republicanism became the form of church government among Presbyterians, and democracy that among Congregationalists. Thus we see that the attempts to restore the Christianity of the New Testament had long before the Eighteenth Century led men to the voluntary practice of liberty, equality and fraternity, and to adopt democratic forms of church government. To establish the liberty of the people it was necessary only that revolutionists carry over these ideas into the world of political affairs, and make their adoption compulsory by the force of mass action.

I said that the popular idea of liberty since the Eighteenth Century has been "Let the people rule." It was said "the voice of the people is the voice of God," or, as Lincoln put it, "You can't fool all the people all the time." The idea that the multitude is more likely to be right than the dissenting few is really an assertion of the superiority of intuition, right feelings, belief, over reason as a guide to behavior. Voltaire opposed reason to faith, but, as we shall see, his rationalism was not at all the Socratic criticism and clarification of ideas, nor was it the "right rea-

son" of Aristotle. Voltaire based his appeal to reason on an empirical and sensationalist philosophy. He confused appeal to reason with appeal to experience. He seemed unaware that the empirical philosophy he adopted was anti-intellectualist and so opposed to pure reason, a skepticism which reduced knowledge itself to a kind of faith. Voltaire, therefore, in the name of reason opposed one faith to another. He made a gospel of reason. The next step would have been to assign reason to a place of secondary importance and assert the supremacy of instinct and emotion as guides to living. Voltaire did not take this step; but Rousseau and Helvetius, and many of the revolutionists who followed them, did. It was this Rousseauist confidence in instinct and emotion which led to belief in the superior wisdom of the untutored masses, and so in "Liberty Enlightening the World."

The crowd always has a delusion of its own infallibility. It believes in its convictions with such intensity of emotion, that this intensity itself becomes a criterion of truth. Strong faith moves mountains, while self-critical open-mindedness discourages precipitate action. The average man is essentially a believer. "To let the people rule" is, therefore, to commit the destiny of man to the guidance of faith rather than reason.

Surely the Protestant doctrine of salvation by faith alone had something to do with establishing this principle. It is significant that Rousseau came from Geneva, the home of Calvin. For while Calvinism had no confidence in the wisdom of the unregenerate masses, it shared with all Protestantism of that time in giving tremendous empha-

sis to the Augustinian doctrine of justification by faith. It was not primarily work or reason which made man right; his heart must be right. He must first of all *believe* rightly and he would become right by the grace of God. Having no merit of his own, his only hope of salvation was trust in Christ. Such faith was counted unto him for righteousness. It was this emphasis on faith which led the Reformers to deny that there was any saving grace in works, and by "works" they meant primarily the ceremonies and sacraments of the Church. But they also taught men to live by faith, to humble their intellects and to have little confidence in human reason. Note how Luther states this point in his sermon entitled *Justification by Faith*, which was a sort of manifesto of the Reformers. He says, "How is the doctrine of that great master, Aristotle, confounded, who taught that reason instructeth man to do the best things. . . . This doctrine Christ doth condemn. . . . All men must confess their imbecility, for if any man doth persuade himself that he is able to do any good work by his own strength, truly he accuseth Christ of falsehood. The word of God wherever preached casteth down whatsoever things are high and great."

This doctrine was preached powerfully in Seventeenth Century England, as well as at Geneva. It is not surprising that when reason again asserted itself, the reaction took the forms of sensationalism and skepticism. Reason had long been under suspicion and now the pursuit of knowledge abandoned the logic of abstract ideas and confronted faith with appeal to *experience*. Empiri-

cism in Protestant England followed the precedent of Nominalism in Medieval Catholic times, and the example of Baconian logic. It was a formative force for the natural science of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. It made science and liberalism natural allies, but its influence on liberalism, as political philosophy, was to make it self-contradictory—that is, to appeal to reason with Voltaire and to deny reason with Rousseau. Liberalism has always retained this dual attitude toward reason. *A liberal is a rationalist who walks by faith in the wisdom of the irrational majority.*

One of the most important contributions of the Reformation to the Eighteenth Century philosophy of freedom was “the right of private interpretation.” The English Bible in the hands of the common man became a charter of freedom. It inspired in the individual greater self-consciousness and led to a new independence of judgment. Man began to feel himself responsible for his own destiny. He could challenge priestly authority over mind and conscience. He now had something which supported him in criticizing the acts of his social superiors, and in expressing his opinions concerning matters that had hitherto been regarded as beyond his scope of knowledge.

“As fer war, I call it murder,—
 There ye hev it plain an flat,
 I don’t want to go no fuder
 Than my Testement fer that.
 God hez sed so plump an’ fairly
 It’s ez long ez it ez broad,
 An you’ve got to git up early
 Ef you want to take in God.”

In these words, Lowell's *Hosea Bigelow* shows that he has no doubt about his competency to pass judgment. The Reformation had given him a moral franchise.

The creeds provided official interpretations, to be sure, but as sectarian divisions multiplied the number of creeds increased. The individual could choose among them. Choice implies criticism. And from criticism, the road leads on to complete independence of thought, to religious liberalism like that of Hume, Jefferson and Paine. The Bible was first submitted to popular interpretation, then attempts were made to rationalize it, to explain away its mysteries and find natural causes to account for its alleged miracles. Finally it was subjected to scholarly criticism and analysis. A modern mind appeared which was wholly secular, which had outgrown the need of authority and infallibility. The pursuit of truth became open-minded, unprejudiced, free of irrelevant interests. Any outside interference with the advance of knowledge, any censorship of its publication, was resented as an assault on liberty. Human life had regained its intellectual adventure—for the few.

For the multitude the right of private interpretation worked in the opposite direction and produced illiberality of mind. It fortified ignorance with the delusion of infallibility, circumscribed the outlook of many men with an unimaginative literalism and rationalized the crowd's will to power. It made it possible for men to use the Bible as a weapon with which to resist the spread of liberal ideas. The Bible is by no means the simple and easily understood book which many imagine. If reading it with

simple faith has brought consolation to many, it has also brought misunderstanding and dissension. It is easy for men to read their own meanings into it and then proclaim them as the word of God, equally binding on all men. Private interpretation meant that any group of men, however ignorant, need only be able to read the Bible to be in possession of ultimate, undeniable truth about almost any important question of human life. For many the pursuit of truth became the search for texts of Scripture to support partisan beliefs. "Truths" acquired in this easy manner, and by minds which have not known the civilizing effects of wide reading and patient scrutiny of all sorts of generalizations, are extremely dangerous. A narrow intolerance is engendered. Men develop the habit of jumping to hasty conclusions. Sure they are right, they become stubbornly unteachable and coercive of others. Popular prejudices of all sorts become entrenched. Differences of opinion on any subject are regarded as moral issues. Any criticism of the true believer is sinful; those who resist him are not merely in error, they are bad people. Sanctions are found to justify those hatreds to which crowds of all sorts are always inclined. And these attitudes are carried over from matters of religion and become the spirit in which democratic masses deal with public questions of all sorts.

In the revolutions at the close of the Eighteenth Century great numbers of people became *liberated before they were liberalized*. It has always been the hope of democracies that political responsibility and the exercise of political power would educate the public and thus lead

it in time to the liberal's understanding of, and love for, freedom. It would be a pity to have to abandon this hope, but as liberals to-day become more realistic they become increasingly aware of the illiberalism which thrives on democracy. Minority groups of all sorts use freedom of speech chiefly to circulate propaganda designed to restrict men's liberty. Timid legislators yield to the clamor raised by organized lobbies. Everybody has a cause—and by a cause I mean a preconceived idea as to what his neighbors must do or not do—and to compel obedience he would capture and use the secular arm of the state in ways not unlike those of the Inquisitors of the Middle Ages. The power of the state thus becomes invasive of traditional liberties as guarantees of the immunities of the individual are jeopardized. The rule of the people tends to be a contentious method of division of spoils among piratical crowds, some bent on exploiting the public, others upon acting as its moral guardians. The crowd becomes restive under any constitutional limits to the exercise of its will over the individual. Liberty, as democracy, finds itself in conflict with the liberty secured by the Bill of Rights. Only liberal-minded people can enjoy liberty. The modern man has inherited his free institutions from the great liberals of the Eighteenth Century. *What he failed to get from them was their liberalism.*

Two liberal traditions flow from the Eighteenth Century. They are not easy to distinguish because they often express themselves in the same words. The first lays emphasis on reason, on individual excellence and responsibility, on freedom guaranteed by a bill of rights. The

second emphasizes enthusiasm, collective sovereignty, and the uprising of the people. They differ, you might say, as in the arts classicism differs from romanticism, the one giving primacy to form, the other to inspiration. I will discuss the second tradition in the succeeding chapter. Let us now consider how the first was related to the "Enlightenment" of the Eighteenth Century.

Liberty is not so much the source as the result of enlightenment. Eighteenth Century culture was formal, often amusingly so, but this formalism was a basis of its freedom. Form gave meaning and permanence and a hierarchy to the things of life. It was manners and ceremony and style—and among Englishmen it was constitutionalism. The great political contribution of English speaking peoples to civilization is the formal limiting of the powers of government by recognized and respected constitutional grants and checks. The purpose of a constitution is first of all to compel the sovereign power to obey the law and behave itself. Instead of depending on the government to make them decent, reasonable Englishmen sought to make the government decent and so to respect the dignity and peace of the individual, to assure men's rights by seeing to it that everyone had legal remedies against usurpation. The great purpose was to prevent any organized mob from ruling by brute force. Inevitable conflicts among men were to be settled as matters of principle and reasoned law. This is revealed, for instance, in the whole tone of Burke's speech on *Conciliation*. The argument is based on discussion of the rights

guaranteed men under the Constitution. "We conquer," he says, "not by force but by our Constitution." Here is no rule-or-ruin temper of mind. Discussion here is not intellectual bullying or raucous demand, but a tolerant attempt at a *meeting of minds*.

The constitutionalist point of view also dominated the thought of James Otis, in Massachusetts, in his argument against issuance of writs of assistance which in fact gave government agents the power to search and seize without due process of law. He assumed that the rights of the individual were not liberty in general, nor such as the authorities saw fit to grant him; they were specific and formal defenses which individuals had for themselves against the danger of tyranny on the part of officers of government, and which as a last resort preserved freedom by making it practically impossible for the government to enforce bad and unpopular legislation. At the time Otis spoke in support of these constitutional rights, they were invoked by the people, many of whom were law-breakers, smugglers and keepers of contraband goods. For the government was then trying to enforce measures which were as unpopular as prohibition is to-day, and many decent and respectable people refused to obey them. The Bill of Rights, both English and American, became primarily useful as aids to people who fell into the clutches of the law in times when the government was madly trying to enforce laws good men would not obey. Such rights as freedom from search and seizure without trial by a jury of one's fellows, restraint of the authorities from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments, or from

trying a suspect twice for the same offense or compelling him to bear witness against himself—all these and their like were invoked in behalf of men accused of defying the law. They made effective resistance possible when governmental action made criminals of otherwise law-abiding people. They were a constant warning to the ruling power that men would, in the end, reserve the right to say what laws they would and would not obey. Eighteenth Century Englishmen enjoyed freedom because their ancestors had put government in its proper place and knew how to keep it there.

At the close of the revolution of 1688, the newly elected William and Mary had entered into solemn contract with the nation to respect these rights forever. In the *Treatises on Government*, written about this time by John Locke, a clearly humanistic view of the state is set forth. Government exists for the sake of the individuals who live under it, not they for it. Similar views had been expressed earlier in New England by Roger Williams. Locke says that government rests on the consent of the governed, and that the powers so granted to it can never exceed the ends for which it is established. He argues that when anyone undertakes to make laws whom the people have not appointed, he does so without authority. He further says that when the legislature itself ceases to protect property or betrays the liberties of the people, then government is at an end and it is the right and duty of the people to establish order anew. The influence of Locke over the thought of the succeeding century may be seen in the writings of Samuel Adams and Thomas Jeffer-

son. The theory of the "Social Compact," which Locke derived from Hobbes, became for men like Rousseau and Paine less a humanistic theory of government than a gospel of Utopia, to be achieved by the uprising of the masses against the classes. This was largely because Rousseau and Paine practically identified the people with those elements in the population which Hume called "the rabble."

Such idealization of the proletariat did not predominate in the liberal thinking of Eighteenth Century England. Burke condemned the French Revolution. Hume was a severe critic of those multitudes whose actions were prompted by "enthusiasm" rather than guided by understanding. Godwin, philosophical anarchist though he was, followed Plato and Aristotle in one important matter. He based freedom squarely upon reason and reason alone, and argued that if men would obey the laws of reason they would need no other laws. This is very different from that utopianism which based the hope of liberty on mass action. The old English liberalism was essentially a civilized attitude toward life. It had more reverence for the wisdom of antiquity than for medieval dogma. It welcomed the advance of science and was critical of popular belief. It was equally disdainful of puritan intolerance and democratic enthusiasm. It sought to protect the individual equally from the tyranny of the crown and that of the majority. More skeptical than rationalistic, it asserted the reality of experience and of the concrete, and strove at once for clarity of thought and appreciation of good form in all things. It was a *cultural movement*

which had much in common with that of Erasmus and Montaigne.

The writer who did more than anyone else to spread English liberalism to the educated classes of continental Europe, and make its ideas, though modified somewhat by the Frenchman's wit, those of the Age of Reason, was Voltaire. What Erasmus had been in the early Sixteenth Century, Voltaire was in the Eighteenth. Like Erasmus, he was the leading literary man of his century. Like Erasmus also, he was an emissary of humanistic learning. A wit, half rationalist, half skeptic, he made folly ridiculous, smoked out obscurantism with laughter, taught a generation of scholars open-mindedness and reverence for intelligence and good taste. Voltaire's interest and influence were not, however, centered in academic circles like those of Erasmus. He was extremely sensitive to official and clerical deeds of injustice and cruelty. On more than one occasion his championship of the outraged and the defenseless raised a storm in Europe. Voltaire led no crusading armies in the cause of liberty; he erected no guillotine for the emancipation of multitudes who had not yet learned the meaning of liberality of thought, he did not stain his hands with human blood, offering sacrifices to the Goddess of Liberty. Yet few men have accomplished so much for freedom as Voltaire. Liberty is to be won not by opinionated devotees, however much they may call upon her name, but by those whose example sets free the mind of man. The very name of Voltaire strikes terror to illiberal minds. One loves him for the enemies he made.

Voltaire lived in England from 1728 to 1731. The impression which this liberal country made on his mind is seen in the letters he wrote during these years. They are really essays on liberalism, designed with humor and some satire to awaken thinking Frenchmen to the contrast between England and their own country, and so to make them sensitive to their own lack of liberty. Voltaire does not theorize after the manner of Rousseau about liberty in the abstract. He points to concrete examples of liberty. His account in the earlier letters of the English Quakers was doubtless meant to point a moral to the French whose king, Louis XIV, had revoked the edict establishing religious toleration and had in his old age strengthened the influence of the Jesuits. There is also an object lesson in the irony with which he contrasts the sincerity and simple dignity of Quaker manners with his own courtly etiquette, for the Quakers were regarded by many as fanatics. But it would seem that Voltaire's admiration of the Quakers was genuine in part. They appear to have been the only Christian sect he mentions with approval. His own Deistic faith had something in common with this extreme form of Protestantism, as the chapel he built at Ferney many years later would indicate. Like the Quakers, Voltaire was a pacifist. He sympathized with their individualism and independence of mind and with them he had no use for oaths, priests, sacraments, or ceremonies. Of course he would not share the mysticism of this society, and he says with typical Voltairian humor that its founder had the prime requisites of a true prophet—namely, inability to read and write.

For the Quaker colony, which William Penn founded in Pennsylvania, Voltaire had the highest praise. He depicts it as a very Eldorado of freedom. He points longingly to the liberty of conscience and of thought which there prevail, and finds example in the peace and harmony and dignity of living which result from it. He heartily approves the liberal form of government of the colony of Pennsylvania, and calls attention to the fact that the promises which it made the Indians were made without oaths—and that these were the only promises to darker races that the white man ever kept unbroken.

For the edification of the clergy at home, he says that the morals of the higher clergy of the established Church of England are much higher and less corruptible than those of the French prelates. He then adds that this happy condition is probably the result of the English custom of advancing men to positions of high dignity in the Church only late in life when they are "insensible to every passion—save avarice."

Comparing England to Rome, he says that the Romans were happier in that they never knew the dreadful follies of religious wars, but that somehow the civil wars of Rome ended in slavery while those of England ended in liberty. The English, he says, are the only people on earth who have been able to prescribe limits to the power of kings. Nobles rise without insolence, there are no vassals, and the people share in government without confusion. The peasants are not bruised or afraid. There is religious toleration, and in fact "England is never tempestuous except when the king raises a storm."

Voltaire is greatly impressed by the liberal thought of England; John Locke, he says, was the greatest philosopher of the age. In fact it was from Bacon, Locke, and Newton that Voltaire derived his own philosophy of liberalism with which he made his century "the Age of Voltaire."

From Locke, this Eighteenth Century philosopher derived certain definite teachings about the rights of man and the proper purpose and necessary limitation of the powers of government, teachings which in time crystallized into uncritically accepted political dogma. Jefferson could therefore write, "We hold these truths to be self-evident. All men are created free and equal and are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, among them the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." The Twentieth Century mind would hardly consider these or any political doctrines "self-evident" truths. From Locke also Voltaire derived a certain skepticism of thought. But in this respect I do not understand why Hume did not have greater influence upon Voltaire and Eighteenth Century liberalism. Hume was perhaps the greatest thinker of that century. But he was not a democrat.

The prevailing attitude of the Age of Reason was not the mellow and ironical questioning attitude of Montaigne, nor was it doubt as to man's ability to attain ultimate knowledge or reduce the universe to logical formula. It was rather a limited skepticism, being for the most part doubt and unbelief of religious teaching.

Concerning the ultimate validity of reason there seems

to have been little doubt, except for a few thinkers like Hume and Kant, and even the latter struggled hard to escape the skeptical implications of his own critical reasoning. One sees the influence of the Age of Reason in the writings of many Nineteenth Century liberals. The unknowable exists, but in a world apart concerning which theologians may exercise their fancy if they are so inclined. But the reasonable man is concerned with knowledge of the knowable, and here knowledge has the solid foundation of fact. The unknowable is really the supernatural, Nature's laws are rational and their discovery by man is knowledge. This, in a word, is the assumption of Spencer, Huxley, Clifford, and the French Positivists. It is an Eighteenth Century point of view, very different from that of Socrates who said he knew nothing, or of Plato to whom knowledge is clearness of thought, so that the thinker knows exactly what he means by the concepts he uses.

Eighteenth Century liberals were skeptical of religion but they were cocksure about what they did believe. As a matter of fact, they lived comfortably in a very compact little logical universe. They were often quite doctrinaire, setting precedent for that doctrinaire habit of mind which prevails among radicals to-day.

From Bacon Eighteenth Century liberalism, largely through Voltaire, derived its naturalistic and materialistic bent, and from Newton and the Seventeenth Century scientists its rationalist tendencies. Hence it opposed reason to faith, and science to theology. From science it gained a new view of the world which excluded miracle

and revelation, substituting an essentially mechanistic universe for that which had prevailed in the thought of preceding ages. Such a world view is not very consoling. The masses have never accepted it, and I doubt if many men outside those scientific circles in which mechanism is a matter of method and hypothesis, and is known to be a *view* of reality rather than a complete account of it, really grasp the significance of the mechanistic theory. It would seem to be about the last thing men would try to make a new religion of. Voltaire, who seems to have held this view, had no illusions about the matter. He said that philosophers would never found a religious sect because their writings were not for the vulgar, and they themselves were free from enthusiasm. The thinking part of mankind, he added, is confined to a very small number, and these will never disturb the peace and tranquillity of the world.

But many who followed Voltaire tried to do just that. They popularized interest in science by presenting it as the new gospel. Science would work miracles for mankind, would cure the ills of the world, lighten the burden of toil, and lead to the ultimate triumph of humanity on this earth. Exaggerated as these promises were, we are doubtless chiefly indebted to the old liberalism for such progress as science has been permitted to make and for such general advantages and liberalizing influences as it has brought with it. For otherwise the masses might have been much more hostile to it than they have yet shown themselves to be. What the "Age of Voltaire" accomplished was to tie up the cause of liberty

with the advancement of culture and the progress of civilization. It was more concerned with what men believed or ought not to believe, than with attaining those tentative, open-minded, self-critical habits of thought which characterize the civilized mind in whatever it believes or doubts. But it created a tradition of liberalism in which freedom of thought and the use of reason are the prime requisites of any liberty at all. It saw the cultural value of doubt, and that all intellectual advance begins in questioning and continues in it. If it confined its skepticism mostly to doubt of popular religious beliefs, it directed it where skepticism was most needed in the struggle for freedom. It bequeathed to us the hope of liberty for all mankind and to that end set constitutional barriers against the usurpation of rulers and the follies of the crowd. It saw that the group tends always to strangle the individual; that man as individual must be protected against man acting as mass. The crowd imagines it loves liberty, but crowd thinking is illiberal and crowd behavior is struggle for power. Perhaps the greatest contribution to liberty which the Eighteenth Century made, besides defiance of authority and the basing of freedom on reason and culture, was the new self-confidence which it brought to the mind of man. Instead of dreaming of an ideal past from which the race had fallen, the Age of Voltaire transferred this ideal to the future, and for its achievement liberated the energies of thinking men and women. It is in this sense that its liberty has been proved to be Enlightenment.

CHAPTER VI

ROMANTIC IDEAS OF LIBERTY

Since the days of Rousseau, liberals have not been quite sure whether they are champions of culture or of nature. They do not know whether they are advocates of reason or of instinct. To-day the liberal proclaims himself a rebel against authority, a free spirit who must be rid of his inhibitions, and to-morrow he announces that liberty is a myth having no reality in an industrial civilization. It is good liberalism if one holds with Jefferson that that government is best which governs least. It is also good liberalism to work for the extension of the activities of government, especially its control over industry. I know liberals who at the same time invoke the Bill of Rights in defense of civil liberty and denounce the Constitution because it is a barrier to the absolute rule of the majority. In one sentence a liberal will say that the public is always wrong because the average man cannot and will not think for himself; in the next sentence he will cry, "Let the people rule!" Liberalism is undecided whether it is individualism or socialism; whether liberty is a human achievement or a gift of nature; or whether the "progress" in which liberals believe should be directed toward further advance of civilization or toward revolt against civilization and a return to nature. To be sure, few of

these dilemmas can be resolved. But most liberals to-day are doctrinaire about these matters. They cannot rest in open-mindedness or indecision, for that would be to paralyze activity; and the liberal belongs to a movement. He is busy reconstructing society and must accomplish something.

The difficulty and confusion result from the permeation of the liberal tradition by the philosophy of Rousseau. Few people realize how many of their ideas are derived from the teaching of this writer, or how irreconcilable they are with any rational solution of the problems of living. Since much so-called "advanced thought" is unconscious repetition of Rousseauist doctrine, it is highly important that we have clearly in mind just what Rousseau contributed to the philosophy of freedom.

I have pointed out certain logical weaknesses in Eighteenth Century thought. It was individualistic, yet envisaged liberty for all men. It was rationalistic, yet its rationalism was based on a sensationalist theory of knowledge which tended toward skepticism. The appeal to reason, therefore, becomes involved in a practical dilemma. If it is an appeal to such reason as actually exists among men, it must be addressed to the thinking minority. It is thus to invite men to emancipate themselves from herd opinion and to assert their intellectual independence. That is, it appeals from popular conviction to the higher court of dispassionate reëxamination of prejudice. Reason renounces the jurisdiction of the crowd mind, and in this sense liberalism is aristocratic rather than democratic. If, however, the appeal to reason is addressed to

the crowd as court of last resort, and embraces the crowd's preconceived ideas and enthusiasms, it becomes appeal to unreason. Reason thus becomes the rationalization of the will of the majority. And since the majority can hardly be presumed to have gained the liberal point of view through special culture, it must be supposed that the average man is naturally a friend of liberty. Liberty is a natural right of which the masses have been deprived by their rulers. The liberal, therefore, calls for the emancipation of the masses and the appeal to reason becomes appeal to nature.

Rousseau made liberalism a gospel of universal emancipation by the simple process of transferring the hope of freedom from culture to nature. Man in the state of nature was not only free, he was wise and good. The laws of nature are rational and benevolent, and from their contemplation arise the loftiest moral sentiments. To obey these laws is the great duty of man, and in such obedience man obeys the laws of his own being and is free. Civilization enslaves man and corrupts him. No one is naturally evil; the bad man is the weak man, whose strength has been depleted by the unnatural ways of civilized life. Civilized man is but a fraction of a man. Social institutions have made him unnatural. Citizen and man are necessarily opposed to each other. "These two words, country and citizen, ought to be expunged from modern languages. . . . Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man . . . he overturns everything; disfigures everything; he loves deformity,

monsters; he will have nothing as Nature made it, not even man; like a saddle-horse man must be trained for man's service—he must be made over according to his fancy, like a tree in his garden." It is to the primitive impulses that everything should be referred. "The natural man is complete in himself. . . . In the natural order of things, all men being equal their common vocation is manhood." The best culture would be that which takes nature for model in everything. To be free man must be natural. The free man is, therefore, spontaneous; his instincts and emotions are not inhibited. "We are never so ridiculous as when acting in set forms. . . . I should be temperate for sensual reasons. . . . I would always keep as near nature as possible in order to humor the senses I have received from her, very sure that the more of herself that is added to my enjoyments, the more of reality I should find in them." Instinct and emotion, when not perverted by the artificial restraints of civilization, are voices of nature and guides to the good life. Hence in the struggle for liberty the man of nature is set in opposition to the man of culture.

Rousseau stands the liberalism of the Eighteenth Century squarely on its head. His alleged individualism turns out to be only naturalism. Love of liberty becomes hostility to culture: there is more real wisdom to be found in a tribe of North American Indians than in all the universities of Europe. In idealizing the natural man, Rousseau would enfranchise "the noble savage" in every breast. Since in the order of nature all men are equal, it follows from this point of view that distinction and dif-

ferentiation among men are the fruit of culture and civilization. It is then as natural man, that is, as undifferentiated man, that humanity attains freedom. But undifferentiated man is man acting as mass. Rousseau sets out with an extreme form of individualism, but since his individual is the same, the identical natural man, in all people, he ends in identifying liberty with spontaneous, that is untrammelled, mass action. We shall have a closer look at this paradox when we presently turn our attention to the bearing of Rousseau's theory of the Social Contract on liberty. In the end, liberty is the liberty of the sovereign and collective will of the people. And who are the people? In theory, everybody in general and nobody in particular. In practice, however, it is said that those who oppose culture to nature would enslave the natural man and are, therefore, the enemies of liberty and of the people; for the people as sovereign, collective will is the free expression of the natural man. In other words, the people consists of those elements in the population upon whose natural man civilization has been for the most part imposed from without; it is the masses against the classes. It was so that the gospel of Jean-Jacques was understood by the multitude; and thus was inspired the baptism of Liberty in the French Revolution.

One need but note the contrast between Rousseau and Voltaire to see how far the former had departed from the Eighteenth Century tradition of liberalism. The names of these two men are so closely associated in the history of liberty, that they are usually supposed to have stood for the same principles and worked for the same

ends. It is true that their combined influence did much to cause the Revolution. But Voltaire appealed to an educated minority and broke down respect for an antiquated social system which stood in the path of the progress of civilization, while Rousseau denounced civilization itself, led the crowd to envisage itself as the true sovereign which had been robbed of its rightful inheritance, caused it to imagine that its own dictatorship would be Liberty, and stirred it to rebellion.

In their temperaments, their standpoints, their objectives, Voltaire and Rousseau were far apart. The face of Voltaire is that of one of the most wide-awake men that ever lived. Rousseau has the face of a dreamer. A psychologist would say that Voltaire was an extravert, Rousseau an introvert. Both men had undoubted genius. Voltaire's thought is a stroke of lightning, Rousseau's an emotional explosion.

It has been said that the true meaning of any social theory is the kind of man in whose interest it is created to be a weapon. And Rousseau certainly did his best to reveal himself. He was born in 1712 and was, therefore, eighteen years younger than Voltaire though he died ten years before him. His entire mature life was thus spent during the years when Voltaire was the dominant intellectual force in continental Europe. For a time, when he was assisting Diderot and D'Alembert with the *Encyclopædia*, he professed to be a disciple of Voltaire. But Rousseau could not remain the disciple of any man. He and Voltaire were not friends.

Voltaire was the exponent of detached and critical

reason, Rousseau of sentiment and emotion. When Voltaire appeals to nature, it is chiefly against the supernatural and the authority of the Church. Rousseau, as we have seen, opposes nature to culture. Voltaire had an irrepressible and dangerous sense of humor. Rousseau like devotees in general, is without humor and overcompensates with sympathy. Voltaire belongs among those who in all ages have been the champions of lightheartedness and sanity, and have made folly, intimidation, sham and rascality ridiculous. He is of the company of Lucian, Butler, Cervantes, Erasmus, Montaigne, Lessing, Anatole France. Rousseau's place is among the prophets. Voltaire seldom indulged in self-pity, and when he was intensely indignant and in earnest it was over some outrageous act which the authorities had committed against the poor and helpless. Rousseau reeks with self-pity, and the injustices against which he rails are almost always those in which he feels himself the injured party. The disillusioned Voltaire seems to have had little faith in the masses, yet he was genuinely social. He made and kept a host of friends, and always had an incredibly wide correspondence with people of all sorts. He is said to have written over fifty thousand letters. Though he lived many years in exile, he seems to have known a large number of his contemporaries and to have kept in touch with the general trend of events. At Ferney, he seems to have shown unusual skill in dealing with people. His employees were devoted to him and he attracted to the place people of various shades of belief and social position. Rousseau on the other hand, was a recluse, a suspicious person with

delusions of persecution, wretched in his loneliness, yet jealous and self-conscious in the company of others. I doubt if he ever had a friend with whom he did not quarrel. Like many lovers of humanity, he was an anti-social person.

Some men are born believers. Without a cause and a creed their ego shrinks. Their wish to be important is rationalized as devotion to principle. Their lack of inner adjustment and their emotional instability—their soul hunger—they mistake for philosophic love of truth. The truth they are always seeking, these varietists and Don Juans of the spirit, is the woman of their dreams—mysterious, perfectly beautiful, romantic Truth, the one and only answer to their great longing. Such people never attain intellectual independence; their life is a series of conversions. They move from one cult to the next without making progress. The objects of their beliefs shift and change, but the act of believing remains the same. They accept their latest faith with the same infantile credulity and delusion of finality as their first.

Rousseau was a believer of this kind. Inconstant in matters of belief, as in his many love affairs, he remained the same Rousseau through all. His autobiography reveals no development in character. But he had to have a faith. He was first a Protestant, then a Catholic, then a Deist, then again a Protestant, and a prophet of the religion of the Return to Mother Nature. But although the form of his belief might change, he never displayed true liberality of mind. He was always the defender of his faith, ever preaching and moralizing, denouncing the

sin of the world, rebuking those who disagreed with him. His was the prototype of that illiberal and intolerantly proselytizing spirit so often found among radicals.

Rousseau felt himself obliged to go out of his way to set men right and point out to them their errors. There is an example of this missionary zeal in a letter he wrote Voltaire. The disastrous earthquake and tidal wave at Lisbon had made a deep impression on many minds; for this fatality occurred at a time when it was the fashion to see in the benevolent order of nature a teleological argument for a divine Providence. Voltaire's *Candide* is a merciless burlesque of Leibnitz' theory that this is the best possible of all worlds, and in this book Voltaire made discomfoting reference to Lisbon. Rousseau was shocked and grieved at Voltaire's impious remarks and wrote to tell him so. Such doctrine was a challenge to Rousseau's faith in nature, and to popular optimism. He reaffirms the dogma of the perfection of nature. The evils in the world are not nature's work but man's. He is afraid that Voltaire will lead people to conclude that life is not worth living. Philosophers, he says, are incompetent to pass judgment on the worth of life. If one wishes information on this important subject, let one consult some "honest tradesman." The democratic "cult of the low-brow" owes much to Rousseau.

Voltaire's dramas frequently brought their author into danger. His free and easy treatment of certain subjects of religious interest made him the object of the bitter hatred of the higher clergy. He was denounced as a

heretic and an infidel, and it became unsafe for him to reside in Paris. That Rousseau's particular brand of liberalism did not prevent his joining with the opponents of free speech in the heresy hunt, we have some evidence in one of Voltaire's letters. "I have heard that in some weekly papers the poet Rousseau has written against my play. This man who has himself written so many impious things presumes to reproach me publicly for having shown little reverence for religion. The public will do me the honor to believe I shall not lose my time in answering the invectives of the poet Rousseau."

Democracies try to achieve moral excellence by legislation. The crowd demands conformity to popular convention and would protect the individual from temptation. Thus the dilemmas of the least civilized are often enacted into law and become the standards of conduct for everyone. In some democratic communities, for instance, no book may be published or sold legally which contains even one passage that might scandalize or lead astray a weak-minded person, or suggest erotic thoughts to youths of impressionable age—or rather to the imaginary young person who exists in the mind of the censor. Democracies, with unlimited faith in the magic and saving power of passing laws against the things which tempt them, use their liberty to suppress and censor the liberal arts. The theatre especially has long been the object of fool-proof legislation—without, however, very satisfactory results for either art or morals. In Geneva, after the Reformation, the Republic had suppressed the theatre, and that

champion of freedom, the French Encyclopædia, in an article on Geneva, discussed this fact in a manner not wholly flattering to the Republic.

Rousseau found in this article occasion to put himself on record for righteousness. In an open letter to his former colleague, D'Alembert, he defended the suppression of the theatre. His point of view is interesting. He says that the theatre has a corrupting influence on the morals of the public. Men are born good, no art can make them so but may easily do the opposite. A busy and contented people do not need such pleasures as the stage provides. Nature and work give man pleasure enough. He warns against the bad example of the loose moral lives of actors, and the temptations to luxury and vice in the display of gaudy clothes and other finery. He is shocked by the drama's preoccupation with sex. Even when love is portrayed as perfectly moral, he thinks the effect is evil because the actress who takes the part of the heroine is usually very attractive. The sight of the beautiful heroine in love only serves to point the contrast between ideal women and one's wife in daily life, and so makes men discontented. The remainder of the letter is designed to show the harm the stage may do religion, and Voltaire's *Mahomet* is cited as an example; the author is charged with trying to make a hero of an infidel.

I am not interested in the hypocrisy of this letter, nor in the motives which may have prompted Rousseau to take such a pose. What interests me is the fact that he could argue in these terms, and for so illiberal a cause.

Rousseau's basic ideas of life and conduct are those of the man on the street.

The *Confessions* reveals the author as a very unadjusted and neurotic person. He is overcome by the loftiest moral sentiments, sometimes on the most incongruous occasion imaginable. Although he failed miserably to put these sentiments into practice, he never tired of preaching them to others, and seemed really to believe that at the last Judgment it would be counted in his favor that none had exceeded his admiration of virtues which he had neglected to live by. Men have condemned him for this. But to condemn is not to understand. Rousseau at heart condemned himself. He was haunted all his life by a feeling of inferiority and a sense of failure. His spirit was in conflict with itself. Like Luther, he was preoccupied with the feeling of sin and the need of redemption. Unlike Luther, he failed to find deliverance. This feeling of sin is common among men who accept the popular conventions and *mores* as final. It becomes tragic to the extent that a man's own habits and impulses are in conflict with the very moral sentiments which are vital to him. Rousseau seized upon these moral sentiments and criteria of duty and self-esteem which were in fact the outgrowth of popular moral convention; he used them to denounce and resist the social order with which he was in conflict. He attributed his sentiments to nature as their source, and idealized it. Nature becomes his refuge from man, and from a civilization before which he stands self-condemned. There is, psychologically speaking, more in

the "return to nature" than this. Nature as refuge is a sort of parent-symbol or mother-image. It is also a lost Eden in which man, returning, gets back his childhood innocence. Hence in nature there is redemption as well as freedom. The multitude, when it frees itself from corrupt rulers and the restraints of civilization, and can express its sovereign will spontaneously, will behave as natural man. The curse upon mankind will be removed. Rousseau made natural liberty into a religion with himself as its prophet.

In an earlier chapter, I dealt briefly with the psychology of the Christian symbols of redemption from sin. It would seem that men very generally feel themselves guilty and thus estranged. They long for "reconciliation with the Father." Christianity asserts that man must be made over, "born again," That is, he longs to become a child again and have a new start. Man desires the innocence, the freedom from responsibility, the security, the parental love which were his as a little child. Psychologists call this longing "the infantile return." The symbols in which it is expressed are usually those of death and rebirth. I pointed out the psychological meaning of this symbolism in Christian tradition. But it is not confined to Christianity. Men everywhere dream of regaining some lost paradise. It is to this longing that Rousseau appeals with his gospel of freedom by return to nature. Social redemption and the Golden Age became for vast numbers the goal of democracy. As a result, largely of the impetus which Rousseau gave to these ideas, Nineteenth Century liberalism developed its

utopian "religion of humanity." And out of the religion of humanity came radicalism. Radicalism has for many people truly the value and function of a religion. It is held with the same emotional fervor; it inspires a similar spirit of self-sacrifice: it also transforms existence into a cosmic drama and develops its own peculiar orthodoxies, ceremonials, and evangelism.

In order to understand how greatly modern liberalism and radicalism are indebted to Rousseau, it is necessary only to state in dogmatic form the cardinal principles of his doctrine. They are first, The Natural Goodness of Man; second, The Determinism of the Environment; third, The Return to Nature; fourth, The Sovereignty of the People; fifth, The Social Compact. One is at once reminded of five points of Calvinism. This is no accidental or whimsical association. It is significant that Rousseau grew up in the city where Calvin had established the Reformation. Calvin was for Rousseau what Hegel was for Marx. He furnished the setting and raised the issues. He dealt, as you might say, with the same questions and answered them with the same air of finality. Rousseau's answers were almost precisely the opposite of Calvin's, but the point is that the *dilemmas* are the same. We shall see this as we proceed. But first I wish to make another observation. Try to imagine the liberalism and radicalism of to-day stripped of these five dogmas, and ask yourself what would be left. Obviously the liberal would have to occupy his mind with entirely different interests or liberalism would be a thing of the past. Now this is precisely what is happening. These issues are played out; to the

thinking man of to-day not one of Rousseau's five dogmas is true. This is what is the matter with liberalism to-day. It can survive only if it can de-Rousseauize itself.

The doctrine of the natural goodness of man supplants the Calvinist dogma of the total depravity of man. To Saint Paul, the natural man is a sinner since the fall of man. Calvinism saw in Adam's sin the corruption of his entire nature and that of all his descendants. Rousseau simply reverses this doctrine. Man is by nature a saint. If he lived according to nature's laws he would be perfect. It is not from nature but from civilization that he must be redeemed. In so far as this teaching is a denial of the doctrine of original sin, there is much to be said for it. For the consequences of that doctrine are among the most unhappy things we have inherited from the past. It is essentially hostile to any humanistic culture.

Rousseau, however, was not a humanist. He was a humanitarian: and there is a world of difference between the two. Humanism stands for discipline, excellence, proportion, discrimination of worth, intellectual independence, criticism of dogma and of herd opinion. In a word, it is an ally of civilization. But humanitarianism idealizes man in general and makes mere sympathy the sum of all virtue and wisdom. Walt Whitman says that the greatest of all truths, that which underlies the wisdom of Christ and Socrates, is "the dear love of comrades." Brotherly love is very desirable—when it is intelligent. But I always suspect that he who loves everybody in general does not love anyone in particular. Love should have at least a little exclusiveness and preference for its object, or it is

mere gregarious instinct which man has in common with animals. But then Whitman "could almost turn and live with animals." He had much in common with Rousseau.

In proclaiming the natural goodness of man, Rousseau gives primacy to instinct and emotion, and minimizes discipline and reason and distinction of worth among men. One man is by nature just as good as another. But the wisest men have taught that goodness is excellence; it must be achieved; it is that which marks the distinction between higher men and lower, and between men and animals. It is not so with Rousseau. "Happy the people among whom one can be good without effort and just without virtue." As men are naturally good, it is not necessary that they excel in intelligence in order to do good. Indeed Rousseau seems to find that it is the simple-minded people who are the best. Therefore let men follow their natural inclinations, be inspired by noble sentiments, and they need have no doubts as to what is right. The sovereign people can do no wrong.

Many democrats and liberals share with Rousseau this supreme confidence in the majority. It is because man is naturally good that you can trust the people. There need not be, and therefore should not be, restraints upon the collective will. All that is necessary to abolish the evils and abuses of society is that the mass should assert itself. Since the days of Andrew Jackson our Democracy has not held excellence in high regard, nor has it had great respect for intelligence. To be democratic one must just be natural. The plain man resents superiority. He is just as good as anybody. If anyone is

suspected it is the educated, the cosmopolitan, the urbane man. The rural community, not the progressive city, is held to be the stronghold of righteousness. It is the proletariat whose dictatorship will create the perfect society. The guidance of superior wisdom is not necessary when goodness is a gift of nature.

I suppose it is hardly necessary to state that the dogma of the natural goodness of man is as unpsychological as that of his total depravity. We have stopped talking about man in general in these ways. We are beginning to discover the theoretical significance of the perfectly obvious fact that some men are better than others by both nature and achievement. During the past century emphasis has been placed upon that in which men are alike. In the future it may be placed on that in which they are different. Psychologists are at work on tests by which differences of superiority and inferiority may be measured and graded. It is too soon yet to generalize, but we may well expect that the results of the intelligence tests on democratic dogma will be far reaching. Now goodness has to do with intelligence; it is primarily intelligent behavior. But it also has to do with adjustment, and this has to be achieved by each individual. There are in the natures of us all many anti-social impulses, infantile and animal traits and savage desires. These must be adequately repressed and worked into effective habit-patterns or there is trouble. Thus, out of the raw material of impulse, each must construct a personality. In civilization one becomes a free man only

by overcoming himself. The dogma of the natural goodness of man is little more than flattery of the crowd.

The doctrine that man is the product of his environment follows closely upon that of his natural goodness. Man, according to Rousseau, would continue in his natural goodness were it not for the corrupting influences of the society in which he lives. "If there is any miserable country in the world where one cannot live save through doing evil, and where the citizens are rogues by necessity, it is not the criminal who should be hung, but he who compels him to be such. . . . The first false idea which enters into his head is the germ of error and vice." The learned societies of Europe are nothing but "schools of falsehood." Again and again Rousseau holds society chiefly responsible for the misconduct of the individual. The will of the individual is thus not free; in this Rousseau agrees with the Calvinists and their doctrine of predestination or "election." Theologians said the individual was predestined to salvation or damnation not of his own choice but by the will of God. Rousseau substitutes society for God.

Thus, as Carlyle said, men have a new gospel; the world is to be reformed not by each man mending his ways but by all together drawing up a new constitution. The evil in the world is not after all deeply rooted: it is merely contingent upon the forms of social organization. The democratic masses can easily eradicate it by changing the system. Environmentalism is an important article of faith for present-day liberals. Radicals are

hospitable to such doctrines as Behaviorism and the inheritance of acquired characters, not for psychological or biological reasons, but from sociological considerations. Many see nothing inconsistent with liberalism in a psychology which presents the individual as a mere automaton. The individual exists not in himself, but in and for society, and is just what society made him. In a perfect society he would automatically become perfect. Therefore, his imperfections are nothing for which he is responsible. Society is to blame. In radical propaganda this argument is used as an indictment of the present social order.

The extent to which the individual is influenced by his environment is an unsettled question. But it is a question of fact and is not to be settled by a priori reasoning. Perhaps individuals differ greatly in this respect, some being much more susceptible to outside influences than others. Environmentalism as maintained by Rousseau and his followers is pure dogma, constructed in advance of adequate psychological knowledge. This dogma is responsible for much of the still prevailing sentimental attitude toward criminals. And it is interesting to note that it is a favorite doctrine not only among professed liberals, but also with certain narrow-minded guardians of the morals of the public. A pamphlet recently issued by one of the most illiberal organizations in the United States supports the demand for rigid censorship of books and the theatre with the argument that whatever enters the mind of the individual through the eye becomes a permanent part of him for good or ill. Hence the law

must protect us all from ever seeing any object which might lead to our downfall. Of course, if we are such helpless victims of circumstances, we cannot be trusted with moral responsibility, and the state is justified in taking away our freedom.

Environmentalism is thus a stock argument of enemies of liberty. The argument has some plausibility in the case of very young children; but even here the influence of environment is often greatly exaggerated. Children who grow up in identically the same environment often develop widely divergent types of character, for in any environment the organism is not passive but active and *selective*. Only the extreme form of behaviorist psychology would hold that character and personality are nothing but those habit-patterns which are stamped into one's nervous tissue by an external arrangement of stimuli. The behaviorist himself is compelled to make this statement hypothetically, since it lacks the support of experimental evidence. At most he can only say that if he could absolutely control all the possible stimuli to which a child could react from birth to maturity, he believes he could compel the child to become any kind of person he might choose. But, of course, it is impossible to subject a human life to such continuously controlled laboratory conditions, and even if it were possible, and the experimenter knew enough to do it, all that such an experiment would mean would be that the psychologist had artificially selected the stimuli to which his subject could react. In the normal environment, much is left to chance, and the selection is done by the subject himself.

Arguments drawn from such artificial conditions would not have much weight when applied to normal conditions. It would seem that it is precisely in its rigid environmentalism that the case of behaviorism is weakest. Here it revives the error of the old associationist psychology, which held that the infant mind was a *tabula rasa* on which everything that later constituted it was printed from without. The more complex mental phenomena were held to be not so much the outgrowth of one's own nature as constructions or mechanisms made up of assembled psychological atoms and impressed into the organism from without. The old sensationalism was interested in problems of knowledge, behaviorism is interested in behavior, but both are forms of associationism. To both, the individual is a product rather than a process of organic development.

Now it is the environmentalism of behaviorism which causes it to be popular with certain liberals. To make man perfect, operate on him from without, manipulate his environment, regulate the conditions of his life. Never mind about his responsibility; the very word is out of fashion among advanced thinkers. Bring on the republic of free men by treating every man as if he were an automaton. The masses are to be emancipated by social machinery. It is not the individual who needs cure. The new liberalism is occupied with curing the ills of society. And who is society? Are there no individuals in society? What moreover is the social environment, the manipulation of which is calculated to redeem the individual? Are we not all of us by our very presence and

behavior the social environment of one another? The environment is not an impersonal thing: it is you and I. We are each other's environment. So to hold the environment responsible for the goodness of the individual means that you are not responsible for your own behavior but for mine, and I, while having no responsibility for myself, am somehow responsible for you. This is a bright idea. We will each regulate the other rather than himself. Now see how Nineteenth Century liberalism worked out in practice. As Rousseauian religion of humanity it became utopian, then radical and the progress of radicalism leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Men cannot keep liberty and at the same time transfer responsibility from the individual to the community. Environmentalism, the dogma of both communists and prohibitionists, is incompatible with liberty.

Rousseau's doctrine of the return to nature, I have already discussed. I said it has something in common with religious symbols of death and rebirth. Thus, here again, we may compare this teaching with Calvinism. The Christian doctrine of regeneration as elaborated by the Calvinists offers no hope for the natural man. He is utterly condemned. He is a sinner not only because of what he does, but because of what he *is*. He is a lost soul and may be saved only by the grace of God. He must be transformed into a new creature, given a new nature. Carried to its logical conclusion this doctrine could mean that nothing unregenerate man has done or could do would be pleasing in the sight of God. No work of art, or achievement of genius or industry, no mere human

wisdom, no man-made institution has in itself any saving value. There is more joy in Heaven over one sinner, however unworthy, who repents and experiences a change of heart, than over ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance. Hence men come to believe that all that is necessary for spiritual superiority is the experience of conversion. The pursuit of knowledge, the age-long effort of the genius of mankind for excellence and beauty and graciousness of life, would naturally be less encouraged among men who were each thus occupied with the salvation of his soul, than in communities where the meaning and worth of human life were thought to consist in elegance of form and distinction of worth. That the tremendous emphasis given to the doctrine of regeneration contributed to cause the cultural slump in Nineteenth Century America there can be little doubt.

Had Rousseau been a humanist, he would have challenged this doctrine of regeneration with a defence of human excellence. He would have spoken out like a man in behalf of the wisdom and culture of the ages. He would have shown that what men call the spiritual life can be and has often been attained by human effort. He would have insisted that men pay respect to human worth gained by self-discipline. He would have confronted both the regenerate man and the natural man with the truly civilized man. But he was not a humanist. He confronts Calvinism with a sentimental idealization of the natural man. He outdoes the preachers of regeneration in declining to give honor to cultural achievement. He sees in civilization hardly anything but its corruptions, arti-

ficialities, follies. The Calvinist sought escape from the sin of the world in divine grace, through which one received a "new nature." Rousseau seeks such escape in the idealization of Nature herself.

The idea of freedom as return to nature has influenced liberalism in various ways. Freedom is held to be a natural right, a gift of nature, rather than a human achievement. It is spontaneity. If men cannot be spontaneous as individuals, perhaps they may indulge in anti-social behavior by acting as crowds. They become less concerned about those individual liberties which are guaranteed by bills of rights; they demand liberty as removal of restraints upon the will of the crowd. De Tocqueville noticed this trait among the American masses nearly one hundred years ago and warned against "the tyranny of the majority." Siegfried in our own day again calls attention to it.

The return to nature, moreover, leads men to feel that they are free when they are *merely formless*. Hence democracy tends to become indifferent to culture if not openly hostile to it. To the free-born American citizen anyone who is genuinely interested in art and philosophy is a "nut." There are whole communities in which one cannot even use the English language correctly without being accused of putting on airs. And, in our formless democracy, even privacy is resented. I believe we have less of it than any so called civilized country in the world. Everything goes on in the glare of publicity. No secrets are spared, no delicacy is free from invasion. Our free public is naturally interested in the personal affairs of

every one; to restrain its idle curiosity would be to interfere with its liberty.

Civilization is not denial of nature; it is man's improvement on nature. The improvement is not uniform. It is by no means complete. It is costly. To side with civilization against natural man does not mean that one must be satisfied with all, or even any, of its present forms. There is nothing final about these forms. The civilized man is free to criticize them and to desire their improvement. Such improvement is called progress. The liberal is a progressive. He would like to believe in the progress of civilization and the return to nature at the same time. To the logician this might seem a difficult thing to do. But faith always has a logic of its own. Progress is a loose term and may be variously defined. As I have just used the word, it means any sequence of human achievements, the total result of which is to improve the conditions of living. Used in this sense, the term indicates always some definite and concrete gain which results from continued effort in a given direction. There need be no general law of progress, no uniform necessity for it, no cosmic principle or force which directs it or underwrites its ultimate success. It may at any time take an unexpected turn or stop short. Any hope we may have for the future of progress is based upon experience. It usually happens that one improvement suggests another, although it does not always do so, nor is there any assurance that it will. Future improvement, moreover, is frequently unforeseeable since it consists mostly of discoveries and inventions which have not yet been

made. Since to foresee such discoveries and their results would be to discover them before they are discovered, which is absurd, it follows that no one can predict the goal of progress in general. Hence there is not much use in talking about it.

In the sense in which I have used the term, progress is incompatible with the return to nature. How then does the liberal reconcile the two? He conceives of progress as a gift of nature. Nature herself is progressive. This is why liberals in the Nineteenth Century took kindly to the doctrine of evolution. It seemed to guarantee social progress. Progress and evolution became one and the same thing. Future improvement was no longer thought of as contingent upon human inventiveness and achievement. Evolution, the great law of nature working through history, would inevitably lead the whole mass of mankind to Utopia. History had a program. It was a pageant, a great parade, headed straight for the big tent where the performance of the Coöperative Commonwealth of Free Men would soon begin. Liberals conceived of progress as a mystical cosmic principle which in the end would vindicate all the faithful who had believed in it, and in fact redeem mankind in spite of themselves. Although none of the generalizations with which biologists stated the theory of organic evolution was applicable as an explanation of social change (Spencer's universal "law" being applicable only to the fiction that society is an organism), and although Nineteenth Century scientists showed nature to be anything but the benevolent and rational Maternal Being which Rousseau

imagined, men looked to natural law to reconstruct the institutions of society and bring liberty and justice and material abundance to all. Liberals saw in history an "evolutionary and revolutionary trend." Socialistic ideas were mingled with those of the older individualistic liberalism and began to supplant them. The materialist interpretation of history, or economic determinism, became popular. Individual contributions to human advance were minimized. Progress was the work of impersonal forces. It was not the creation of unique men, the original thinkers, the inventors and artists and scientists. It was the by-product of the historic class struggle, the conflict of the masses against the classes. *The masses themselves* were the unconscious agencies of the forces of progress. The thinkers had contributed nothing, they had merely reported the deeds of forward-moving humanity, after "the people" had accomplished them. Indeed most men of thought were portrayed as mere retainers of and apologists for the reactionary master-classes. The goal of progress was fixed and predictable. It was the emancipation of the mass, the rule of the people. The rule of the people was liberty, and to such an end social evolution as a law of nature was striving. This leads us to the fourth dogma of Rousseauism, liberty as the Sovereignty of the People.

Calvinism had exalted the Sovereignty of God to the central place in its theological system. The chief end of man was to glorify God and to enjoy him forever. Sovereignty was made the most important of the divine attributes. God's will alone is free. He elects to whom he will

show mercy, and whom He will punish everlastingly. To His revealed will, the mind and heart of man must submit absolutely; in fact all things are ordered for His glory. It is not to be wondered at that the mind of Rousseau was occupied with the idea of sovereignty. Again he substitutes society for God. Hence it followed that his Nineteenth Century disciples declared that "Humanity is God." Of course he does not mean that organized existing society is divine. He means that the freely exercised collective will of the people acting as mass is the only and absolute sovereign.

It would seem that the doctrine of the return to nature, if carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to anarchism. This tendency it shares with the doctrine of regeneration. John Humphrey Noyes, the Perfectionist, argued that the regenerate soul, being perfect in Christ, owes no deference to man-made laws. Christianity, as I have said, has more than once been obliged to suppress the antinomian trend of its teaching. So Rousseau's doctrine would logically lead to the egoism of Max Stirner. Whether it actually did so in Stirner's case I cannot say. But that it strongly influenced romantic and humanitarian anarchists, like Bakunin and Kropotkin, is obvious. Rousseau avoids anarchism in the ordinary sense of the term by substituting the sovereign and untrammelled will of the people for that of the individual. It is only when acting as crowd or mass that man may be lawless. The collective will may not be bound or restrained. It alone is free and absolute, like the Divine Will of Calvinist theology. We have seen how Seventeenth and Eighteenth

Century liberals labored to limit sovereignty, to bring the sovereign under the rule of law and reason, to set bounds beyond which the sovereign might not invade the individual. They understood that absolute sovereignty and liberty cannot exist together. This is just as true for a democracy as for a monarchy. In fact, it is probably more difficult to preserve individual rights in the former than in the latter, for the monarch is *another will*, an *outsider* and men watch him with fear and suspicion. When they feel *themselves* to be the ruling power they become less vigilant. The men, therefore, who established the Republic of the United States, being liberals of the old English school, wisely feared the power of the people. They continued to regard the new sovereign with the same jealousy and suspicion which they felt toward the old. They did their best to prevent its becoming absolute. They carefully limited the powers granted the new government and created various checks and balances to its exercise of authority.

Now all this counts for nothing in the teaching of Rousseau. The only true sovereign that ever existed is the people acting as mass. All other ruling power is condemned, not so much because it invades the individual's liberty, as because it is usurpation of the power of the people. To that power there is rightly no limit. The liberal, therefore, should be zealous not so much for his individual rights, as for the right of the people to rule. This change of emphasis shifts the whole perspective of the struggle for liberty. In the *Social Contract*, Rousseau says:

"I suppose man arrived at a point where obstacles, which prejudice his preservation in the state of nature, outweigh, by their resistance, the force which each individual can employ to maintain himself in this condition. Then the primitive state can no longer exist; and mankind would perish did it not change its way of life. . . .

"To find a form of association which shall defend and protect with the public force the person and property of each associate, and by means of which each, uniting with all, shall obey however only himself, and remain as free as before. Such is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract gives the solution. . . .

"These clauses [of the contract] clearly understood, may be reduced to one; that is, the total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the entire community—for first, each giving himself entirely, the condition is the same for all; and the conditions being the same for all, no one has an interest in making it onerous for the others. . . .

"Further, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as complete as it can be, and *no associate has anything to claim: for, if some rights remained to individuals, as there would be no common superior who could decide between them and the public, each being in some points his own judge, would soon profess to be so in everything.* . . .

"Finally, each giving himself to all gives himself to none; and as there is not an associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as is ceded, an equivalent is gained for all that is lost.

"Each of us gives in common his person and all his force under the supreme direction of the general will, and we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.

"Immediately, instead of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a *moral and collective body*." This public personage, the collective will is sovereign. And "It should be observed too, that public deliberation, which may bind all the subjects to the sovereign, on account of the two different relations under which each of them is considered, cannot for the contrary reason bind the sovereign towards himself, and that consequently it is against the nature of the body politic that the sovereign impose upon himself a law which he cannot infringe . . . *there is not and cannot be any sort of obligatory fundamental law for the body of the people*, not even the Social Contract.

"Now the sovereign being formed only of the individuals comprising it, neither has nor could have interests contrary to theirs; consequently *the sovereign power has no need of guarantee towards the subjects*.

". . . whoever shall refuse to obey the general will shall be compelled to it by the whole body, which signifies nothing if not that he will be *forced to be free*." (The italics are mine).

So this is the new liberty: the tyranny of all over each. Freedom is merely the right to participate in the dictatorship of the crowd. If one disobeys the sovereign people, he is to be "forced to be free;" that is, individual freedom has now become abject obedience to the majority. It

is only when running with the multitude that man has rights; as individual, he has no rights. Now that The People is sovereign there are to be "no guarantees toward the subjects." Nothing could be more plain; once power comes into the hands of the people there are to be no more guarantees of individual liberty. Constitutional bills of rights are worthless; "there is not and cannot be any sort of obligatory fundamental law for the body of the people."

The idea that guarantees are unnecessary because there is no conflict of interest between the individual and the crowd is a delusion. This is to say that the electorate knows better than I what is good for me. Such doctrine merely supports the crowd in its fond delusion of infallibility, and in its passion to meddle with everything and everybody. Nothing is to be left for me to decide for myself. The compact majority will decide all things for me; it has a brotherly interest in my welfare, for I am now its property. So also has the farmer for his pig, and in the end the public eats up the man. Of course there is most violent conflict of interest between myself as a private person and myself as a member of a mass. As the latter, I am a mere numerical unit. At best the public can represent only those interests which I have in common with every one else, and it is ever ready to sacrifice all my other interests to these. Complete and entire individuals can never meet in public. As public I am but a fraction of myself. The general public is not ever the sum of the fractions to which it reduces mankind; it is only the greatest common denominator of those frac-

tions. Between the public and the individual there is an issue of greatest importance; it is this: which is to have ultimate moral responsibility?

Rousseau seems to think that I am truly compensated for the loss of responsibility for myself by the right which I receive to share equally with the others in ruling my neighbors. Most men, I confess, seem to find consolation in the exercise of this right; indeed one suspects that it is the great interest which the members of a democracy have in common. But what if I prefer to mind my own business? What consolation is it then to me that I am "forced to be free?"

Thus far, I have confined the discussion to the theoretical assertion of the alleged identity of interest between the individual and the sovereign people which, according to Rousseau, makes guarantees of personal liberty in a democracy unnecessary. Let us note how this theory works out in practice. Theoretically, everyone participates equally in the collective will. In practice, this will is the will of a partisan group. Frequently it is not even the will of a majority, but of a coercive minority which has not scrupled to manipulate itself into a position where it held balance of power at a time when the public was chiefly interested in deciding some wholly unrelated issue. Commonly the public is misled by skilful propagandists who disclose neither their own identity nor their real objectives. Most of the issues presented to the public for decision are misrepresented, and seldom does more than a small portion of the population show an active interest in public affairs, which are for the most part left

to those who make their living as professional politicians. It is doubtful if there exists such a thing as the collective will of the people. Specially interested groups of people are permitted to have their own way, usually at the expense and inconvenience of the rest of us, largely as a result of popular indifference. When there is not this indifference, opinion becomes sharply divided, and a public decision represents the victory of one faction over the other. To what extent and with respect to what things shall the victorious faction coerce the opposition into obedience? Once it was thought that this question was settled by our Constitution. But organized crowds have made the discovery that with sufficient pressure they can break through the constitutional barriers around the rights of individuals and minorities. The crowd having tasted power becomes restive at any restraint, ruthless and insolent in its treatment of dissenters. Liberty, as rule of the people, is thus a fiction; for the rule of the people is the rule of a faction. In the people's name one faction rules another. The present trend of democracy is to place the individual at the mercy of the most mob-minded, rapacious, and intemperate elements of the population, for it is those with the least respect for the rights of others who are most persistent in the struggle for power. Liberty as rule of the people destroys liberty as individual right. The sovereign will of the people is a polite name for the tyranny of the best organized faction. This "sovereign," like his predecessors, must be restrained by law, for he is by nature a despot. Rousseau's sovereign collective will is little more than the deification

of the collective egoism of men, a boundless egoism, which in becoming collective would, if it could, override every human consideration.

The fifth dogma in the Rousseauist creed is the Social Contract. The notion that government had its origin in a mutual agreement of free men, living until then in the state of nature, was not original with Rousseau. The contract theory had been stated by Hobbes and Locke and others. It provided arguments useful in combating the dogma of the divine right of kings. Hobbes and Locke drew different conclusions from this premise, and although the doctrine is revolutionary, it is not necessarily democratic. It may mean only that the authority of the king is presumed to represent the will of the nation. Rousseau's treatment of this theme, however, is positively utopian. He goes beyond Locke's doctrine of the consent of the governed. Sovereignty may not be delegated or alienated, and not even the Social Contract itself is permanently binding. Hence the free and equal citizens may at any time abolish the existing contract and draw up a new one more to their liking. So the way to cure the ills of society is to abolish the present system *in toto* and have a new deal. The reorganization of society is a simple matter. All that is necessary is that the collective will ordain a new covenant. We have already seen that in practice every sort of propagandist group presumes to speak for the sovereign people in such matters as this. Social reconstruction now became the new gospel of salvation. Men became preoccupied with "the social problem," as if there were but one such problem and one

panacea. To the extent that Rousseau's influence spread, liberals were drawn towards radicalism and tended to become chronically revolutionary.

I cannot think that it was a mere coincidence that men became fascinated with the idea of the Social Contract during the years following the Reformation. However much the older naturalism and nominalism may have contributed to the elaboration of this doctrine, it is not surprising that it should have made strong appeal to men living in Protestant communities. Calvinists studied the Old Testament in search of models for the theocratic state. There was much speculation on the condition of Adam before the fall of man, which furnished the imagery for subsequent theories about man in the state of nature. Rousseau's natural man is really *Adam in the garden of Eden*. But Calvinism contributed to the theory of the Social Contract more than the figure of Adam. It contributed the very idea of the *Covenant itself*. Was not the Testament itself a covenant, which God had made with His people? Calvinism laid strong emphasis on the "New Covenant," the new dispensation and covenant of grace. To the Calvinist, the Covenant had an importance which the Sacraments had for the Catholic. It was upon the divine promise sealed with the new covenant that Calvinism, with its doctrine of "the perseverance of the saints," based the assurance of salvation. Calvinists, moreover, founded the *religious community* upon a covenant which the believers entered into with one another. In America this practice, begun by the Pilgrims on the Mayflower, was doubtless very advantageous in the

founding of the colonies, and, as we shall see, set a precedent which was later followed by various communities of reformers in their efforts to reconstruct society by the method of "association."

The emphasis which Rousseau gives to the Social Contract again reveals the Calvinistic background of his thought. He transforms theology into sociology. But in his social thinking he retains many of the emotional values of the religious devotee. He is mystical, rapturous, dogmatic. Under his influence liberalism ceases to be realistic, and becomes "idealistic"—that is, melodramatic. It was "idealism" to idealize the masses, to hope for social revolution.

We have an excellent although extreme illustration of this social idealism in the selections which Eltzbacher has made from the writings of Bakunin. I quote almost at random: "Every evolution signifies the negation of its starting point. Since according to the materialists the basis or starting point is material, the negation must necessarily be ideal, that is, everything that lives makes the effort to perfect itself as fully as possible. . . . History consists of the progressive negation of man's original bestiality by the evolution of his humanity. . . . We believe in the final triumph of humanity on earth. . . . We yearn for the coming of this triumph and seek to hasten it with united effort. . . . All rights and duties are founded on liberty. The right of freely uniting and separating is the first and most important of all political rights . . . liberty is not a matter of isolation, therefore, but of mutuality—not of separateness but of combination; for every

man it is only the mirroring of his humanity (that is of his human rights) in the consciousness of his brothers." But "men will be held together in society no longer by a supreme authority, but by the legally binding force of contract. . . . To escape its wretched lot the populace has three ways, two imaginary and one real. The two first are the rum shop and the church, the third is the social revolution. . . . A cure is possible only through the social revolution—that is, through the destruction of all institutions of inequality and the establishment of economic and social equality. . . .

"The revolution is already at hand today. . . . What keeps the salvation-bringing thought from going through the laboring classes with a rush? Their ignorance. . . . Hence the aim must consist in making him (the laborer) completely conscious of what he wants, evoking in him the thought that corresponds to his impulses. If once the thoughts of the laboring classes have mounted to the level of their impulses, then will their will be soon determined, and their power irresistible."

The direct line of descent of these sentiments reaches from Rousseau, through the "idealists" of the French Revolution, to the radicalism of the Nineteenth Century. It is only necessary to remove the doctrine from its original idyllic setting to the stage of the industrial conflict, and to substitute the proletariat for "humanity," and behold that which often passes for liberalism and advanced thought even to-day!

But such ideas were not confined to this direct line of descent. Rousseauism was in the air in the Nineteenth

Century. Men absorbed it who had never read a word written by its author. The idea of making society over by means of a new compact or form of association was very common in America one hundred years ago. There is not much evidence that the leaders of the American Revolution were greatly influenced, at least directly, by Rousseau. They seem to have derived their liberal traditions from Locke and the old English liberals. But when the generation who had carried through the War for Independence passed away, a change began to come over the American mind. It became more romantic, more democratic. The franchise was extended. With the success of the Jacksonian movement the old political leadership of the educated classes was repudiated. The power and influence of the rank and file increased enormously. The public expressions of civilization in America became colored to an extent hitherto unknown in our history by the interests, prejudices, beliefs and self-idealization of the common masses. The shifting of the cultural center of gravity was felt, not only in politics, but in religion, in art, in journalism, in literature. Everywhere it *tended to lower the quality of leadership*. It was then that the old liberalism, derived from England, began to decline, and a new liberalism appeared modified by the ideals and enthusiasms and social hopes of the average man.

This new American liberalism had much in common with Rousseau. With many men democracy became a kind of religion of humanity, in which were proclaimed precisely those five dogmas which, I have shown, were the cardinal doctrines of Rousseau—the Natural goodness of

Man, the Determinism of the Environment, the Return to Nature, the Sovereignty of the People, the Social Contract. Perhaps no writer of the Nineteenth Century has closer spiritual kinship with Rousseau than Walt Whitman, and Whitman's songs, both in form and content, are the canticles of the American religion of democracy. American liberals have never on the whole, however, taken kindly to the socialistic elaborations of Rousseauist doctrine which constitute the radicalism of continental Europe. The reason for this, I think, is largely economic. Class distinctions, opportunity and ambition have each a different rôle here. Perhaps also American traditions of liberalism became fixed before the country was industrialized.

That the doctrine of the Social Contract made a deep impression on the American mind in the Early Nineteenth Century, we have abundant evidence in the wave of enthusiasm for reform which swept over the country. Perhaps I should say waves of reform, for the reformers were of many kinds; they were everywhere, and each had his plan for the perfection and reorganization of society and the government. Communities were founded in large numbers, each with the idea of demonstrating to the public a better way of common life or form of compact by establishing its peculiar form of "association."

To many the idea of the new start took the traditional form of religion. It held that the millennium would be proclaimed here in the New World, and numerous ideal colonies were organized to welcome it. Other reformers turned from voluntary association to propaganda de-

signed to change government and law. Reform legislation was urged for the "perfection" of society, and constitutional conventions and amendments were proposed. The assumption was, and still is, that everybody and everything can be reformed by law. All that is necessary is that the sovereign people or their representatives issue a decree. It is also assumed that any regulation of the individual which the collective will chooses to make will be and can be put into effect. Habits and customs and convictions of those to be regulated by law need not be taken into account; it is not necessary to defer to the psychology of human nature. Let the compact majority merely draw up a new clause to the Social Contract. Now this is precisely the assumption of Rousseau's doctrine of the Social Compact. The individual will entering the collective will surrenders itself; hence the compact is unanimous. There is no tyranny of the majority; through the Social Contract there is always perfect agreement. The individual's will is acting freely in the collective will, even when the latter forces him into grudging obedience.

I suppose it is hardly necessary for me to add that the whole theory of the Social Compact is a fiction. It is both unpsychological and unhistorical. Scholars no longer believe that organized society had its origin in any such manner. The autonomous individual did not exist in the state of nature. At best we may only hope that he may emerge from the culture of civilization. Government is not the result of an original contract. Originally it was tyranny. Civilization has been and is a struggle to bring and keep it within the bounds of reason and justice. Man-

kind has never by any general agreement surrendered the individual to the absolute sovereignty of anyone, either king or multitude.

I have discussed the dogmas of Rousseau separately in order to show specifically the differences between his teaching and the liberalism we have inherited from the Renaissance and the Eighteenth Century English. When his system of belief is analyzed we are moreover able to see just what modern liberalism and radicalism have borrowed from him. But a system of doctrine is something more than a compound of separate and distinct ideas. It is an attitude towards life. It is the self-expression of a *certain kind of man*. Viewed as a whole, Rousseau's teaching is a kind of intellectual and moral relaxation, a blurring of distinctions of worth, a letting down of barriers. It is as emotional release that Rousseau gives one the illusion of freedom. This philosophy is of the heart, not of the head. There is a quality in it which is soft and warm and expansive. I feel like a convalescent when I read Rousseau.

Thus nature ceases to be a struggle for existence and becomes motherly, reflecting the moods and noblest aspirations of man. Men are all brothers and equal by nature. The simplest are the wisest, the most humble the noblest, and freedom is for all; it need not be achieved; it is a natural right. As such it is unrestrained egoism. Lost to the individual in society, it returns to him magnified as the egoism of the crowd. Thus as sovereign collective will there is escape for man from the restraints of reason and institutions.

Here then we find a mystical and emotional appreciation of nature, an idealization of simple humanity, a tendency to deny the primacy of intellect and to assert instead that of instinct and inspiration, egoism asserting itself as spontaneity or "free spirit"—that is, spirit of revolt. All this together is *Romanticism*. Rousseau was not the only Eighteenth Century Romanticist, but it is largely as a result of his influence that the liberalism of the Nineteenth Century became romantic.

This romantic liberalism grew into an important social phenomenon even before the close of the Eighteenth Century. It was the faith of Robespierre and other prophets of "The Rights of Man" in the French Revolution. It inspired the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft, the best-known literary woman of that generation in the English-speaking world. It was with writers such as she that the Feminist movement of the Nineteenth Century really had its origin. In advocating the independence and equality of woman, this writer reasons from Rousseauist premises. Having lived in France during the Revolution, she was strongly influenced by the new gospel of revolt and emancipation. When Burke criticized the Revolution, she replied, about the same time as Paine, with a book on the *Vindication of the Rights of Man*. This she followed with the *Vindication of the Rights of Women*, in which arguments for Feminism are drawn directly from Rousseau's principles. She quotes Rousseau frequently, and like him she sees freedom as escape from inhibitions and institutions. Like him, she also moralizes and expresses the will to revolt in terms of lofty and noble sentiment.

It was as the champion of natural morals that Rousseau had condemned the institutions of civilization. It is from a similar standpoint, rather than by reasoning from results, that Mary Wollstonecraft condemns the institution of marriage and the prevailing notions respecting sex. "Right and wrong, virtue and vice must be studied in the abstract and not be the measure of weak human laws and customs. . . . Women should be concerned with real virtue and not appearances. . . . There must be equality of the sexes as human beings. . . . Elegance is inferior to virtue." The basis of morality is not reason but humanitarian sentiment. It is "the love of mankind from which all virtues spring." In a treatise on the moral instruction of school girls, Mary Wollstonecraft states the fundamental principle of morals. It is "Not to hurt any living thing, and to give happiness."

Thus kindly sentiment is the true guide to behavior, a point of view far remote from the reasoned ethic of Aristotle. The generation who followed the French Revolution made such sentiments the basis of their whole social philosophy. To Leigh Hunt, Abou Ben Adhem has the sum of all wisdom and virtue; his name leads those of all who love the Lord, he loves his fellow man. With St. Simon and Comte, the religion of humanity takes definite form. Humanity is God. Brotherly love and service are the whole duty of man. Right and wrong, freedom, progress, become matters primarily of emotional interest. Freedom is *Liberty in general*, a universal natural right reasserted, as stalwart humanity breaks the chains which bind it to the past and rises in all its height and dignity.

Freedom is now demanded in the name of Humanity. It appears automatically when the people rule. The good intentions of the mass are sufficient guarantee of individual liberty. Authority anywhere is suspect. Man has a natural instinct for freedom.

This type of liberalism has become so commonplace that we generally assume all love of liberty to be identical with it. But we have only to compare this point of view with that of a liberal like Milton to see that the two belong to different worlds of thought. When Milton argued for the freedom of the press, he argued a specific issue, not freedom in general. His appeal was to logic and experience. He showed historically the origin of censorship in the Inquisition. He pointed out the futility of the attempt to protect the wise and the foolish alike from temptation. He showed that the results of such attempts would discourage scholarship. He did not say that man is a talking animal and therefore has the right to say whatever his nature prompts him to utter. He did not assume that the authority of Parliament is inherently hostile to humanity, and that if historic institutions were abolished the speech of all men would become pure and wise. He did not contend that the speech of all men is of equal importance and that hence no one has the right to constrain another. He did not invoke the sovereignty of the people, or argue that since all men want to talk, the self interest of the mass assures freedom of speech to all.

Not many contemporary liberals approach the problems of liberty from the classical standpoint of Milton. The freedom they demand is liberty in general, the free-

dom and autonomy of the "free spirit," not so much rational self-control as the release of instinct from inhibition. As an illustration of this romantic idea of liberty, I select a few passages from an article which appeared in 1928 in a journal published for college students. The article was written by a prominent feminist, formerly an editor of a well-known liberal magazine. The writer may or may not have been conscious of her dependence on Rousseau, but her environmentalism and her preoccupation with instinct and inhibition are very typical. "The desire for autonomy is one of the strongest in human nature, and one of the earliest manifested." But it is very difficult to guide the child "without falling into the mistake of regulating it." Rousseau, it will be remembered, was quite eloquent on this point. His *Émile* is to be protected from the environment, for it will condition him in evil ways. All habits are said to be the results of environment, and the free *Émile* is to have only one habit, the habit of having no habits. "If," says the author of the present article, "the average person in such a position makes a sorry mess of it, that is not to be wondered at; the question in its essentials is the question of freedom, and the history of that question down to date is a history of failure. For the instinct to be free is profoundly affected by environment. . . . Theorists are fond of assuming that these usages and laws [of social organization] exist to protect the rights of individuals against the encroachments of other individuals. . . . This may be the case ideally, but it has never been so in fact." Thus freedom as a natural right was early suppressed in his-

tory. “. . . the individual is subordinated to the family organization.” . . . The concept of freedom as a natural right is comparatively new in the world's history. . . . Even so great a thinker as Aristotle entertained the belief that there are free natures and slave natures.” The strongest enemy of freedom is fear. Every human being has the innate desire for freedom, but he has also the instinct of self-preservation. . . . The average individual, therefore, even though he be a victim of the social order, inclines not only to accept the ills he has so long as they are tolerable, but to regard with fear and suspicion any agitation for change. . . . It is impossible for a single individual to achieve more than a very limited degree of independence in thought and action unless he is ready to suffer the possible consequences of his hardihood. . . . There can be no real freedom then without social sanction. . . . For every autonomous act or thought which is considered important enough to be regulated by custom and law really amounts to a challenge of law or custom. . . . Institutionalism envisages a level of safe mediocrity, a condition in which the ideal is an imitation of the average. . . . It is because of this opposition of ideals that pioneers of freedom have invariably been its martyrs.”

The author quotes a passage from Mill and one might easily think that she and Mill held similar views about liberty. But the presuppositions and the objectives of the two are wholly different. Mill, it is true, was concerned with the conflict between the individual and society, but his aim was to establish reasonable and clearly recognized

limitations to the control of the individual by the many. His argument is a rational consideration of the results of the attempt to coerce people in matters which concern only themselves. The individual may easily be mistaken and the results of his conduct may be bad for him, but he must be presumed to have a certain responsibility for himself, for to treat him as if he were an automaton would work more general harm than could result from liberty.

To our feminist writer freedom is primarily a matter of uninhibited instinct. The social environment suppresses instinct. Institutions are essentially hostile to freedom. Any assertion of individual liberty is necessarily revolt against law and custom; "man's fears translate themselves into social bonds which hamper him at every step in his upward struggle." So the masses are struggling upward, but their timidity creates the social bonds which hamper them. To be free is to throw off this social bondage. Some contemporary Behaviorists would go so far as to blame the social environment for even these fears. Fear as an inherited mode of response can be elicited only by dropping an infant or making sudden loud noises; all other manifestations of fear in human life are the results of habits or "conditioned reflexes" set up in the individual by the environment. In any case, the question of liberty here reduces itself to the conflict between instinct as natural right and the social environment which makes the individual its victim. Individuals who rebel become martyrs, for the crowd clings to its mediocre institutions and resists change. Hence the author speaks of social

change, and "agitation." The implication is clear. Since freedom is impossible without social sanction, and freedom is rebellion, the crowd must be agitated to rebellion. Thus we shall have individual liberty as the crowd revolts against social bondage. Freedom is removal of traditional restrictions upon the will of the mass. This hope for personal freedom in spontaneous mass action is pure sociological Romanticism.

In the first chapter I said that the liberalism of our age is a confusion of two incompatible philosophies of freedom. This point cannot be too strongly emphasized. The first of these philosophies conceives of liberty as a name for certain concrete rights. It appeals to historic precedent, to reason and experience. Liberty is a cultural achievement. It is dependent on personal responsibility, on the exercise of intelligence and good taste, on the securing of certain immunities, necessary if individuals are to attain maturity. Hence sovereignty must be limited by law. If there is to be liberty, there must be no absolute sovereign. The collective will and the individual will are coequal, each a wholesome limitation to the other, each governed by common sense and kept within proper bounds.

The second philosophy conceives of liberty as freedom in general, a gift of nature to be restored to all mankind in equal degree by the emancipation of the masses from social bondage to the institutions and traditions of civilization. The hope of freedom is based on the belief in the good intentions of man acting as mass. No other guarantee of the individual is necessary. Hence, "let the

people rule." Liberty is individual spontaneity secured by mass action.

The first view of liberty is the Classical. The second is the Romantic. It is very difficult for the two to keep house together. Now I believe there is much more freedom under the first theory than under the second. But contemporary liberalism tends to renounce the classical tradition. The liberal to-day tends to become a sociological Byron, an economic Heine, a political Wordsworth. It is nature, rather than culture, which is made the basis of his freedom. And in this consists the irony of the new liberalism. As naturalism it would be at one and the same time scientific and idealistically humanitarian. That is, it envisages the salvation of the world both as spontaneity and as mechanism. Taking the spontaneous freedom of nature for its model, it derives therefrom its cult of enthusiasm for the liberation of the masses from social bondage. Man is an animal motivated by its material interests and has an inalienable right to economic opportunity, and to self-expression. But this makes liberty an animal ideal. The inhibitions of the masses must be removed. Society is sick; the unnatural social order must be overthrown. The individual is, therefore, in revolt against it.

But how has the individual become the victim of society? He has become so through the influence of the environment. Change the environment, and the individual would change. This is the law of nature. And so the environment in the grip of which individuals are mere automata, is to be changed by those individuals, who,

being its helpless victims, cannot even change themselves? This would seem to be a difficulty. But, it is said, social change is not the work of the individual will, but of the law of progress. Science is invoked in support of this law. Liberalism is strong for science, not necessarily for the pure science of culture but for its revelation of the beneficent laws of nature. Now the method of science is mechanistic, so the liberal announces himself a mechanist. Conceive of the universe as a machine and all living things become machines. Naturalism then becomes mechanism, denying the possibility of freedom of any sort. So it would seem that the attempt to base freedom on nature involves a contradiction. Freedom and mechanism are difficult to reconcile.

Dr. David Ritchie, in discussing freedom as natural right, says that the term natural is used ambiguously. There are at least three distinct senses in which the terms natural and nature may be used. In the Classical sense of the term, nature is not personified or deified. Nature in general is simply the world of common objects and forms. According to Aristotle, the *nature* of a thing is the *kind* of thing it is. Thus one might translate the passage in Genesis: "each species brought forth after its nature." The words "nature" and "kind" are thus almost synonymous. And when we speak of human nature, we mean the *kind* of beings people are. When Aristotle sought to know the nature, or kind, of any class of objects he looked for the most perfect representatives of that class. To know what kind of fruit the apple is, do not pick the stunted and defective specimens of the class,

but the best, that which manifests the form most completely. So human nature is really manifest only in the best men. In the others the form of the species is dimmed or blurred. From this point of view, liberty is the freedom which characterizes the best men, and is necessary to men of this kind, for without it they would be different. That is perfect to which nothing can be added and from which nothing may be taken away without spoiling it as the representative of its kind. Since the good man is both wise and civilized, there is here no conflict between the freedom of culture and that of nature.

Secondly, we may think of nature, or the natural, as opposed to the supernatural. In this sense a Hume or Voltaire would have used the term. The supernatural is apprehended by faith, the natural by reason. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century naturalists sought to explain objects and events by measuring and classifying them and showing their relations with the observable facts of common experience. Thus the Age of Reason rejected miracle and revelation as contrary to experience and the system of nature. Liberty according to nature, then, is liberty according to the dictates of reason. It is freedom of thought in opposition to dogma and authority. It is liberty justified and demanded by the intelligence of mankind. In this sense civilization is natural and may yet lead to freedom.

In the third place we may think of the natural as opposed to the artificial, the cultural. That is natural which is *original*, primitive and unspoiled by the hand of man. Nature may be possessed and enjoyed immediately

through the senses and in instinctive and emotional response. He is free who obeys only the laws of nature. To enjoy complete natural liberty one should go wild. Natural freedom is unrestrained egoism. But man is not only a natural egoist; he is also naturally gregarious. The egoism of the individual is in conflict with altruism. But in the crowd the two blend. Natural liberty is the egoism of the crowd.

Now it is in this last sense that Romanticism understands nature and the natural. Ordinarily we think of Romanticism as a literary and artistic movement in the Nineteenth Century. As such it was a revolt against the formalism of neo-classicism. We may also think of it as the release of imagination from the confines of rationalism and realism. Certainly it did make more of the dreams and fancies and ideals of the individual. It was more concerned with inspiration than with form. The great romanticists—Goethe, Blake, Wordsworth, Wagner, Victor Hugo, Heine, Chopin, Whitman—awakened a new consciousness of the individual and are largely responsible for the peculiar “idealism” of the Nineteenth Century. All art in creating form idealizes its object. But Romanticism idealized reality in a new way. The ideal was no longer form imposed upon the real. It became a *flight from the real* into a world of fictions elaborated according to the heart's desire. The meaning of life was found in its emotional possibilities, and soon the emotions, rather than the intelligence, became the guide to living.

This literary and artistic movement was closely related to the social philosophy of the times. It colored

men's thinking about freedom and humanity. Both nature and man were idealized alike by artists and social theorists. Each appealed from traditional culture to a mystical power in nature, and to the natural inclinations of the individual. Each glorified the natural man, sought kinship with animals, found wisdom in ignorance and beauty in the vulgar, and believed that in emotional release there was magic redemption for individuals and for society. Each shared in the humanitarian sentiments which at times became a religion of humanity. To a large extent, the literary and artistic movement was but the expression of romantic liberalism as a social movement.

Professor Paul Elmer More says that Romanticism is a dissolving together of heart and nature in a vague revery, which takes the place of insight, an expansive conceit of the emotions, with the illusion of beholding the Infinite within the stream of nature, and this he says is the dominant tendency and admitted ideal of the modern world. Intellect is identified with desire. An emotional mysticism results. Hence the "expansive egoism" which Professor Irving Babbitt finds to be characteristic of Romanticism in all its phases and which he attributes largely to the influence of Rousseau. In contrast with this, we have only to consider the classic repugnance for the Infinite and for vagueness; the emphasis on restraint and proportion. This contrast is very marked in the ideas of liberty. Classic freedom is self-restraint—that is, self-government. Romantic freedom is the dream of satisfying an insatiable longing. Hence as liberalism becomes romantic it loses its hold upon reality, and turns from

programs of enlightenment and practical measures of social betterment to dreams of Paradise. Thomas More's Utopia also exists, not in reality but admittedly only in the universe of discourse. The Romantic Utopia abandons both reality and logic, and exists as a Freudian compensation for every thwarted wish-fancy.

CHAPTER VII

LIBERTY AND TOLERANCE

In the preceding chapters I have tried to state the essential and distinguishing principles of the various traditions of liberty, and to show how each tradition presupposes and is related to a specific philosophy or way of life. Much of the confusion about liberty is removed when it becomes clear wherein these traditions differ from one another. People who hold different traditions would use freedom for different ends. They place different emphases and valuations on the possibilities of experience and hence would (direct and) control these possibilities for different purposes. Liberties are, therefore, in conflict, and we have seen that there can be *no universal freedom*. In facing the problem of liberty as a concrete issue, it makes the greatest difference which tradition one holds; for one is likely to decide whether certain forcible restraints on behavior are justified by the results according to the value one sets upon the results—that is, from one's general standpoint.

I was recently discussing the question of liberty with a lawyer: whether in certain concrete cases of the extension of governmental control over industry, the average individual enjoyed more freedom than when exposed to the danger of commercial exploitation; whether the

precedents established by those legal regulations of the individual which are generally recognized, justified in principle the further coercion of him for desirable ends. And we found ourselves endlessly reasoning in circles. The problem of freedom flows all round such legalistic arguments, however sound and convincing they may be, for it is basically a psychological problem.

Freedom is always relative; and that society will be relatively most free in which people have best learned the lesson of minding their own business. The law may specifically define what our several rights and proper occupations are, but behind the law there must be a certain disposition in the people. If liberty is to exist, the individual must be zealous for the freedom of others; he must be willing that people differ from him. He must not strive to make his own preferences theirs. He must not be too easily shocked or scandalized when tastes differ. He must hold his own convictions rather tentatively, and remember that *he may be wrong*. Especially must he be modest about beliefs which assign duties and obligations to men, for to demand assent to such convictions is often to claim ownership of one's neighbors. No meddlesome people can long remain free.

Nothing destroys liberty so surely and quickly as the spread of intolerance. Tolerance is a better guarantee of freedom than brotherly love; for a man may love his brother so much that he feels himself thereby appointed his brother's keeper. Tolerance is mutual respect. We do not always respect what we love, but seek to devour it. Small men are prone to turn their loves into proprietor-

ships, and their cherished ideals into weapons for the coercion of others. For little-minded men are opinionated. The ignorant man always believes he is right; the educated man seldom. Hence intolerance is the device by which the ignorant, the unadjusted, the mentally immature, strive to lord it over the community—always of course in the interest, not of their own power, but of "Eternal Right." The less a man has in him, the more intemperate he becomes in the vindication of the right. Intolerance leads to the dominance of the less civilized elements of the population. For tolerance is a civilized attitude toward life and only the magnanimous man attains it. The dominance of the intolerant is always and everywhere a revolt against civilization. And the converse of this statement is also true: wherever men are in revolt against the advance of civilization, they develop a spirit of intolerance.

The crowd mind is essentially a conformist mind; and this is so even when the crowd is openly indulging itself in antisocial behavior. Crowds seldom interpret their motives correctly. Each crowd fabricates a system of obsessive ideas which serves to disguise its real motive, to disarm opposition, to justify its behavior in the minds of its members and hold them together in "the movement." The ideas of the crowd become stereotyped, standardized. Having made up its mind, it refuses to listen to the expression of dissenting opinion. Objectors are thrown out, howled down, thrust aside, trampled. As the crowd thinks and acts in a pseudo-social environment created by its own rationalization, it can sustain its pur-

pose only by remaining deaf to the voice of conflicting reason. Dissent on the part of its members is disloyalty, treachery. Dissent of those outside the crowd, or any criticism of its noble experiments, is devilish enmity of righteousness and truth. Every crowd, if it has the power, will resort to censorship and will ruthlessly destroy those who resist it. It wants freedom of speech only to spread its own propaganda, meanwhile making strenuous efforts to prevent contrary propagandas from getting a hearing. In this respect, all crowds behave in very much the same manner—rival political factions, super-patriots, prohibitionists, moral crusaders, radicals, “boosters,” fascists, fundamentalists, bolshevists, being all equally illiberal.

The wonder is that there is any liberty at all. We owe what we have of it largely to the mutual jealousy and suspicion of rival crowds, which fortunately impel them to pull one another down, each acting to check the despotism of the rest. We are even more indebted to those *truly liberal-minded individuals in all ages* whose wisdom and example have taught humanity such tolerance as it knows in its saner moments. The true liberal confronted by the herd and the pack has always faced a disadvantage and a task. He is at a disadvantage in that his very tolerance leads him to champion freedom of speech for those who disagree with him, including those who would use such freedom to make illiberal propaganda. His task has again and again been the same: to keep the lights of civilization burning. It is important to remember that Western civilization has advanced most rapidly in those brief periods of relative tolerance and personal liberty,

the Periclean Age, the Renaissance, the Eighteenth Century, the era of the progress of science in the Nineteenth Century. These have been the times when the authority of the crowd over thought was weakened, and the influence of unique individuals was greatest. And these are the times which have made the history of liberty.

Tolerance of the freedom of speech is the real test of a people's love of liberty. It is the measure of this tolerance, rather than the statues of emancipators in the public square, which shows whether or not a people is free. Freedom of speech is, I believe, the liberty on which all other liberties depend. No other liberty, even the little we now enjoy, has been so hard to gain. No exercise of freedom is so essential to the advance of civilization, and none is at the same time more dangerous. No other recognized liberty is so repeatedly subject to attack, and none may so easily be lost. The exercise of this right may incite men to riot, and the attempt to suppress free speech has been the common cause of persecution. Enemies of freedom and cultural advance always strike first at freedom of speech because in doing so they not only hope to shoot liberty through the heart, but they can easily find plausibilities to justify such an assault on freedom. No form of liberty is so commonly abused.

Under the guise of liberty men may take most unwarranted liberties with the public, uttering blasphemies and obscenities which offend against decency and may corrupt morals. No one can deny that many who lay claim to this right will be men of bad manners and evil intent. Even at best, freedom of speech must result in the spread

of error as well as truth. And since the masses always take more kindly to error than to truth, and popular delusion may lead to disaster, it would be a service to mankind to protect them from their destructive folly. Are there not many people who would be discontented and rebellious in any social order? Give such malcontents freedom, and they will persuade the idle and empty-headed that they can gain universal happiness through revolution; the result would be constant turmoil and liberty for no one. Again, it may be said that freedom of speech makes impossible any continuous or concerted social achievement. It spreads doubt and confusion and unsettles decision. Hence there comes a time to stop talking and do something. On this point, fascists in Italy and communists in Moscow are agreed; they are equally disinclined to regard organized society as an everlasting "debating society."

I grant the force of these arguments. What they really amount to is the assertion that a large portion of the human race is incapable of liberty. This I am prepared to admit. The question is, what shall we do about it? Are the gullible and corruptible of so much more value to society than anyone else that to protect them against their own weaknesses we must strangle their superiors? This would seem to be the assumption on which all prohibitions and censorships are based. Since fools cannot, without danger to themselves, enjoy freedom, no one may be free. The wise may then never aspire to any liberty beyond that which is safe for the foolish. But since it would seem that either the wise or the foolish

must be sacrificed for the other, why should wisdom be always asked to make the sacrifice? Civilization could do nothing more suicidal than this. You may be sure that society will inevitably take on the general characteristics of the type of man with whose survival it is most concerned. Any restriction of freedom which would effectively protect the neurotic and the defective from temptation and error would also close the mouth of genius. The bed of censorship is procrustean. It always stands for the dilemmas of lower men. And be not deceived: folly may be enhanced by the sacrifice of wisdom, but the foolish are never served thereby. They may gain in power until they rule mankind, but they will never be saved from themselves. The sacrifice of the wise for the foolish is always in vain. Censorships exist ostensibly to stamp out error and vice; their real purpose, however, is to stamp out the truth.

Assuming that the foolish could be protected by the denial of free speech, truth could not possibly be the gainer thereby, for the pursuit of truth necessarily takes place in the open. It is not at all the same thing as prophylaxis against error. Men who are officially occupied with the prevention of error have little time for the pursuit of truth. For who are they to whom the important matter of regulating freedom of speech is invariably delegated, these arbiters of truth and beauty and the good, who decide for the community what it may see and hear and read and speak? Are they ever men distinguished for wisdom and excellence—ever the civilized and urbane, the artists and scholars, the scientists and philosophers, who

might, if anyone may, speak with authority in these matters? The censor is almost invariably a second-rate person whose chief qualification for office is absolute ignorance of the thing he censors. This is to be expected; for he must represent the standpoint of the man in the street. A first-rate mind would have nothing to do with such business. It is intolerance, not desire for improvement, which commonly menaces freedom of speech. Intolerance and insincerity: I do not believe there was ever a censorship established except to perpetuate a falsehood.

Toleration has its dangers. They are usually exaggerated, but it is true that freedom cannot be had without its price. But think of the dangers and certain evils of intolerance. The alternative to freedom is the loss of one of the most costly and valuable elements of our social inheritance. It is *to abandon the intellectual and spiritual adventure of civilization*. The experience of the past should warn us never to compromise with illiberalism in the slightest degree, or surrender the very least of the liberties mankind has so painfully achieved. History reveals unmistakably what is the alternative to this troublesome freedom of ours. It is official terrorism with no one to protest; it is cultural stagnation with genius groveling before stupidity, truth besmirched and branded an outlaw, scholarship carried on furtively and bigotry free to indulge its sadistic impulses. With freedom of speech allowed, the second-rate man has his say along with the rest; without it, he alone may speak.

It ought not to be necessary to say these things in the Twentieth Century. These truths are part of our common

cultural inheritance. There is no reason why everyone should not be aware of them. A John Milton has lived and written; also a John Locke and a John Stuart Mill. Why are not the *Areopagitica* and the essays on *Tolerance* and *Liberty* known by every high school student? These writings set forth the very fundamental principles on which our boasted liberty rests, principles as true to-day as they ever were. It is simply incredible that they should be everywhere ignored by those educational institutions which democracy has established to prepare students for life in this "land of the free." Such neglect again reveals the extent to which the public has followed Rousseau in the attempt to found liberty on nature rather than on culture.

The average college student has some vague ideas about Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and was probably prepared to answer a few questions about the shorter poems when he took his entrance examinations. But I have not in months talked with any recent college graduate who had the slightest suspicion that Milton was one of the great liberals in the history of the English-speaking peoples, although the *Areopagitica* and the circumstances in which it was written make one of the important chapters in the history of liberty.

Of all the leaders of the English Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, Milton was doubtless the best educated. He was, in his early manhood, certainly the most broad-minded. Though he lived in an illiberal age—he died just one hundred years before the Battle of Bunker Hill—none of the revolutionary leaders of the century

which followed him excelled him in devotion to the cause of freedom. He had studied at Cambridge with the expectation of entering the ministry, but declined ordination because of his disagreement with the doctrines of the Church. He had spent much time on the continent and in Italy. He had met Galileo in prison, and knew Hugo Grotius, the Dutch scholar living in exile because of his heresies. Milton understood the significance of the revival of learning, and had returned to England to devote his life to literature. He says that having come home about the time that Charles I broke the peace, it was his interest in liberty which drew him into the contest. "The vigor of Parliament had begun to humble the pride of the bishops. As long as liberty of speech was no longer subject to control, all mouths began to be opened against the bishops. . . . This awakened all my attention and my zeal. I saw that a way was opening for the establishment of real liberty, that the foundation was laying for the deliverance of man from the yoke of slavery and superstition. . . . I therefore determined to relinquish all other pursuits in which I was engaged and to transfer the whole force of my talents and my industry to this one important object." Accordingly he wrote urging the complete separation of Church and State.

"When the bishops could no longer resist the multitude of their assailants, I had leisure to turn my thoughts to other subjects; to the promotion of real and substantial liberty, which is rather to be sought from within than from without, and whose existence depends not so much on the terror of the sword as on sobriety of conduct and

integrity of life. When therefore I perceived that there were three species of liberty which are essential to the happiness of social life—religious, domestic, and civil; and as I had already written concerning the first, and the magistrates were strenuously active in obtaining the third, I determined to turn my attention to the second, or the domestic species. As they seemed to involve three material questions—the conditions of the conjugal tie, the education of children, and the free publications of the thoughts—I made them objects of distinct consideration. . . . Lastly, I wrote my *Areopagitica* after the true Attic style, in order to deliver the press from the restraints with which it was encumbered; that the power of determining what was true and what was false, what ought to be published and what to be suppressed, might no longer be entrusted to a few illiterate and illiberal individuals, who refused their sanction to any work which contained views or sentiments at all above the level of vulgar superstition.”

Milton's long treatise on divorce is a truly liberal and intellectually respectable document. I recommend the reading of it as an aid to sanity, especially to those who have only recently discovered the problem of sex morality. Naturally Milton's writings on this subject brought him into difficulty. The revolution was hardly the liberal movement which he had imagined. Like revolutions in general it had rather substituted new tyrannies for old. “New presbyter is but old priest writ large.” In pulpit and in Parliament, Milton was bitterly denounced. He was threatened with impeachment. In 1643 the Lords and

Commons assembled in Parliament ordered that no book, paper, or pamphlet should be printed, bound or put on sale unless it be first approved and licensed by such persons as Parliament should appoint.

The *Areopagitica* was issued in defiance of this law and was a direct address to Parliament. It is an argument for the repeal of the law establishing the censorship. The author shows proper respect for the laudable intentions of the Lords and Commons, and it is worthy of note that he cites the example of ancient Greece in presuming "in publick to admonish the state." "If I should thus farre presume upon the meek demeanour of your civill and gentle greatness, Lords and Commons, as what your publisht order hath directly said, that to gainsay, I might defend myselfe with ease, if any should accuse me of being new or insolent, did they but know how much better I find ye esteem it to imitate the old and elegant humanity of Greece than the barbarick pride of a hunnish and Norwegian statelines. And out of those ages, to whose polite wisdom and letters we owe that we are not yet Goths and Jutlanders, I could name him who from his private house wrote that discourse to the Parliament of Athens that perswades them to change the forme of Democracy which was then establisht."

As reasonable men the Lords and Commons should be as willing to repeal one of their own acts as any set forth by their predecessors. "If ye be thus resolved, as it were injury to thinke ye were not, I know not what should withhold me from presenting ye with a fit instance wherein to shew both that love of truth which ye eminently pro-

fesse, and that uprightnesse of your judgement which is not wont to be partiall to your selves, by judging over again that Order which ye have ordain'd to regulate Printing."

It is a common trick with legislatures, when they want to enact some questionable measure, to tie it up with enactments which are both justifiable and necessary. The law in question was no exception. It was in part a law which established and protected copyright. "For that part which preserves justly every man's Copy to himselfe, or provides for the poor, I touch not, only wish they be not made pretenses to abuse and persecute honest and painful Men who offend not in either of these particulars. But that other clause of Licensing books, which we thought had dy'd . . . when the Prelats expir'd, I shall now attend with such a Homily as shall lay before ye, first the inventors of it to bee those whom ye will be loath to own; next what is to be thought of reading in generall, what ever sort the Books be; and that this Order avails nothing to the suppressing of scandalous, seditious, and libellous Books which are mainly intended to be supprest; last, that it will be primely to the discouragement of all learning, and the stop of Truth, not only by the disexercising and blunting of our abilities in what we know already, but by hindering and cropping the discovery that might bee yet further made both in religious and civill Wisdome."

He will not deny that government should be concerned how books demean themselves. They may be like "those fabulous Dragons teeth; and being sown up and down,

may chance to spring up armed men. . . . And yet on the other hand, unlesse warinesse be us'd, as good almost kill a Man as kill a good Book; who kills a Man kills a reasonable creature . . . but hee who destroyes a good Booke, kills reason it selfe." Not only may a kind of homicide be thus committed, but there is danger that it be extended to a "Kinde of massacre whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elmentall life, but strikes at that ethereall and fifth essence, the breath of reason it selfe, slaies an immortality rather than a life."

Who were the inventors of censorship? Milton turns to history. A few books were suppressed by the Greeks and Romans, but the ancients were amazingly tolerant in this respect. Even in the early Church "the primitive Councils and Bishops were wont only to declare what Books were not commendable passing no further, but leaving it to each ones conscience to read or lay by." Censorship was not made an institution until "the Councell of Trent and the Spanish Inquisition engendering together brought forth or perfected those Catalogues and expurgating Indexes that rake through the entralls of many a good old Author with a violation wors then any could be offer'd to his tomb. Nor did they stay in matters Hereticall, but any subject that was not to their palat they either condemn'd in a prohibition, or had it strait into the new Purgatory of an Index. To fill up the measure of encroachment, their last invention was to ordain that no book, pamphlet or paper should be Printed (as if S. Peter had bequeathed them the keys of the Presse also out of Paradise) unless it were aprov'd and licenc'd

under the hands of 2 or 3 glutton Friers." Censorship was the invention of the Inquisition.

"And thus ye have the Inventors and the originall Book-licencing ript up, and drawn as lineally as any pedigree. We have it not, that can be heard of, from any ancient state or politie, or Church, not by any Statute left us by our Ancestors, elder or later; nor from the moderne custom of any reformed city, or Church abroad, but from the most antichristian Councel, and the most tyrannous Inquisition that ever inquir'd. Til then Books were ever as freely admitted into the World as any other birth; the issue of the brain was no more stifl'd than the issue of the womb."

The Reformation was new in Milton's time, and he doubtless made a telling point when he accused the Puritans of resorting to the very tyrannical practices against which they had themselves risen up in rebellion. What he says applies with equal force to that censorship which in America has been steadily increasing since the days of Anthony Comstock. As our people are several centuries removed from the horrors of the Inquisition, they think of censorship as at worst merely a ridiculous nuisance. They have had little experience, as yet, of the frightful use which may be made of this arbitrary and inquisitorial power when it passes into the hands of organized intolerance. The spirit of intolerance exists among us; it needs only the touch of the American genius for organization. Even now there are certain "reform" organizations which have attained sufficient strength to embolden them to reveal a little of their true character and aims.

But to return to Milton. He next attacks the psychological presuppositions of censorship. Do men draw more harm than benefit from reading freely all sorts of books good and bad? Milton does not think so. Hence censorship is worse than useless. He reminds the Bible-reading lawmakers, that Moses, Daniel, and St. Paul were all learned in the wisdom of the heathen without apparent harm. In fact, censorship works positive injury to true religion. This was seen when the Emperor "Julian the Apostate and subtlest enemy to our faith, made a decree forbidding Christians the study of heathen learning." The result was that the Christians were "so much in danger to decline into all ignorance" that they thought to be deprived of pagan learning "a persecution more undermining and secretly decaying the Church than the open cruelty of Decius or Dioclesian." Milton quotes St. Paul: "prove all things, hold fast that which is good"; also, "To the pure all things are pure, not only meats and drinks but all kinde of knowledge whether of good or evill; the knowledge cannot defile, nor consequently the books if the will and conscience be not defil'd." "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloister'd vertue, unexercis'd and unbreath'd, that never sallies out and sees her adversary but slinks out of the race. . . . Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather; that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary. . . . Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of vertue, and the scanning of error to the

confirmation of truth, how can we more safely and with less danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractats, and hearing all manner of reason?"

It is feared the infection may spread, but then all human learning must be removed out of the world, "Yea, the Bible it selfe; for that oftimes relates blasphemy not nicely; it describes the carnall sense of wicked men not unelegantly . . . for these causes we all know the Bible it selfe put by the Papists into the first rank of prohibited books."

Milton's words have been proved prophetic. That even the doctrine of divine inspiration does not deter the prudish of our times from presuming to censor the Bible, we have evidence in a news item which I quote from the *New York Evening World* of September 27, 1929.

"London, Sept. 27 (U. P.).—In the versions of the Bible published by the National Sunday School Union, the censors' axe fell with special severity on Solomon's doings and utterances. The songs of Solomon, considered throughout the ages as one of the gems of literature, was totally suppressed as being likely to corrupt the mind of the youth.

"Other eliminations included the eleventh chapter of the Second Book of Samuel, the first chapters of the First Book of Kings and most of the verses of Genesis.

"All passages which might cause the mind of youth to question the virtue of Biblical characters were eliminated from the Idyll of Ruth and Boaz and all the verses were suppressed which described the way Abigail affronted her churlish husband. The Sunday School version likewise omitted the description of the manner in which David made her his wife."

If all men are to be protected from temptation who is to protect the censors? "and again if it be true that a wise man like a good refiner can gather gold out of the drossiest volume, and that a fool will be a fool with the best book, or without book, there is no reason that we should deprive a wise man of any advantage to his wisdom while we seek to restrain from a fool that which being restrained will be no hindrance to his folly . . . a wise man will make better use of an idle pamphlet than a fool will do of sacred Scripture. . . . Children and childish men who have not the art to qualify and prepare these working minerals, may well be exhorted to forbear, but hinder'd forcibly they cannot be by all the licencing that Sainted Inquisition could ever contrive."

The order of licensing thus "conduces nothing to the end for which it was framed." No sensible magistrate or city ever tried to protect men from all temptation, for they knew that "if they fell upon one kind of strictnesse, unlesse their care were equall to regulat all other things of like aptnes to corrupt the mind, that single endeavour they knew would be but a fond labour; to shut and fortifie one gate against corruption, and be necessitated to leave all others round about wide open. If we think to regulat Printing, thereby to rectifie manners, we must regulat all recreations and passtimes, all that is delightful to man." No music may be heard or song sung but what is grave and solemn. There must be a licensing of dancers and a censoring of all gestures, a restraining of all liberty, far beyond anything Plato imagined in his fancied perfect State. "And who shall silence all airs and madrigalls

that whisper softness in chambers. The windows also and the balconies must be thought on." Soon food and drink must be prohibited. . . . "Our garments also should be referred to the licensing of some more sober workmasters. . . . Who shall regulat all the mixt conversation of our youth male and female together, as is the fashion of this country?" Finally the public censor must prohibit all evil company.

The Puritans did attempt some such general regulation of everybody, which fact accounts in part for their speedy downfall. Meanwhile, though they did not purify Merrie England, they succeeded in working no end of mischief. As Milton said, such attempts can only "make us all both ridiculous and weary, and yet frustrat . . . here the great art lies to discern in what the law is to bid restraint and punishment, and in what things perswasion only is to work." It is for want of this knowledge of the basic principle of the function of government that amateurs and zealots make bungle of the law; and the public has to pay dearly for their blunders, being urged the while to make a fool of itself and obey bad law merely because it is law. The legislature undermines the very moral obligation to obey when it makes laws which rob men of responsibility. "If every action which is good or evill in man at ripe years were to be under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were vertue but a name? Though ye take from the covetous man all treasure, he has yet one jewell left; ye cannot bereave him of his covetousnesse. Banish all objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercis'd in any hermitage, ye

cannot make them chaste that came not thither so. . . . Suppose we could expell sin by this means; look, how much we thus expell of sin, so much we expell of vertue; for the matter of them both is the same; remove that and ye remove them both alike."

Consider moreover, says Milton, the type of man who must inevitably fill the office of licenser. "It cannot be denied but that he who is made judge to sit upon the birth and death of books . . . had need to be a man above the common measure, both studious, learned, and judicious." But if he be a man of such worth there can be no more tedious and unpleasant task than the journey-work of the censor. No real scholar or man of high intelligence will waste his time reading to no other purpose than the detection of the censurable. "We may easily foresee what kind of licensors we are to expect hereafter, either the ignorant, imperious and remisse, or the basely pecuniary." This is a situation which those who would reform mankind by the machinery of law never foresee; the enforcement of their noble experiments must necessarily be entrusted in great part to men who by nature and inclination inhabit the borderland of the underworld.

"I lastly proceed from the no good it can do, to the manifest hurt it causes, in being first the greatest discouragement and affront that can be offer'd to learned men. . . . What advantage is it to be a man over a boy at school, if we have only scrapt the ferular to come under the fescu of an Imprimatur? . . . And how can a man teach with authority, which is the life of teaching, how can he be a Doctor in his book as he ought to be, or else

had better be silent, whenas all he teaches, all he delivers, is but under the tuition, under the correction of his patriarchal licencer to blot or alter what precisely accords not with the hidebound humor which he calls his judgment. . . . I hate a pupil teacher, I endure not an instructor that comes to me under the wardship of an overseeing fist. . . . The State shall be my governours, but not my criticks; they may be mistaken in the choice of a licencer as easily as this licencer may be mistaken in an author. . . . For though a licencer be judicious more than ordinary . . . yet his very office and his commission enjoyns him to let passe nothing but what is vulgarly received already. . . . Henceforth let no man care to learn, or care to be more than worldly wise; for certainly in high matters to be ignorant and slothful, to be a common steadfast dunce, will be the only pleasant life and only in request. . . . Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity of all knowledge in the Land, to mark and licence it like our broad cloath and our wool packs. . . . Whence to include the whole Nation, and those that never yet thus offended, under such a diffident and suspectfull prohibition, may plainly be understood what a disparagement it is. . . .

"I could recount what I have seen and heard in other Countries where this kind of inquisition tyrannizes. When I have sat among their learned men, for that honor I had, and bin counted happy to be born in such a place of Philosophic freedom as they supposed England was while they

did nothing but bemoan the servile condition into which learning amongst them was brought, that this it was which had damp't the glory of Italian wits, that nothing had bin there written now these many years but flattery and fustian. There it was that I found and visited the famous Galileo grown old, a prisoner to the Inquisition, for thinking in Astronomy otherwise than the Franciscan and Dominican licencers thought." Censorship is the "common grievance of all those who had rear'd their minds and studies above the vulgar pitch," and "if it come to inquisitioning again and licencing, and that we are so timorous of ourselves, and so suspicious of all men, as to fear each book and the shaking of every leaf, before we know what the contents are, if some who but of late were little better than silenced from preaching, shall come now to silence us from reading except what they please, it cannot be guessed what is intended by som but a second tyranny over learning; and will soon put it out of controversie that Bishops and Presbyters are the same to us both name and thing." The "plot of licencing" will result in incredible loss. "More than if som enemy at sea should stop up all our havens and ports and creeks, it hinders and retards the importation of our richest Merchandise, Truth." Indeed, "it was first establisht and put in practice by Antichristian malace and mystery on set purpose to extinguish, if it were possible the light of the Reformation and to settle falsehood . . .

"Lords and Commons of England, consider what nation it is whereof ye are and whereof ye are the governours; a Nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingeni-

ous, and piercing spirit acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to discours. . . . Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making. . . . Give me liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above all liberties. . . . And though all the windes of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors in a free and open encounter?"

So, the cause of freedom is the cause of truth. It is not in the service of the truth that censorships are proposed. The battle which Milton fought must be waged again and again by each generation. This issue is just as alive to-day as it was in the year 1643. We need but to look at countries like Italy and Russia to see with what complacency the masses surrender this basic liberty. The trend of events in our own country is hardly more reassuring. Intolerance and obscurantism and the lust for power are not confined to any age or place. Some of the identical interests and types of men against which Milton contended—and he leaves no doubt as to who instigated this attack on freedom—survive and seem to be bent upon making all America conform to their will. So also, as a matter of fact, does almost every well-organized crowd in the country. Each has its propaganda of illiberalism and intolerance. It is as if our generation had arranged a contest to see which crowd could in the shortest

time destroy the greatest number of our inherited liberties. Day by day the newspapers relate the story. Now a book is suppressed in Boston, another is prohibited by the postal authorities in Washington, a third is seized by the customs officers in New York, a fourth is brought into court by some society for the suppression of vice. It is extremely difficult for the average reader to secure any one of the great masterpieces of literature in an unexpurgated edition. It is doubtful if any of the great classics could pass the censorship of the United States Post Office if its author were living and writing in America to-day. Many publishers and book dealers are perplexed because it seems to be impossible to foretell the workings of the censors' minds. Public libraries have their "infernos," in which books which might irritate local self-appointed censors are withdrawn from general circulation. The legislatures of our great states are pestered each session with "clean books" bills, in which it is proposed that a book may be suppressed if one sentence taken out of its context scandalizes a plain common man, and further that the expert testimony of educated people may not be admitted when a case involving a book is brought to trial. Rigid censorship legislation is proposed in Congress, in which not only alleged obscenity is to be suppressed, but unconventional political doctrine. When the Comstock legislation was passed, Ingersoll and other liberals protested in vain, contending that the censorship so established would be used in the interest of political and religious propaganda. Surely the law prohibiting the giving

of information concerning "birth control" has about it an odor of ecclesiasticism.

The inquisitorial spirit crops out everywhere in the mob spirit manifest alike in New England and in the South, in laws against the teaching of theories of evolution, in "black-lists" of lecturers circulated among patriotic societies, in the prohibition of free speech and assembly in connection with labor disputes, in the conviction in a United States court of a reputable author for writing a book on the physiology and psychology of sex for the enlightenment of young people, including her own children, in the denial of citizenship to pacifists, in the deportation and exclusion from the country of alien radicals, in the resentment which leading prohibitionists show toward criticism of their project, in the odium theologicum with which church bodies are entering politics, in the whole demeanor of the moral crusaders who have pitched their tents about the national Capitol. We have always been reputed to be a rather violent and opinionated people, but we have never before, as we are doing now, augmented these traits into systems of organized intolerance.

Civilized people do not behave in this manner. It is the increasing preponderance of the barbarian in our midst which to-day menaces American liberty. In our attempt to base freedom on nature, rather than culture, we have long pandered to the tastes and prejudices of the mob. The country is now paying the penalty. The enemies of freedom are and always have been the same as the enemies of culture. Again and again the wisest have

warned us that liberty will be betrayed by the half-educated; and that the multitude will, if it renounces its cultural leadership, respect no humane limitations of its power. As Mill says:

"The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as power is not declining but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase. . . .

"The 'people' who exercise power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active *part* of the people; the majority or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently *may* desire to oppress a part of their number and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power."

Mill wrote the essay *On Liberty* in 1859, the year Darwin published *The Origin of Species*. England at that time was probably the most tolerant country in modern history. In this respect it was certainly superior to the America of to-day. Yet he wrote, "It will be said, that we

do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions; we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets. . . . But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least for its expression still exist by law . . . unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind that the suspension of the worst forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a generation, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to resuscitate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of at the present time as the revival of religion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry; and where there is a strong permanent leaven of *intolerance in the feelings of the people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country* [italics mine], it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution. . . . Persecution has always succeeded, save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted."

Mill's special reference to the abiding intolerance of the British middle classes is significant, for it is from these elements of the British population that much of the early emigration to America was drawn, and it is, I regret to say, in precisely those sections of our country where the descendants of this emigration are relatively strongest that the spirit of intolerance is most extreme. It would not be fair to say that our people had made no advance in the arts of civilization since our fathers left England, or that

none of us to-day have outgrown the prejudices with which they came. But it would seem that for most of us the isolation of the frontier, just as it has sharpened the Yankee profile, has brought out vividly our ancestral characteristics both good and bad. Matthew Arnold, who wrote of the nonconformist lower middle classes of England in much the same vein as Mill, observed the close similarity between the life of these classes and the civilization of America. The observation led him to a shrewd, and I think on the whole correct, diagnosis of the American mind. It goes without saying that the more unpleasant manners, among which intolerant behavior is one, will be most ostentatiously displayed by those whose self-righteousness blinds them to the need of improvement. The ordinary American is very self-righteous. The flattery of demagogues, the exercise of political power, Puritanical religion, bad education, prosperity, and the egotism which always characterizes the crowd mind, have all tended to make him so. He is the "rightest man" in all the world. He has a mission to correct everybody and put all things right. Hence it might easily come to pass that from rural and small-town America there would arise the most serious menace to the liberties of the English-speaking peoples.

That even in England the danger of intolerance has long been sufficiently serious to merit the concern of philosophers is evident in the writings of Milton, Hume, Mill and others. Says Mill again:

"Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time

of the Commonwealth, they have endeavored, with considerable success, to put down all public and nearly all private amusements; especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre. There are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendent power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may some time or other command a majority in parliament. . . .

“But the strongest of all arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right. . . . But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as law on the minority on questions of self regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people’s opinion of what is good or bad for other people.”

And in fact this opinion as to what is good or bad for other people is seldom the fruit of common sense, but is rather an extravagant and misguided selfish interest. “There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot,

when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion and the feeling of another who is offended at it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. . . . But where has there been a public which set any such limit to its censorship? . . . In its interference with personal conduct, it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or thinking differently from itself: and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of all moralists and speculative writers. . . .

"To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred of Mohammedans against them than the fact of their eating pork. . . . It is, in the first place, an offense against their religion; but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Their aversion for the flesh of the 'unclean beast' is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite. . . . Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that majority

should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country. This would be nothing new in Mohammedan countries. Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion? and if not, why not? . . . The only tenable ground of condemnation would be that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere."

The principle on which the eating of pork is prohibited is the same as that of other prohibitions, and one might add the motive is similar. "No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves."

That Mill intended his logic to be applied to the prohibition of alcoholic beverages, and to stand as a warning to intelligent men, there can be no doubt. He foresaw just what has now happened, and said that the principle on which men tried to justify this destruction of individual responsibility was a "monstrous principle." "But without dwelling upon suppositious cases, there are in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practiced, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions propounded

which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at what it thinks wrong, prohibit a number of things which it admits to be innocent.

"Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English colony, and of nearly half of the United States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes, for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. And although the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States, including the one from which it derives its name [this was evidently the Maine Law] an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists to agitate for a similar law in this country."

A new theory of "social rights" was propounded in support of such legislation which Mill shows to be deadly dangerous. "The Traffic . . . impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse. . . . I claim as a citizen a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another."

There are doubtless minds to which this theory will seem plausible. At first it appears like a statement of the social responsibility of the citizen. But it is in fact the opposite: it is a childish demand on society, an insistence

that everyone abstain from all things which happen to be dangerous or distasteful to oneself. As Mill says, "A theory of 'social rights' the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language, being nothing short of this—that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them. For, the moment an opinion which I consider noxious passes anyone's lips, it invades all the 'social rights' attributed to me. . . . The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard." With this "monstrous principle" the modern reformer becomes a menace.

The history of "reform" during the last one hundred years is largely that of growing and spreading intolerance. The early American reformers of a century ago created something of a mass movement of good will to man, as anyone may see who will read Emerson's essay on the reformers. They enlisted much of the idealism and youthful enthusiasm and liberalism of those days. Perfectionists, Utopians, Dissenters, Come-outers, Trans-

cedentialists, New Harmonyites, Owenites, Fournierists—they were all inspired with the vision of establishing here the Social Millennium. They were predominantly individualistic, even to the point of being fantastic. They eschewed any thought of using force to establish their reforms. Reform was to be voluntary, and the methods were persuasion and free “association.” A great number of new communities were founded in which all sorts of experiments in liberty were tried. Imagination ran wild with intense love of freedom and boundless faith in mankind and in the future. There was little thought then in the mind of the world-mender of capturing the machinery of government and driving ahead to a Roman peace. He believed that a kindlier, more free, more joyful existence than mankind had yet known was easily possible. It was necessary only that free spirits throw off the slaveries and hypocrisies of the past and meet together in some beautiful spot in nature, to start life over and start it right.

The followers of Robert Owen at New Harmony, deliberated and fixed the date for the establishment of the Millennium by voluntary human association. It was to be the 14th of May, 1855. Their leader in Congress said “Up to this hour, mankind in all the earth has been the slave of a Trinity of the most monstrous evils that could be combined to inflict mental and physical evil upon the whole race.” These monsters of the past were private property, an absurd system of religion, and marriage founded on proprietary right in another individual. Owen’s doctrines were not shared by all, but his liberal

sentiments were characteristic of the reform movements of those days.

These reformers were the very reverse of the sour Puritan. Many of them were religious liberals who had forsaken the churches. Most of the rest were members of new and bizarre religious cults. And for the most part they looked upon the government of the United States with suspicion. John Humphry Noyes, Perfectionist, went to extremes in this respect which made him unique, but there can be little doubt that he merely gave extravagant expression to sentiments shared by many reformers. In his letter to Garrison in 1837 he said: "I have subscribed my name to an instrument similar to the Declaration of Independence, renouncing all allegiance to the Government of the United States, and asserting the title of Jesus Christ to the throne of the world. . . . When I wish to form a conception of the Government of the United States, I picture to myself a bloated swaggering libertine, trampling on the Bible, its own Constitution, its treaties with Indians, the petitions of its citizens. . . . I have renounced active cooperation with the oppressor on whose territories I live."

I refer to such sentiments because they indicate that, at the beginning, reformers had little desire or thought of securing their social millenniums by means of sawed-off shot-guns, prisons and padlocks. Their frame of mind did not, however, endure. But the step from persuasion to invasion was a natural one in a country where on every hand evangelists of religion were exhorting and terrifying

and convicting of sin. The "Temperance" movement in those days was very strong and urgent, no less conspicuous a liberal than P. T. Barnum finding it expedient to join in with it. Soon its color and temper changed. It became customary to lay the blame for drunkenness not on individual appetite and lack of self-control, but upon the traffic which made it possible for men to drink; the dogma of environmentalism again. Soon, as Mill says, a number of states tried the experiment of prohibition. The experiments were usually of short duration, and without much success, and there seems to have been no concerted effort to impose such legislation on states which did not want it by writing it into the Federal Constitution.

The success of the Abolitionist movement did much to change the psychology of reform in this country; and envy of that success, which was achieved by a proclamation of the Federal Government and fixed for all time by Constitutional amendment, led reformers of all sorts to modify their methods. If the great evil of slavery could be abolished by a decree of the Government at Washington, so also might anything be abolished which the reformer thought sinful. It was now said to be the duty of the Government to regulate the private morals and personal tastes and habits of everyone. Forgetting that the Emancipation Proclamation was a war measure, and that before slavery could be abolished unfortunately nearly half the population of the nation lay prostrate in the dust, unmindful of the bitterness which this great and necessary reform unfortunately had to arouse, subsequent reformist movements became impatient with the slow

methods of persuasion and turned to compulsion. Their efforts were now directed toward the manipulation of the balance of power of the electorate, so that organized minorities could control the whip hand of the government and thus bring all men to their knees. They also forgot that the Abolitionist movement, although it was necessarily invasive, invaded with the battle-cry of freedom. In this respect it differed from other reforms which sought to imitate its methods. The Southern States might regard the very principle of Abolition as an assault on their liberty. They did in fact take the field against it, so intensely did they resent what they considered the unwarranted meddling of outsiders with their domestic institutions. They rebelled against the Union rather than permit Northerners or the Government at Washington to tell them what was right and wrong, or what they might or might not do in their own "sovereign states." Their argument that they were fighting for liberty would not have been specious had the rights they sought to defend been those of personal liberty, such as are—or were at one time—guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. As it was, they stood self-condemned; they were fighting for the right to enslave and own their fellow men. I doubt if freedom's crusade ever had so clear and righteous a justification as did the movement for the abolition of slavery. Yet even then the Great Emancipator hesitated, knowing that many, even in the North, would regard as tyrannical so just but unprecedented an extension of the exercise of federal power. No such hesitancy appears to characterize the reformer of to-day. Abolition meant the emanci-

pation of people held in bondage, but no such justification for invasion can with convincing logic be claimed by our crusaders. They proclaim not emancipation from bondage, but what Mill called the "monstrous principle", that they have a "vested interest" in the perfection of every individual which gives them the right to define for everyone what is right or wrong; failure of anybody to recognize such right being so serious a personal grievance to the reformers that they demand national legislation in self-defense.

With this change of method the reformer himself becomes transformed from the dreamer of dreams into the lobbyist, the propagandist, the plotter of political strategies. He is a person wholly different from his liberty-loving, idealistic, impractical predecessor. He understands the weaknesses and vanities of men and knows how to use them to the advantage of his cause. Where schemes are in the making he is there, and where hatreds run like grass-fire before the wind, it is his zeal that kindles the flames. The Social Millennium, "Heaven on Earth," once the dream of young America, is in this practical age about to be forcibly realized through the machinery of the law, with voices shrieking, "Thou shalt not," with grim-visaged men planning the acts of *agents provocateur* and the raids of armed men.

The Abolitionist movement found it necessary to carry a moral issue into the political arena; and now morality is made to justify any oppression of one part of the public by another. Any difference of opinion among men may be transformed into a "moral issue." Virtue has moved

her residence. Once enthroned in the conscience of the individual, she now sits on the political platform. Very soon conscience will function only when the votes are counted. A new and sure method has been discovered for the redemption of mankind; it is this: the way to make men good is to deprive all of them of moral responsibility.

Even if good men were in agreement on questions of personal morals, it is dangerous policy to get people out of the habit of judging such matters for themselves; for a man might someday find himself in a situation for which the legislature had neglected to provide the rule of conduct, or he might have to act quickly and not have time to look up the statute, or his guardian policeman might fall asleep.

But I do not believe that it is single-hearted love of righteousness so much as *love of power* which is the underlying motive of reformist crowds. Moral considerations make convenient weapons, for they render opposition defenseless. The demand for moral conformity in matters of strictly personal conduct to-day serves a purpose similar to that which the demand for conformity in matters of religious belief once served. As the inquisitor is forced to relinquish the one demand, he takes refuge in the other; for with either he claims the same right to impose on somebody. And the struggle against intolerance is ever very much the same. There are certain men in whose keeping a moral issue becomes a frightfully dangerous thing. However they may arrive at their convictions—and it is seldom after having walked in the path of philosophy—their moral zeal never for one moment permits

them to suspect that they may be mistaken. The testimony of wiser men has no effect on their minds, nor do considerations of humanity. Those who differ from them they make no attempt to understand. Differences of opinion are for such men differences not between truth and error, but between good and evil. They hold their ideas with an intensity of conviction and singleness of aim which amounts almost to monomania. They are not to be deterred from pursuing their fixed goal by the sight of any wreckage they may bestrew or the chagrin of their fellow men. History is full of the mischief such men have wrought whenever they have had the power. Their spirit of intolerance is very infectious, firstly because it is always disguised as zeal for righteousness, and secondly because the crowd mind being, as I have shown, always potentially homicidal once it is called into action, is very susceptible to the appeal of "righteous indignation." Intolerance begets intolerance, both for and against itself.

Now when there is a rapid spread of intolerance among the people, accompanied by a corresponding extension of the power of government, and a decline in the quality of statesmanship, which as Milton said is the art "to discern in what the law is to bid restraint and punishment, and in what things perswasion only is to work," there is every danger of an orgy of persecution. There are many indications that the American people are setting the stage for just such a performance. We have for a generation been busy making our government weak where it should be strong, and strong where it should be weak. It yields timorously to the pressure of the mob, and is becoming

petulant and not over straightforward in its dealing with the citizen. To curry favor with insistent minorities, it passes laws which it knows should not have been passed and can never be enforced, even with terrorist methods; it then becomes panicky over the consequent lawlessness, resulting from its own folly, and increases the penalties. The legislative branch passes responsibility over to the executive, and the executive to the courts. The courts scold juries because they do not convict under laws in which millions of honest men do not believe. The one obvious thing to do is not done, for too many of our lawmakers are lacking in courage to defy organized intolerance. This is a more dangerous situation than most people realize. Intolerance is on the increase; the people are beginning to approach almost every public issue in a spirit of bitter factiousness. There have been previous occasions in history when government, reaching beyond its proper sphere, yielded to importunities to pull certain gentlemen's chestnuts out of the fire for them. It frequently found itself pulling the chestnuts out of fires of persecution before the job was done.

One frequently hears complaints of the "tyranny of prohibition." It is not tyranny, but it is I think the most unmistakable of many evidences—some of them perhaps even more pregnant with menace—that a sinister psychological disturbance, like a kind of madness, is taking possession of the American spirit. Certainly we cannot proceed far in the direction in which we are now going. I doubt if we can remain in our present situation without persecution. In the past when sectarian groups have been

able to compel the "secular arm" of the state to enforce their special tenets, and have had the privilege of urging on the business and seeing to it that it was done to their liking, persecution has resulted. Once started this is a difficult thing to stop. Persecution had its beginning with the Reformation and continued even in Protestant countries until the influence of the Eighteenth Century liberals put an end to it. Certain laws—notably all those which invade the domain of conscience—can by their very nature hardly be enforced without resorting to it. When questions of conscience are hotly contested, government should be especially cautious, for sectarian crowds will bring tremendous pressure to bear on it, and to permit itself to become the instrument of their will is to provide them with the power they seek to persecute.

Tyranny takes place when law is set aside, persecution when it invades the domain of conscience. The tyrant is as a rule an individual, of course aided by a group, who sets himself above the law; a great successful robber and exploiter, his usual concern has been power and wealth for himself and his favorites. Although some tyrants have persecuted, notably in periods of revolution when new dictators were striving to crush dissenting or counter-revolutionary opinion, they have usually had enough business on their hands without invading the realm of conscience. Persecution is rather a form of crowd behavior. The crowd is a creature of common belief and common antipathy. It would bring men into itself body and soul, or destroy them. It resorts to persecution to secure uniformity of belief and personal conduct in matters of re-

ligion, morality and patriotism. It is the natural enemy of private judgment, for private judgment would disintegrate it.

To the civilized man, religion and morals are to some extent matters of private judgment. He knows that the good life may be sought in more ways than one. He has no will to make his private life the one right way for all men. Valuing privacy for himself, he respects it for others. He claims no merit for his virtues, nor does he cackle every time he acts with common decency. There are some things which to his mind are sacred—that is, inviolable. He does not use his religion as an excuse for making himself a public nuisance; nor does virtue impel him to peep into other people's bedrooms, and no watchdogs or iron bars are necessary to keep him from trespassing on the inmost sanctities of other people's lives.

But to the rabble, nothing is really sacred. By the term "sacred," it simply means that its own prejudices are above criticism. Its idle and meddlesome curiosity respects no privacy, as may be seen in the newspapers any day. It has its finger in every pie, and its nose in every business, and it is always pulling up the roots of men's souls. When a crowd-minded man gets religion his first thought is to "sell" it. He becomes a barker. He judges the truth of an idea by the number of people who entertain it. The crowd parades its virtues in protest against the feeling of inferiority. Since anyone who differs from it challenges, thereby, its beliefs and hence its very existence as a crowd, it demands absolute unanimity so far as it has the power. Crowd ideas function only in an

environment in which reality is distorted. Hence the resentment of men toward anyone who would disillusion them or waken them from their dream. Always after a brief period of cultural advance or social change which calls for the readjustment of men's mental habits, a kind of panic seizes the multitude. Great numbers of people become openly homicidal with righteous indignation. Religion and morality are transformed into weapons of the crowd will to power. The great tidal waves of persecution which have swept over society, spreading suspicion and terror and torture, are an ever recurrent form of psychic epidemic.

The word persecute literally means to follow through. In the popular sense of the term, we say a man persecutes another when he deliberately and with malicious intent sets out to do him injury. But in its correct and historical use the term persecution means pursuing with thoroughness; in other words, *enforcement to the limit*. The enforcement officers who actually do the work of running down the victims of the law and of torturing and killing people, may or may not do so with malice. They may not themselves be in sympathy with the law; they are merely doing their duty as officers of the government. When law invades the realm of conscience, and makes outlaws of conscientious people, when heavy penalties are provided for minor offenses, when the enforcement of law becomes the triumph of bigotry—that is persecution. Acts of persecution are always instigated by some overzealous faction; they take place when the government ceases to preserve the balance among intense partisan

groups and becomes the agent of one of them. All that is necessary to start persecution going is that religious, moral or patriotic bigots succeed in forcing the government to pass illiberal legislation and rigidly execute it. Only a very small beginning is required, a mere letting down of a constitutional bar or surrender of a guarantee, and a flood of madness and fury will pour through, rising and spreading rapidly until it sweeps away all barriers and fills this America of ours with horror.

We think of the cruelty and oppression of the past and wonder how human beings could possibly resort to such things. Persecution, we say, belongs with the "dark ages" when mankind was ignorant and barbarous. I assure you the men of those ages were not very different from ourselves. Every type of person that lived then can be found among us to-day. Almost daily one hears and reads expressions of precisely those sentiments which, in the past, moved the crowd and its leaders to imprison and kill men for daring to differ with the crowd and its beliefs. Mill reminded his readers that persecution had scarcely ceased, even in the Nineteenth Century, to be an established institution in one of the most liberal nations on earth. He called attention to the newness and precarious position of tolerance in the England he knew. The virtue of tolerance is rare; it has ever to struggle with the passions of the crowd. It can prevail, and liberty with it, only so long as the influence of a civilized minority holds sway. We are indebted for this blessing of civilization, not to devotees, or spokesmen of the masses, but to such men as Erasmus, Milton, Montaigne, Hume and

Voltaire, to the few who found freedom to be first of all emancipation from the tyranny of herd opinion. Since eternal vigilance is the price of liberty the freeman must keep an ever watchful eye on every popular movement which would make use of some lofty principle, worthy cause or desirable end, to justify its acts of intolerance. He will also have a care about his own convictions and devotions lest they betray him into the delusion of infallibility and cause him to lose his own liberty in denying it to others.

CHAPTER VIII

FREEDOM AND POWER

It is often said that a man has no more and no less freedom than he has power. What I have power to do, that I am free to do. If I have no power of resistance, I am at the mercy of everyone, and having no rights, have no liberty. It was Max Stirner who said, I can get farther with a handful of might than with a whole bag full of rights. He therefore urged the proletariat to seize power if it would be free. As Blackstone says, there is no right without a remedy, and a remedy is the power of the State invoked in my defense. Freedom is simply a matter of the exercise of force, so what have culture and abstract reasoning to do with it? If the behavior of men is an indication of their way of thinking, it would seem that most people feel this way about freedom as a practical problem. Since, then, the two great sources of power over men are money and organization, let us gain control over these, and liberty will take care of itself.

But will it? Is freedom never surrendered to prosperity? Or is it not possible that the general preoccupation with economic interests and the advancement of organization accounts in part for the growing indifference to freedom in the modern world? It cannot be denied that there is a relation between freedom and power. But

freedom in civilized society depends on something more than the mere amount of power men may possess. The more power I have, the more freedom, so, if I become all-powerful, I have a monopoly of liberty and there is no freedom left for anybody else. This is not liberty but tyranny. Among civilized men the problem of freedom is not merely that of gaining power but of *controlling* it, of maintaining balance of power, of directing it toward desirable ends. A society in which everything tends to be subordinated to the struggle for power is not advancing in liberty but drifting toward despotism.

It makes a great difference whether the restraints of the will to power arise from within, and are the fruit of reason and mutual respect and consideration for the values of civilization, or are imposed from without by conflict with other wills: in other words, whether men are decent because they want to be, or because they have to be. There can be no real freedom unless restraint comes from within. Now the very aim and reason for the existence of culture is the voluntary restriction of the exercise of power, and the transformation of brute force into the pursuit of value. Which is to say that while freedom is the exercise of power, it cannot exist without culture. It also follows that when their power exceeds their culture, men become a menace to liberty.

Professor L. P. Jacks in his book, *The Living Universe*, contrasts "The Civilization of Power," and "The Civilization of Culture." He says that when men think of the world as a dead, mechanical thing which exists chiefly that they may exploit it, they tend to over-emphasize the

political state. The chief end of life then becomes the pursuit of material wealth. The first concern is that men, each motivated by his material interests, be governed, held in restraint. This is the Civilization of Power. But the Civilization of Culture seeks some rational or spiritual meaning in the world; it emphasizes the development of men and women, and its first concern is that people be educated. These terms are rather vague; and instead of regarding the mechanistic theory as the cause of the Civilization of Power, I should be inclined to reverse the causal relationship. But the contrast exists between a civilization which is a mere organized struggle for material advantage and one which is organized to achieve some cultural aim. Liberty in the two means very different things. In the Civilization of Power, it means little more than economic opportunity.

In a sense, all societies have been organizations of power; there can be no society in which power is not organized. Moreover, I doubt if ever a civilization existed without coercion, injustice, exploitation. I have no wish to contrast our modern industrial civilization with something purely imaginary and utopian. Neither would I imply that our social order is grossly materialistic and lacking in cultural aim, by comparing it with some earlier civilization based upon a religious culture. The fact that a society was controlled by religion does not necessarily mean that it was more spiritual than one controlled by its commercial interests. The religion itself might have been materialistic; its "cultural ideals" little more than the superstitions of primitive men. I am concerned with

what happens to freedom when men prize it, and all cultural values, less than material possession, and respect it less than the power of numbers. That is, when in seizing and using power they are checked less by considerations from within than by external forces.

Again it is not my purpose to indict the Capitalist System on the ground that it is destructive of liberty. It often is so, but it does not appear that people are less free under private ownership of capital than under any system of Communism that we know. Capitalists frequently sacrifice liberty for profit, but in this respect they are little different from those radicals who likewise place a purely materialistic valuation on freedom and culture and always say, "you must solve the economic problem" before all else. The man who sets out to get rich at any cost is simply solving his economic problem first. He is doing individually what the radical would do collectively: improving his material condition in the delusion that other interests can wait, for once material demands are satisfied, it is thought all other satisfactions will follow automatically. The notion has permeated all ranks of society that liberty is something you can buy. Now, of course, the economic problem, for obvious reasons, never can really be solved either for the individual or for society, and the preoccupation with it, to the exclusion of all else, renders men incapable of making any good use of the solution, even if it were possible. Not that the material condition of individuals and society cannot and should not be improved; it has been and is being im-

proved. But I do not think it advisable to sell our cultural heritage or our liberties in order to achieve this end.

It is often said that Liberalism is a *bourgeois* philosophy, that a poor man does not have enough liberty to justify in him any concern lest he may lose it. He is a "wage slave." Living in poverty, he is never free to do what he wants. He must endure all sorts of petty tyrannies on the part of his employer and overseers. He has to work while others idle and enjoy. The pressure of want often makes it impossible for him to leave uncongenial employment. In theory, his labor is not forced labor because he is presumed to have contracted freely with his employer; but a contract which is not entered into freely is theoretically null and void, and if the person signing it is not in a position to accept or reject its terms, he is not free. Yet he who must find work immediately, or starve, has little choice in the matter. Liberty, moreover, presupposes that men are equal before the law. Yet if a man has not the means to defend his rights in a court of law, he practically has no rights of which he may not be deprived. During the year 1928, the Legal Aid Society of New York handled in all over thirty-two thousand cases. The newspapers commented upon the work of this society as a deserving and inadequately supported "charity." When justice among men is a charity which someone may grant or withhold at his pleasure, it can hardly be argued that our society gives equal liberty to all.

It is not surprising, then, that the freedom to make money should be the liberty that men care most about. In

America opportunity for financial success has been, and is, so great as to have profound psychological effects on the whole population. To improve his material condition is the hope and dominant ideal of the average man. He estimates the worth of all existence—his own included—and the wisdom and justice of every public measure, in terms of the realization of this economic ideal. So long as the citizen can make money he feels himself free, however much he may be regulated and manipulated in other respects. I recently overheard a conversation on the train which I think was typically American. A man handed a newspaper to his neighbor, saying, "Read that; this is a hell of a free country!" The other answered, "What are you crying about liberty for; haven't you got prosperity?" Frank Kent, in his book *Political Behavior*, says that the public will not resent open and scandalous corruption in public office so long as business prospers. At the time of the disclosure of the "oil scandals," when a member of the national cabinet was accused of accepting a bribe of something like one hundred thousand dollars, I heard more than one man smilingly say, "Oh, is that all he got?" Now if men are as indifferent as that to the betrayal of public trust involving the elemental principles of common honesty, it is rather too much to expect of them that eternal vigilance which is the price of liberty.

This freedom to make money not only placed the lure of possible riches before the eyes of the average man; it was part of the general transition of society from the old traditional class leadership to the new leadership of wealth as such. It gave eminence and power to great

numbers of people who had only recently emerged from the mass and had not yet acquired those cultural interests, which, as I have said, are the true basis of liberty for civilized men. Thus it tended to break down the standards required for social leadership. The very words, lady and gentleman, lost much of their traditional meaning. Every female was now a "lady"; a "gentleman" might be little more than Rousseau's noble savage with a dollar in his pocket and the right to vote. The word gentle no longer implied good breeding, but mildness; it was the adjective most commonly used to designate domestic animals that would not kick and bite. Curiously also, the word gentleman became for many a term of reproach. Everybody was a gentleman, but in certain sections of the population in Nineteenth Century America it was an insult to call a man a gentleman. Men regarded the possession of wealth chiefly as a means of escape from hard manual labor, as something to display in evidence of their importance, as opportunity for personal enjoyment. Not many understood the meaning or importance of a cultured leadership, without which social life becomes little more than a scramble for material advantage.

I think it significant that the outstanding personages in the "gilded age" of the last half of the century just passed were predominantly men of what might be called proletarian origin. Their behavior caused widespread denunciation of the power of wealth in this country. But the general tone of this denunciation would indicate that it was more often inspired by envy than by disgust at

shameless vulgarity. Probably no one did more to discredit the new leadership of wealth than the spectacular Jim Fiske. Yet was not the career of this man precisely the realization of the average man's dream of success in a free country? This was what liberty meant to most people. Radicals commonly assume that Capitalism is the enemy of democracy and point to the "gilded age" as the most horrible example of it. But it cannot be too often said that *this type of Capitalism is democracy*. It is the most distinctive expression of itself that democracy has yet produced; its first-born child, its outstanding cultural achievement. This is just what one might expect men to make of liberty in a democracy, for it is the expression of those special abilities and ambitions which are most widely distributed throughout the population. It represents the average man's idea of success in life. Fiske did what millions of common men want to do. He came up from poverty, and though he displayed a crudeness such as a man would probably not display to-day, he enjoyed his wealth in ways that many men would like to enjoy it. He had an exciting time with the stock market. He owned railroads and great houses and diamonds. He had everything he wanted to eat and drink and wear. He associated with millionaires, had influence in politics, and was very popular with the man on the street. If he and his kind showed very little sense of responsibility for the values of civilization, who can blame them? Having no background of long-established cultural tradition, they gave the best imitation of the rich man that they knew how to make. They tried to ape the externals

of the life of the older privileged classes, believing that these trappings and means of culture were the thing itself. It did not occur to them that the life of the older leaders might have had an inside, where values were discriminated and preserved. What they saw in class distinction was not cultural leadership, but merely the possession, enjoyment and display of wealth. That this is the commonly accepted plebeian idea of class, we have much evidence. Thus most democrats and radicals, in their appeal to the masses, seem to see in class distinction among men nothing but a system of exploitation.

I would not contend that the leadership of the aristocracy, gentry and old bourgeoisie was morally superior to that which had its rise in democracy. Much would depend on how one defined morality. My point is that opportunity in democracy tended to give leadership to a type of man who was less sensitive to distinctions of worth in general, as they had been found by long human experience. Hence men tended to become indifferent to any liberty which could not be shown to have cash value.

Before the Nineteenth Century the privileged few enjoyed many liberties from which the masses were of course excluded. They had leisure and what to the average man appeared to be every luxury. It was doubtless always possible for a few men of unusual ability to gain entrance into what was called the "upper classes," but the process of admission was slow and difficult, and the possession of wealth alone did not qualify one for admission. Most of the members of the ruling class were people of at least moderate wealth, though many of them

were poor in comparison with the people who now frequent the night clubs of our great cities. Whatever the degree of their wealth, they maintained a certain cultural standard of living. The gentleman might know the pinch of poverty, he might not be able to keep up his position in the world; but he clung to the manners, and interests, and preferences of his class, even when to do so meant the sacrifice of marriage and children. He struggled for education, not for its monetary advantages but from love of wisdom. For the class required of its members a measure of self-discipline and of knowledge of excellence, and among the privileges it counted education, the aim of which was to create an intellectual leadership in the community. The privileged leaders felt themselves in duty bound to acquire and sustain a hierarchy of values derived from the experiences of the ages, so that they might be able intelligently to say "yes" and "no" to the possibilities of existence and the alternatives of behavior. Thus knowing what to prefer, because they had lived in the presence of things that were preferable, men sought to give tone and meaning to the life of their age. No doubt they enjoyed themselves all the more for this training of tastes and manners, but they did so with some sense of social responsibility for the values of civilization which had been committed to the keeping of their generation. No doubt their choices were often arbitrary and conventional, but at least their preferences were not on the whole cheap and vulgar. Their existence in society, generation after generation, had served to keep it from reverting to barbarism. It meant that the arbiters of

value could be the knowing ones, and it must be said that the works of art they preferred are now generally accepted as preferable; that the books they read are now regarded as classics; that while their leadership made life rigid and formal, it did not make it mean.

In the days when liberty meant inherited privilege, men unfortunately strove to keep it strictly for themselves; but at least they understood that it brought with it certain cultural obligations. They prized culture because they felt that only with its aid could they make the most of the opportunities they had inherited. But as financial opportunity became extended to vastly increasing numbers, and came to be regarded as the sum and substance of liberty itself, culture began to be looked upon as often a distinct disadvantage in the race for material success. Plato, in the *Republic*, suggests that inherited property is more worthy of honor than that which a man may accumulate by his own efforts; the implication being that in the case of the former a man may have leisure and capacity for other interests besides that of making money, whereas, in the case of the latter, most men are obliged to defer this civilization of interest until fortune has arrived, by which time mercenary habits and interests may have completely taken possession of them.

Be this as it may, it can hardly be denied that the broadening, and diversification, and civilization of men's interests has marked influence on their thought about freedom; whereas in the competitive struggle for financial success, freedom is a luxury few men can afford. This fact affects social and personal liberty in many ways.

Frequently the man who aspires to financial success, will scarcely call his soul his own. In any controversial matter he will, regardless of conviction, "play safe." In all his daily habits and personal opinions he permits himself to be moulded to type. On questions of conscience he yields to pressure of business considerations, or to the fear of damaging his influence. He spends his days doing things which others do, and paying for things he really does not want, in order to keep up with his neighbors or preserve appearances. Self-enslaved, it is small wonder that such a man seldom defends the freedom of others, or speaks out when the liberty of the community is threatened.

It is sometimes said that our American educators are timid souls, men of broken spirit, who tamely bear the yoke and submit to bullying in matters where they should be guided by knowledge and conviction. But I think our educators will compare favorably with our business men in this respect. Perhaps in cases where the charge is true, the surrender of academic freedom may result from the fact that the educator has adopted the mental habits of some of the business men about him. Liberals, many of whom are inclined to see conspiracies everywhere, often attribute the spinelessness of much American education to an alleged conspiracy of the vested interests, represented by the business men on our school boards. But if we took a more psychological view of the situation, we should doubtless see that no such conspiracy is required. It is natural that successful business men should occupy positions on school boards. It is also nat-

ural that many of them, in the struggle for success, should have lost the understanding of what freedom means.

This lack of understanding is not confined to any particular class or group. It was almost inevitable, in the historical circumstances, that most men should come to identify liberty with the opportunity to make money. Throughout our history, it has been the hope of material advancement, rather than the love of liberty, which has drawn most immigrants to America. The exceptions to this rule, a very small minority, have usually been either religious enthusiasts, or intellectual liberals like those who came shortly after the Revolution of 1848. The latter group especially thought of freedom as a matter of principle. But for most Americans, the intellectual love of liberty is an acquired taste which has been gained, if at all, after they arrived here. There was a time when Americans conceived of their country as a refuge for the oppressed of all the earth. But to the imagination of the European masses America is, and has always been, an escape from poverty. The two great evils, oppression and poverty, ordinarily are found together, but there are biological reasons why escape from the latter makes stronger appeal. I do not find that oppression as such is often a cause of social revolt. Oppression may be carried to the point where men cease to dream of liberty and accept their lot, as in Rome under the Cæsars, and in Spain after the Inquisition. As Mill says, persecutions, contrary to popular belief, have often been successful. The slave and the serf, moreover, have been known to cherish their bondage, and even to resist their emanci-

pators. Poverty also may be so degrading as to crush men's spirits, but it is easier for the poor to dream of riches than for those who have never known freedom to dream of liberty.

Each of the great waves of emigration to America occurred at a time when there was great poverty in the homeland. That of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries took place at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, when the break up of the Feudal system following the Reformation, especially in Great Britain, had caused much suffering to the working classes. That from Ireland reached its peak during the years of famine which occurred about 1840 and after. The immigration from continental Europe since 1880 has likewise been drawn chiefly from those countries where over-population and poverty have been greatest. This does not mean that it has always been the most wretched who have migrated to these shores. Often, it has been the more enterprising and adventuresome. My point is that the motives of the older and newer immigrations alike were predominantly economic. When political orators used to say "this is the poor man's country," in a sense they told the truth.

Men cannot justly be criticized for this economic motive. But we judge men by the other interests they sacrifice to it. The fact that it was this motive, more than any other, which sifted the nations of Europe to make up the bulk of the American population, may account for certain of our national peculiarities. For there probably never before existed a nation in which agreement was so nearly unanimous that the chief end of man is to im-

prove his material condition. Liberty would be the gainer if we could broaden this agreement, recognizing that the chief end of man, since he must have a chief end, is to grow into a civilized being.

Again, it would be difficult to over-emphasize the psychological effect of holding before millions of people the hope of a new start in life, such as took possession of the mind of the public, both American and foreign, shortly after the founding of this republic. It was then that people began streaming through the mountain passes into the vast and fertile midland region. Rich as were the natural resources, great as were the promises of fortune, imagination magnified them with extravagant fancy; no superlative could express the lure of fortune which caused the extension of population across this continent. Here was opportunity for financial independence, for great numbers of people who had never before in the old countries dared aspire to the free ownership of even the ground on which their ancestral cottages stood. Once in America, the poorest of the poor could hope, with good luck and the labor of his hands, to pay for his passage over the ocean and in time become a land proprietor. That one could thus rise from the humblest to the highest station was a new thing in the world. Of course, even with such opportunity, success could not possibly crown the effort of more than a minority; but it is astounding that so many succeeded. There was much sharp practice, and ever recurrent exploitation of new comers by earlier arrivals. There was a discontented debtor class, grumbling at the extortions of bankers and

demanding cheap money and free land. But the pursuit of wealth remained the dominant interest of the country.

After the Civil War had destroyed the slave-owning class of the South, the rapid development of industry brought to many greater financial opportunities than ever before. The man who could see his opportunity and grasp it became the ideal American. The multitude both envied and worshipped him. Public policy everywhere became subordinated to the ends of prosperity, frequently to the neglect of other ends. Aiding men to make their fortunes came to be regarded as the proper, if not the primary, function of government. It cannot be denied that we have "ideals." Indeed, we have been assured that if we as a people have been more successful in material things than others, it is because our material supremacy rests on a basis of idealism. Perhaps we have a national gift of genius for entertaining precisely those ideals that pay. I am not sure that the liberty of our fathers is any longer one of these ideals. Whatever else has transpired in America, our chief occupation during the last century and a quarter has been in the direction of the achievement of industrial empire, and to this end, consciously or unconsciously, our politics, our education, our culture, our religion, our liberties, have been pressed into service.

The effect of the social and industrial transformation of American life has tended to make the public in this country rather insensitive to meanings and values which have no immediate utility, and to the imponderable qualities of human relationships. Freedom is thus sacrificed to efficiency, or to what someone naively imagines will ren-

der his neighbors more efficient and prosperous. Newly acquired wealth frequently gives enormous power to men whose ideals and prejudices differ little from those of the man in the street. Many of these men sincerely desire to become benefactors of the community, but lacking the perspective of the *connoisseur* of human excellence, they seek to inculcate those popular sentiments and homely virtues which, they are convinced, led to their own success. They are likely, moreover, to believe that the magic of money and organization can achieve whatever social or moral end they deem desirable. Hence such persons frequently provide the professional reformer, who is bent upon regulating everybody and everything, with the financial support which makes possible the realization of his illiberal schemes. The general public, given to being suspicious of the power of money, is less inclined to resent ill advised attempts to uplift it, than to suspect that the would-be benefactor is merely seeking in some underhanded manner to increase his profits. There seems to be little objection to the exchange of freedom for material prosperity. But it is to be noted that absorption in the economic interest has brought certain psychological changes which have profoundly affected the love of liberty.

In spite of the restless struggle for success, the average American is a great optimist. Optimism is an aid in the struggle and is everywhere cultivated. It is "the voice with the smile" that wins. Confidence is necessary for prosperity. Gladness becomes not so much an end in itself as a means to material possession. Everyone is

urged to be a "booster." The average American means by idealism the belief that "every day in every way, we are getting better and better." That self-confidence has inspired many a man to transform failure into success, we all know. And that general happiness is a proper aim of the state has been held by many a good philosopher. So said Aristotle. But it is one thing to make happiness the goal of right living, and it is another thing to require of men a profession of optimism for business reasons. The line between "boosting" and boasting is difficult to draw. Convinced that this is "God's own country," the public persuades itself that it has the best of everything on earth. It becomes blind to its glaring cultural defects. For years it has gone on singing about "the land of the free and the home of the brave," unmindful of the betrayal of one after another of our inherited liberties, unaware of the fact that many peoples elsewhere are achieving more civilized forms of freedom than some of those we boast. Our optimism has made us too easily satisfied with shams of all sorts. Indeed, Americans have always thought successful "humbug" amusing.

A happy result of prosperity is a certain free and easy way, or open-handed demeanor. Americans may be materialists, but they are not penurious. A certain generosity of material things and openness of manner characterize rich and poor alike. There is little here of that guarded privacy and studied politeness which one finds in the old world. Exclusiveness is difficult to maintain here where opportunity obliterates class distinctions. It is still rather common in America for men to give one another a help-

ing hand, or as they say, a chance to make a little money. And when a man is prosperous, it is expected that he will give evidence of the fact by being a "good spender." Hence, everybody spends money in order to appear prosperous. Americans will pay outrageous prices for second-rate goods and seldom grumble. It is from good luck, hard work, and the recognition of ability, rather than from the saving of pennies, that most men hope for fortune. Hence the tendency of people to live beyond their means and to be liberal with their money.

One would hardly expect to find, then, that a people so liberal in certain respects would be as illiberal as most Americans seem to be in other respects. It is precisely where the civilized man tries to be open-minded and tolerant and to respect privacy, that Americans tend to be opinionated and narrow-minded, to lay claim to a vested interest in the conscience of one another. Perhaps the same social-mindedness which causes us to be generous with our money leads us to assume ownership of one another. Or perhaps we have been so busy achieving prosperity, that we have not had sufficient time to become civilized.

Again there can be little doubt that increased opportunity has been the stimulus to a great release of human energy. Increased activity, if voluntary, is itself a kind of liberty. The American is a "hustler." Not every man works harder than he "works for himself," but so many have done so that Americans sometimes give the impression of being chiefly occupied with work. Their desire to improve their efficiency is so widespread that most of

them seek education chiefly for this purpose. But whether ambition of this sort makes in general for good workmanship is a question. The profit motive does not always lead men to try to improve the quality of the things they produce. More effort is often given to salesmanship than to production. Now salesmanship is a kind of manipulation of people; often the devices by which it may be accomplished being made matters of cleverly-mastered technique of applied psychology. Careful attention is given to the art of suggestion, of playing on people's desires and prejudices, of influencing their behavior for ends that may or may not be disclosed. The salesman and the advertiser necessarily become special pleaders, exaggerating the merits of their case and glossing over its defects. It becomes customary to say and do things for the desired effect on others, rather than from unbiased consideration of fact. A people who grow up in an atmosphere of advertising and propaganda become in time habituated not only to the manipulation of some people by others, but to a kind of intellectual shoddiness.

In a recent book on propaganda, one of the most skillful manipulators of public opinion in America makes some interesting disclosures of the nature and practice of this very lucrative art. It would seem that the technique of propaganda is now perfected so that an "invisible government" may be placed at the disposal of any minority which is financially able to employ it. One never knows now when one is being used by unknown persons for ends that remain undisclosed. We are told that very often when we think we are acting most freely, our choices are

in fact determined by skillful men operating behind the scenes. It is only now that we are becoming aware of the enormity and devastating results of the falsehoods put out by the governments of practically all the leading nations during the World War. The weapon of falsehood, which has been likened to poison gas, was used by governments not only against the enemy, but deliberately to poison the atmosphere of homelands with undying hatreds and false ideas of the issues at stake. Many of us have sought to learn some lesson from the behavior of men during that war which might work to the advantage of civilization. But our author says that "the knowing ones" learned from it, for special interests, the tricks of utilizing a war psychology in times of peace. The minds of men may now be regimented as effectively as the bodies of soldiers in an army. No means of communication or form of human association may escape the injection of some extraneous and ulterior purpose. For it is said that every approach to social intercourse may be made an avenue of propaganda. The propagandist has learned the method of using, as did governments in war-time, the clichés and prejudices of the crowd in order to sell his wares or enhance the special interests of his clients.

That such methods have become part of the organization of industry, making possible large-scale production, we have abundant evidence. No doubt the public enjoys many material benefits as a result of the new methods. But isn't it obvious that such methods of propaganda strengthen the clichés and prejudices of the crowd? From

the time when the ancient prophet heard the command of the inner voice, "walk not in the ways of this people," until now, "the knowing few" have worked to spread enlightenment and not vulgar prejudice. And now every channel of human communication is being organized with the sinister aim of pampering vulgarity in return for material advantage. Such deliberate betrayal of the cultural values of civilization makes a sorry spectacle of the leadership of the modern world.

Folly and falsehood have in all ages mocked the efforts of good men to lift the common life out of infantilism and vulgarity. But it remained for the organizing genius of the modern world to standardize folly and falsehood and equip them with the mechanical techniques of mass production methods. In the effort to gain something his client wants, the propagandist studiously gives, or seems to give, the public something the public wants. And since appeal must often be made to the largest possible public, this method of manipulating mankind results in emphasizing and repeating over and over the cheap sentiments and stereotyped verbal formulas of dull wits, and in making capital of the prejudices to which the ignorant are most susceptible. Exploitation of the weaknesses of human nature becomes thus a recognized principle of success. Look at the tabloid newspapers and think of their circulation. Read the speeches of the average politician and of some of the most popular preachers. Note the type of appeal which is coming more and more to characterize the new large-scale advertising. Hear the radio, or better still, frequent the motion-picture palace.

Through the instrumentality of propaganda, the standards and tastes of the half-civilized are coming to dominate everything. It becomes increasingly necessary for any interest of modern civilization, if it is to survive, to organize ballyhoo and sell itself in the public square. The time may soon come when no value of civilization may survive which is beyond the mental comprehension of cab-drivers and shop-girls. This is the "low-brow" age, in which ignorance is deliberately catered to by smiling gentlemen who know better. The essential principle involved in modern propaganda is thus a matter not of wisdom or of good taste, but of intellectual honesty.

The question arises, how fares liberty in an atmosphere of general insincerity? Freedom may not keep company with quackery and not be betrayed. It is not surprising, then, that men should come to prize freedom chiefly as freedom to make their own propaganda. Men become so accustomed to propaganda that they think in terms of it in dealing with any subject whatever. Special pleading, threadbare plausibility, specious argument, partisan slogans, make up the mental equipment of the bulk of the population. The average man does not seem to resent being manipulated; instead, he regards the man who succeeds in gulling the public as a "smart man." Most men become so fascinated with propaganda that they try to play the game themselves. The individual becomes a convert, and in turn seeks to convert his neighbors. Having now a cause, he ceases to examine it critically or with open mind; he will refuse to admit undeniable and well-known facts which might controvert him.

He joins a crowd of like-minded devotees so that within the charmed circle of mutual exhortation to keep the faith, the worse may seem the better reason, and the testimony of all challenging reality be ruled out of court.

Each of these many crowds quickly develops its own verbal rigmarole of second-hand phrases, which are repeated on every possible occasion. Thinking—if there be any behind these habitual formulas—becomes fixed and ceremonial, like the irrelevant habits of certain neurotics, which, try as they may, the victims cannot break. "Tell me the old, old story" is the demand alike of children and crowd-men. Man may want but little truth here below, but he wants it over and over again, like the child and his bed-time story. Notice how men read books and newspapers and attend religious and political gatherings for no other purpose than to hear what they have heard before and to be confirmed in what they want to believe. It is thus that untruths persist long after common sense, even that of the believer himself, has shown them to be false. If by chance a man finds himself stimulated to a little critical and original thinking, he is usually saved from the dread unknown by the platitudes of his crowd: some word or act occurs which stimulates the habitual response; a prearranged verbal pattern is touched off and discharged; an article of his crowd creed is jerked out. This response commonly takes place on a psychological level similar to the twitching of the leg muscles of a decerebrated frog when stimulated by an electric current. It is men who think thus in terms of

crowd propaganda who become in the modern world the guardians of our liberties.

It is a mistake to confuse propaganda with public information, or with the professed "education of the public." Most propagandists persuade themselves that they are merely informing the public. But the public educator has no other aim than the dissemination of the truth. He strives to create open-mindedness. The propagandist strives for conviction, the closed mind, and action which will be to the advantage of his client. He is not necessarily seeking the truth, but only such truth, or appearance of it, as will aid him in presenting his case. And when the people acquire the habit of thinking as the propagandist wishes them to, on every important matter in life, they almost cease to know what the pursuit of truth really is. They have a made-in-advance receipt for everything. This habit of mind makes for illiberalism and intolerance. People become incapable of considering a question without bias. There is little thought of doing justice to contrary opinion. The beliefs supported by the greatest numbers tend to monopolize the agencies of communication and the arenas of public discussion. Fair hearing is denied minority opinion. There is violent opposition if anyone, in a journal, in the theatre, on the platform, or in an educational institution, gives expression to any fact or truth which happens to be offensive to any well organized element of the population.

Propaganda becomes the weapon of the group struggle for power, in which every effort is made to prevent

the contest from becoming a fair fight. Opportunities for the spirit of unfairness have been increased in recent years by the growing organization and centralized control of the means of publicity. On various occasions men in charge of radio broadcasting stations have been accused of exercising censorship. So far as I can learn, some of these accusations have not been satisfactorily answered. Censorship of this kind is almost inevitable, for it is demanded by a very widespread popular sentiment. But even where no conscious censorship is intended, as I believe is frequently true in the case of the press, the highly organized system tends automatically to standardization of public opinion. Almost inevitably that which is the object of popular prejudice, or is outside the routine of subject-matter, or is in conflict with established interests, has great difficulty in securing a hearing. Minority opinion, however true, can scarcely hope to compete in carrying its message to the public with that which, however false, can command the great agencies of publicity. Hence opinions tend to prevail because of the power of the groups behind them, rather than because of their inherent truth. And since the public, urged on by propagandists of all sorts, presumes to decide officially for its members an increasing number of problems involving personal habits and tastes and questions of conscience, we are fast approaching a time when our freedom, in any matter whatever, will depend upon our ability to organize and conduct for it propaganda on a nation-wide scale. We must, moreover, conduct this propaganda more

adroitly, with greater financial support, and with more successful flattery of the mob, than those with whose interests or prejudices our freedom happens to be in conflict.

I recently heard a group of typical prosperous Americans discussing the present condition of their country. To most of them it seemed to be a matter beyond dispute that any restriction of personal liberty which would increase the industrial productivity of the country by ten percent would be wholly justified. They argued that such increased efficiency would give domestic industry an advantage in competition with other nations. On this principle, industrialism would reduce the modern world to complete and abject slavery. We might well pause and question whether the attempt to secure enforced efficiency is not self-defeating. For it is doubtful, in the end, if industrial slaves would be as efficient or show as much initiative as free men. But somehow the erroneous idea seems to be generally and uncritically accepted that individual liberty has no proper place in a machine age.

I do not think it is machinery which directly menaces freedom, but the greater regimentation of the public into power-seeking groups, which large-scale machine production makes possible. The machine did not create the lust for power. It has only provided a new arena in which the struggle for power takes place. It has also made possible the rise from the common mass of a new industrial leadership, many of whose members have yet to grasp the relation between freedom and culture. In this sense, I

think the machine, by placing it within their reach, has increased power and the lust for power for many men who are incapable of using it wisely.

In a world of organization and propaganda, something happens to the very idea of freedom, because the individual as an individual receives too little consideration. So-called liberals frequently condemn individualism. The thing they talk about, however, is not individualism, but egoism; it is little more than the desire of men to take full advantage of economic opportunity and exploit their neighbors without control or hindrance. Against this uncontrolled egoism, many liberals have nothing to oppose but a similarly uncontrolled egoism of the mass. Beyond his will to power, little thought is given the individual. The forces at work in industrial society are largely impersonal, as are frequently the industrial relations among men. In the struggle-group the individual becomes anonymous, a mere numerical unit. Production and distribution require the cooperation of vast numbers of people, only a minority of whom may attain personal independence to any considerable extent. Specialization means, not only that some capacities of the individual are developed at the expense of the others, but that we cease to care about him as a complete man, and become interested only in his speciality.

In the struggle for power it is the power of numbers that counts. Which is to say that a man is of account only in so far as he is represented by his membership in some group or organization. That is, it is only that which we have *in common* with a number of other people which

counts. Thus I may belong to a reading public, a traveling public, a consuming public, a professional society, or labor union, or employers' association, a home owners' or renters' organization, a voters' league, a political party, or to one or more of the many societies organized for purposes of reform. As a member of various groups, I can help exert such pressure on the rest that I receive a certain consideration. But each group represents only a fraction of my interests, and the *sum total of my memberships in all the groups to which I could possibly belong does not add up into a living man*. At best, it is but a linking together of abstractions. In reality none of the organizations to which I commit my several interests represents my interest in the unique form in which I as an individual hold it. What does receive recognition is something which is abstractly considered to be the interest of the average member of the group.

In a world organized for power, the interest of human beings in one another, represented by organization, is purely statistical. Everybody ceases to be considered as man or woman, and becomes for all practical purposes merely an average. Hence human considerations are neglected, and with them, the cultural aims of civilization. Liberty ceases to be thought of as individual right, and becomes something which rival crowds demand of one another. Each struggle-group tends to refuse freedom to its rivals or to its own members, for to grant the latter would be to disintegrate the group, and to grant the former would be to strengthen the enemy. Liberty thus tends to become little more than the freedom of crowds

to be crowds. Tremendous pressure is exerted to remove the traditional restraints upon mass action, and to override barriers which protect individuals and minorities. The most successfully organized and most numerous portion of the mass, that portion whose cause is most commonplace and whose propagandist appeal is most popular, seductive, and exciting, will most likely be victorious in the effort to capture the machinery of the State, establish its own dictatorship, and put an end to such liberty as remains. We have already seen something like this happen abroad, and the result is very much the same whether the dictatorship is established by conservatives or by radicals. So far as the liberties of America are concerned, it would make little difference whether the dictatorship were that of capitalists, of a revolutionary proletariat, of an organization of reformers, or of a religious denomination.

It does not follow that because the group struggle for power menaces liberty the tendency should be encouraged or be accepted with fatalistic resignation. In the past, it was at just those times when some power arose which threatened existing and recognized liberties, that thoughtful men became concerned about freedom and stated the issue clearly. It was so when Charles I tried to follow the example of reactionary monarchs of continental Europe and rule without Parliament on the theory of the divine right of kings. It was so when James II sought to undo the work of the English Revolution of the preceding century. It was so when the liberties of American colonists were menaced by British colonial policy. Since

the foe of freedom to-day is the crowd itself, equipped with the power which industrially organized society makes possible, it will avail nothing to set one power-hungry group against another. What is needed is that the crowd-mind itself be challenged and exposed wherever it appears.

It is time men of understanding stopped flattering the crowd, or accepting its high toned professions and moralistic masquerades at their face value. Any group bent on rule or ruin will disguise its intent, even from the consciousness of its members, with protestations of patriotic, humanitarian, or moral sentiment. It is concerning these sentiments, in which the will to power takes refuge, puts on false whiskers and reappears disguised as benevolence, that clear thinking is necessary. The scholarship and intelligence of the country could perform no greater service in the cause of freedom than to strip organized malevolence of its sheep's clothing and show it to be the wolf it is. As naked and unjustified arrogance and impertinence, the will to power loses much of its appeal, even for the members of the crowd which entertains it, and slinks from the gaze of decent men and women. The wisdom of the ages has, therefore, been very sparing of its flattery of both the despot and the mob.

Finally, it is precisely because it seems to be necessary to give up so many social liberties in modern industrial society that mankind must guard its personal rights with stubborn vigilance. Our race has an adolescent tendency to act on the all-or-none principle, especially when under sway of emotion. If it moves at all, it is always likely to

go too far. Necessary regulation of traffic on the highway, or of interstate commerce, should not among people with mature minds be made precedent for the regulation of conscience by the Treasury Department of the United States. The burden of proof should be made to rest with any advocacy of the extension of the powers of government, particularly of the Federal Government, even for desirable ends. Resort to legislation should be the *very last remedy* proposed for the removal of abuse; for the chances are more than ever that even a good law will have the unexpected result of giving some propagandist group a legal weapon with which it may bully or exploit the community. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, freedom is power to do something. You are free to do what you have power to do. But whenever you seek to exercise power over others through organization or group-will, to just that extent you give yourself over to your group or organization, and lose power over yourself. For the external authority you aid in increasing will command you as relentlessly as it will any other of its victims. If you would keep your power over yourself, keep it off your neighbor.

CHAPTER IX

HOW FREEDOM BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE

There is probably nothing in the comedy of modern life more ironical than the assaults that are made on freedom in the name of morality. For morality cannot exist one minute without freedom. It inevitably perishes together with the liberty which unthinking men would strangle for its sake. The zealot, if he is sincere about his moral issue, puts himself in the ridiculous position of one trying to kill the very thing he is fighting for. Only a free man can possibly be moral. Unless a good deed is voluntary, it has no moral significance. A machine or an animal may be made to behave in ways men desire, but we do not consider such behavior moral. There can be no morality where there is no freedom to do right; and it is just because we believe a man might have chosen the opposite course that we say he did right freely. Therefore if men are to be free to do what is right, they must necessarily be free to do wrong, and take the consequences. This is what we mean by moral responsibility, which is, I believe, the same as intellectual responsibility. For unless a man acts, or is permitted to act, according to his own best judgment, he is not a moral being. And he who acts according to his best judgment is free. Hence as Aristotle said, the good man, the wise man, and the free man are the same.

There are two ways in which men may lose their liberty. First, they may evade responsibility or through ignorance or weakness be incapable of it. Second, they may be deprived of responsibility by other people who may force them to do not what they would with their own lives, but what their regulators think is best for them. Therefore, whoever tries to deprive reasonable men of their liberties, tries to destroy moral responsibility, and is consciously or unconsciously a confirmed enemy of morality. I am not much impressed by the moralistic pose of illiberal men. Since liberty is necessary for any morality at all, the foes of the one are the foes of the other. If more people could see this fact, they would not so easily permit themselves to be put in the wrong by inveterate enemies of human liberty.

The basic problem of ethics involves that of freedom, and moral philosophers have for thousands of years discussed the two together. Moral behavior is simply intelligent behavior. When a man may use his intelligence to guide his conduct, it does not follow that he will always act for the best, for he may be mistaken; but he is both a moral being and a free man. Any act performed automatically, or from compulsion, or fear, or merely out of social pressure, or in obedience to a commandment, human or divine, without considering the results of the act, is not the behavior of a moral being or of a free man. The only free acts any of us perform are those which we do with intelligent consideration of, and personal responsibility for, their results.

There are those who say we are free when we may do

what we want to do. But this would make desire, rather than judgment, the guide to conduct. This argument of desire was used by Edwards to prove that no human will is free. If we will to do what we want to do, our will is determined by desire. And what determines desire? If we will to want to will, without first wanting to will, we have willed something we did not want and are not free. And if we want to will to want, then will is determined by desires it did not will, and is not free. We got into this dilemma by assuming that a man is free when he does what he wants. We must modify the assumption. The free man does many things he does not desire. Often his choice is, at best, the lesser of two evils. For our purposes, a man is free when he acts according to his own judgment and not that of another. And it is action determined by judgment which has moral value. Now there are three ways in which a man may be compelled in the name of morality to act contrary to his best judgment, or without using his reason. They are by the coercive force, first, of the folkways operating as primitive custom and tabu; second, of religious dogma basing morals on divine commandment; third, of the spirit of factiousness imposing its will by means of moral legislation. It is obvious that these three kinds of coercion are interrelated, but each in its way makes freedom a moral problem.

Much that popularly goes by the name of morals is merely dull and blind routine. Habits which had their origin in primitive society often survived as sacred custom in the modern world. Such ancestral folkways may

have no relevance whatever for the kind of behavior demanded by existing situations. Conformity to such customs may in fact be positively injurious and lead to serious maladjustment. Yet it is by just such irrational standards as these that most human actions are judged to be right or wrong. The conscience of most of mankind consists of little more than emotional attitudes, of self-appreciation or depreciation, which are stimulated by the keeping or breaking of popular tabus. Severe penalties of mutual condemnation and social ostracism are placed on nonconformity, whereas very often these penalties, together with the suffering caused by the feeling of guilt, are the only conceivable evils which could result from acting contrary to conventional rules of conduct. It is obvious that if a man steals or destroys the property or does injury to the person of another, the results of his behavior are inevitable; the suffering he causes takes place whether or not he is found out. Therefore the community, if it is to exist at all, must protect its members from one another in such matters. But there are numerous departures from the moral code which result in no suffering unless the wrong-doer is discovered, the only evil results of such departures being the suffering which society itself inflicts on the guilty.

Hence it is evident that much of the control of the individual by the folkways has nothing to do with the good or evil results of behavior, but is rather a device with which members of the community claim ownership of one another. It is chiefly with regard to these *inconsequential* requirements, that the guardians of the folk-

ways make the greatest fuss about moral issues. For wherever the good or evil results of behavior are recognizable, there is no moral issue, but general agreement among reasonable people.

In earlier and more primitive civilizations, the causal connection between behavior and its results was not much emphasized. The mores were an end in themselves. Custom simply preferred one kind of conduct and condemned another. To the primitive mind, any departure from prescribed ways was evil in itself, regardless of results; it was "improper" and hence punishable. But in modern industrial society men tend to become more utilitarian, hence somewhat more mindful of results. The rational temper produced by modern civilization would consequently tend to make them indifferent to the requirements of tribal morality wherever the results of behavior are indifferent. But, unfortunately, since men are not intellectually equal, they share this rational temper in varying degree, some possessing almost none at all. Many who are hardly civilized, however, are not insensitive to personal or commercial advantage, hence a spirit of narrow utilitarianism prevails which is not always rational.

Now those among whom primitive impulses are still strong naturally strive to preserve and strengthen the irrational demands of the mores, by making practically indifferent matters appear to lead to results to which they do not necessarily lead in experience. Many specious arguments are invented to justify demand for conformity in such matters. Certain facts, words, acts, are said to

be evil, indecent, obscene, in and of themselves; and when no other practical good or evil result may be observed to follow the traditional attitudes, it is even held to be self-evident that to disregard the tabu will corrupt the mind, destroy innocence, blacken the character, damn the soul.

Hence it is just when, for many, ethical questions are becoming matters of reason and common sense or good taste—that is, when an element in the community becomes sufficiently civilized to guide its behavior by consideration of results—that moral censorships and prohibitions arise in order to forestall a discriminating attitude toward the folkways. What appear to be moral issues are really conflicts growing out of the fact that people in the community are living on different cultural levels. Aimed ostensibly at the vices of the lower cultural strata, moral coercion, in debatable or indifferent matters of conduct, is in fact an attack upon the necessary freedom and more intelligent morality of the higher culture strata.

In such conflict the moral issue at stake is whether behavior shall be guided by compulsive thinking or by problem-solving intelligence; whether the good life consists of required and ceremonial gestures, the mere routine performance of which is the fulfillment of duty, or of the results which follow intelligent, responsible, considerate thought and action. The folkways, even when they lead to conduct which is desirable and necessary when judged by experience, should be classed as

compulsive, or ceremonial, behavior. Certain neurotics develop individual ceremonialisms, behave in them, and feel about their performance or non-performance very much as the crowd does about its customs and tabus. The motives of habit formation are in both cases psychologically much the same. In both there is the sense of being impelled to act regardless of reason; in both there is a feeling of satisfaction in the act of making the gesture rather than in what it may accomplish; in both, the ceremonialism has the same symbolic meaning—self purification and artificial security.

It is very doubtful if the folkways had their origin in the wisdom of primitive humanity. They were not efforts of intelligence to solve the problems of living. They have no more rational validity than the myths and other superstitions of antiquity. They originated as magic formulas at a time when primitive savages reduced all their daily actions, their work, their eating, their fighting, their hunting, dancing, love-making, and social intercourse, to routine and rigmarole, in order to keep evil spirits away and gain magic power. The customs of the tribe had much the same significance as the fetich, and they are fetiches to many men even to-day.

Whether these ceremonies originated by accident, or voluntarily, they were preserved as customs, not primarily because they led to satisfactory adjustments to the natural environment, but because, like the ceremonies of the neurotic, they were symbols of infantile emotional conflicts and fixations, childish wish-fancies and fears,

and primitive egoism. Just as the tribe decked its bodies in feathers and paint, so *it put feathers and paint on its behavior.*

That these trappings had the advantage of bringing order and stability into primitive life was a fortunate after-effect. Undoubtedly many of the original customs were exceedingly harmful, and we can believe that whole peoples perished because of them. But many were indifferent in their results, and some happened to be beneficial. These more beneficial customs naturally had survival value in the struggle for existence. Indeed custom tended to improve, or evolve, by a kind of Darwinian process of natural selection. The tribe, which on the whole happened to have the most innocuous or useful customs, like an organism which possessed by heredity some advantageous variation, tended to survive, and bequeath its survival values to succeeding generations. And just as in the descent with modification of animal organisms, development was not uniform, a few customs having great survival value might carry along with them to posterity many monstrous atavisms and useless vestiges.

As our inherited folkways were not conceived in reason, neither is their enforcement at any time a work of sweet reasonableness. Under their sway men may lose all sense of proportion. Any deviation from the ways of the crowd may be seized upon and magnified until it becomes the occasion of intolerance and cruelty. For great numbers of people, almost any kind of personal enjoyment comes to be regarded as a species of social revolt and is bitterly resented. Mankind has a strange

propensity to regard with reverence those public teachers who say that something hitherto considered innocent is wicked, and to treat with incredulity and hostility those who would show that some action men had thought evil is perfectly harmless. Devotion to the mores seldom inspires in men feelings of generosity or respect for true excellence. It rather leads to mutual espionage, slander and gossip, and ubiquitous extra-legal censorship, under which people live in fear and furtiveness. The mores, too, provide the dull spirit of reactionism with weapons which may be conveniently used to resist innovation and progress of any sort, especially the intellectual and moral progress of the human race. Many people insist upon universal and indiscriminating conformity to the folkways in just the measure that they are incapable of the life of reason. It is never the most civilized people who are most easily shocked by minor departures from custom and convention. The clamorous "moral enthusiasm" of second-rate men is less love of virtue, than assertion of ownership of all individuals by the collectivity. Since the days of Aristotle, moral progress has been the work, not of the slaves of ancient custom, but of those who have sought to bring custom under the rule of reason, and to displace the pow-wow of primitive savages with the cultivated virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice.

In contrast with the folkways, the great ethical religions represented a tremendous moral advance. For while many primitive customs were retained and given the sanction of divine authority, new emphasis was given to

the *conscience of the individual*. He was led to understand that which transcends his immediate personal interests. He was given a dramatized vision of existence as a whole, in view of which his own life and behavior gained spiritual, or cosmic, meaning and importance. If such cosmic significance was largely illusory, at least it led men to judge behavior with a sense of its remote, as well as its immediate, relationships. The ethical religions thus prepared the way for subsequent rational morality, for no man may attain the life of reason who has not imagination enough to picture the remote consequences of his conduct.

But while the ethical religions awakened the individual conscience, they made morals a matter of keeping the commandments and hence discouraged individual maturity and responsibility. To fear God and keep his commandments is said to be the whole duty of man. Under the guidance of religion the average man comes to believe that the reason why he should not kill, or steal, or commit adultery, or bear false witness, is because he is forbidden to do so by the sacred book. If men may be commanded to exercise certain virtues, the commanding authority is under no obligation to give reasons for the requirements it makes of them; for to recognize such obligation is to make reason, and not authority, the ultimate criterion of right and wrong. But to withhold the reasons and base morals on divine commands is at once to deny liberty and ignore the fact that men are rational beings. It is because of this fact that many outstanding philosophers of freedom have been religious liberals who

have denied the dogma of authority and have substituted rational systems of ethics.

Religion is often said to be the true basis of morals. This statement may mean various things. Historically speaking, it may mean that the folkways have been transmitted from generation to generation by religious institutions. It may mean, again, that the sentiments of religion inspire those loyalties which predispose men to seek the good life. But in this respect religion is not unique: many systems of philosophy have done the same, often with more general success among their followers than would seem to be the case with any one of the great religions; for since not all who profess religion practice what they preach, we must conclude that religious sentiments do not uniformly predispose men to the good life. Finally the statement that the basis of morality is religion, may mean, and I think commonly does mean, that most men, in so far as they behave themselves, do so because they desire the rewards of obedience, and fear the penalties of disobedience, of alleged divine commands.

As a generalization of social psychology, I suppose this statement is statistically correct. If all religious institutions were abolished—such a thing is inconceivable, human nature being what it is—there is little doubt that the majority of the human race would find itself in a most tragic condition, being quite without moral sense, or guidance, or standards of right and wrong. I think there is much truth in the assertion that the prevalence of crime in modern society is in large measure a result of

the decline of religious belief among the ignorant and the unadjusted. But this is to say that a large portion of the human race—how large we do not at present know—is incapable of self-government and therefore unfit for liberty. Now this fact I have already admitted. The question is whether the minority, who are the hope of civilization, must forever be enslaved along with the rest. Perhaps, on the other hand, we should not be dogmatic on this point; a greater number of people might now be capable of self-government had not mankind been so long kept under the tutelage of religious institutions.

People who must have recourse to supernatural revelation and commandment to learn and do what is right, confess by this very fact that they are unable to discover in the nature of things any reason why they should behave themselves. To make commandments the reasons for right conduct is to treat all men as if they were children. There can be no real discussion of moral problems, or modification of conventions, if they are held to be settled by divine decree. Much of the intolerance which exists in the name of morality grows out of just this belief. The average man thinks he knows, without giving thought to the matter, exactly what is right for his neighbor to do on all occasions; he has only to look in the sacred book. Supported by texts of Scripture, the crowd's delusions of infallibility become absolute. But we know that all kinds of things have been justified by meanings which ignorant men have read out of, or into, Holy Writ. Slavery, polygamy, war, monarchy, and blood revenge have all enjoyed this sanction. Perfectionists of the past have found

FREEDOM BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE 283

in religion commandments to practice anarchism and free love. To-day people are quoting Scripture both for and against prohibition—as if the matter could possibly be settled that way!

The serious thing about basing morals on divine commandments and compelling obedience to them, is that in this way men may *evade responsibility for the results of their behavior*. I have tried to show that such responsibility is necessary for both liberty and the moral judgment. A man in military service must do as he is ordered. His responsibility extends only to the faithful execution of orders issued by another. He is not responsible for the orders themselves nor for any mischief which may result from his obedience. His conduct is not determined by his own judgment, nor by his response to anything in the situation where he acts, but by another will imposed from without. His orders may be wholly irrelevant to the needs of the situation. He may know that their execution means disaster, but he can truly say, "I am not responsible, but he who commanded me."

Now something like this is always likely to happen when men try to carry through what they believe to be sacred commandments. Even when they read their commandments correctly, they are not likely to approach a critical situation as men who have a problem to solve. They need not learn what they should do from a study of the case at hand; they are governed by considerations which reside wholly outside the situation and may not be relevant to the behavior which it calls for. They need only persuade themselves they are doing "God's

will" to ignore responsibility for what they do and view the results, however disastrous, with a clear conscience. The moment a man's conduct is determined by anything other than his own best judgment, he acts without regard to the relations of cause and effect; he ceases to be either free or reasonable.

Let a man be convinced that he has a sacred mission in the execution of which he is accountable neither to his fellow men nor to reason, but only to a god made in his own image, and he will practice the brutalities of a Calvin, a John Knox, a Philip II, a Robespierre, if he has the power. Men who thus deify their own wills and give themselves divine prerogative, are, I believe, the most dangerous people in the world. We have but to see the historic examples of this kind of moral enthusiasm, writ large in the biographies of those who have been most distinguished for it, to be convinced that nothing so completely destroys a man's moral sense. An ambitious realist, like Napoleon, will commit many crimes. But the man whose brain is on fire with holy zeal will often stop at nothing. His passion places him beyond good and evil, as these are understood by reasonable men. Beyond the outposts of sanity, morality at once degenerates into messianic delusion and homicidal mania.

The third method whereby men in the name of morality stamp out moral responsibility, and hence destroy their freedom, is the factious attempt to regulate behavior by legislation. The ostensible objectives of such legislation may or may not be desirable; they frequently are so, but the means employed, being compulsory, at

once remove these objectives from the realm of morals to that of law and politics, where they are commonly lost sight of and defeated. The real objective, thinly disguised as moral, is most frequently the victory of some powerful faction over the rest of the community. The subject-matter of this kind of legislation is always something concerning which reasonable men entertain honest differences of opinion: and its enactment into law is an attempt to settle by force something which hitherto has been decided by the intelligence of the individual. It is this determination of some factious group to substitute force for intelligence in the control of behavior which creates many of the so-called "moral issues" in modern society. Wherever there is a moral issue, some crowd is engaging in a moral crusade.

The behavior of the public, once it is aroused in such crusades, is an interesting psychological phenomenon. Commonly it displays all the emotional explosiveness, the intemperance of judgment, the collective egoism, the hostility and specious reasoning of a typical mob movement. Moral crusades, like revolutionary outbursts, wars, and similar psychic epidemic social disturbances, are somnambulistic and episodic. For a brief period people are obsessed with a moral issue which seems to be the most important thing in life; their mental perspective is entirely distorted by it. It is as if some violent impulse, long chained within their natures, were suddenly released. They experience a sort of ecstasy of self-righteousness in excessive devotion to their Cause. They are impelled to speech and action which in their saner moments they

would consider unreasonable and ridiculous. The crusade may override all restraints of reason and justice, as it rushes headlong to the imagined realization of some impossible dream, leaving hatred and destruction in its course. And then one day, for no apparent reason, the people who acted in it lose interest and begin to "come to." A sense of proportion returns to them; the Cause shrinks to its normal dimensions; they go back to their former occupations and interests, get over their animosities and smilingly break the laws which were passed in the heat of conflict.

The recurrence of such episodes ever so often in our social life, and the mental symptoms which men display in them, strongly suggest a resemblance to the individual cyclic psychoses, or manic disturbances, with which psychopathologists are familiar. Case records recount thousands of instances of similar recurrent attacks. The patient ordinarily goes about his daily pursuits in a rational manner, quite well adjusted to reality and to the people about him. Then some trivial event may occur which seems to awaken impulses with which he has been long unconsciously preoccupied. A rapid temporary transformation of character takes place which may endure for a period of a few weeks or from three to four years. During the disturbed or "florid" period, he passes through a sequence of psychic states which is much the same in all his attacks. At first restless, or melancholy and depressed, he later becomes obsessed with a distorted system of ideas which may occupy his mind to the exclusion of everything else. He becomes greatly

excited, throws off all inhibition to the release of impulse, and for a while is quite beside himself. But after a time his reason regains a normal sense of proportion, emotional balance returns, delusions vanish, and his life again resumes its normal course. It may be many years before he suffers a recurrence of the disorder, or he may be permanently cured.

There are various types of manic, or cyclical, mental disturbances. It is not my purpose to discuss them or the causes which psychopathologists assign to them. But I would draw attention to the fact that such disorders seem to have something in common with the periodic moral crusades to which the public mind is subject. In normal times the propaganda of professional reformers, which seems to be chronic in countries which have an historical background of Puritanism, is unheeded by the multitude. People remain indifferent, or mildly entertained; go about their business or their amusements and either ignore the advocate of restrictive legislation, or consider him a crank. Then it may be that after many years during which a particular reform has seemingly made no progress or even lost ground, the community becomes strangely and suddenly disturbed. Often this change is the result of more efficient methods of propaganda and organization. Sometimes the public is, as it were, caught off its guard. Yet no new arguments need be advanced, or new facts discovered in support of the Cause. Rumors which had long been silenced, allegations which had been proved untrue to the general satisfaction, slogans of a preceding generation, are all at once revived as new dis-

coveries and believed implicitly by millions of people. The abuse to be remedied, which, if it really existed, originally aroused the interest of a few reformers, may be well on the way to a satisfactory solution, or be in some cases a thing of the past; other and more glaring evils may confront the public; all this makes not the slightest difference. The public has a Cause. Matters which yesterday were of no importance, to-day are subjects of widespread and passionate interest. Caught in the wave of excitement, great sections of the population will go to almost any extreme to gain victory over opposition. Many people may be hurt before the shouting is over. And then without waiting to see what has really been accomplished, they begin in time to find the whole business uninteresting and a little ridiculous. The great Cause has about as much interest as last year's straw hat. Part of the public returns to its old habits and interests, and part is off on a new crusade. As an example of the ease and rapidity with which the public gets over these episodes, think of that bright and shining crusade against Trusts and Monopolies and Invisible Government which stirred our hearts only a few years ago; and then try to arouse moral enthusiasm in this cause to-day.

It ought to be obvious that no genuine moral gain to the community can be achieved by factious legislation. Men cease to be free moral agents when they are coerced. Neither can a crusade in which reason is abandoned be expected to result in reasonable behavior. Such fantastic attempts at goodness are possible only among a people who have not learned, or will not see, that morals may be

improved only with the increase of intelligence and right reason. People whose culture is largely that of the middle classes of the English-speaking world have always been inclined to associate goodness with stupidity rather than with intelligence, having for the latter a certain suspicion or even moral indignation. Perhaps this feeling arises from our democratic doctrine that one man is as good as another. Since we recognize that one man is not as wise as another, it would seem that ignorance saves its face by assuming moral superiority. Our moral crusades always proceed on the assumption that reason and intelligence are not necessary for good behavior, but that men know what is right by intuition. Hence, the crowd has no misgivings about its moral intuitions. It is sure that all right-minded men must have the same intuitions as itself. All who do not agree with it, should know better than to think as they do; they must be either perverted or deliberately evil. So it is naïvely believed that the realm of conscience is not only not invaded, but actually supported by moral legislation. I think this doctrine of Intuitionism is both erroneous and dangerous to civilized forms of liberty.

The notion that man has a special and separate "moral sense" which is *independent of common sense and intelligence* is psychological romanticism. Like romanticism in general, it exalts inspiration and undervalues good form; it makes goodness primarily a matter of right feelings. Righteousness then becomes essentially subjective, rather than something which takes place between a man and his environment. This is the doctrine of "the Beautiful Soul."

Lecky, the distinguished historian of European morals, held the doctrine of Intuitionism in opposition to Nineteenth Century Utilitarianism, which he thought too narrow and calculating. He believed that the "principle of the greatest happiness" was insufficient as a guide to behavior, and that man to be moral must be actuated by devotion to something higher than himself. But I can see no necessary conflict here. It does not follow that a man can have no loyalties simply because he acts according to his best judgment. The question is, whether devotion may be substituted for intelligence as a guide to behavior. Since endless mischief has been wrought by blind and opinionated devotees, it would seem that it is precisely a man's devotions concerning which he most needs to exercise his intelligence.

The term moral intuition may have either of two meanings, both of which are unpsychological. First, it may mean that we have immediate, extra-rational and certain knowledge of the right, which is similar to sense experience, or to what Kant called a priori intuition of space. If this is so, it is difficult to see how there could possibly be any disagreement among men about matters of right and wrong, or why it should be necessary to teach morality to children, since the moral will would recognize the right the moment it saw it. But I do not believe any psychologist would to-day argue that the will has a special kind of knowledge, different from that of intelligence. Dewey holds that the will is not a separate faculty, but is a predisposition to act in certain ways because of the habits we have formed. The moral senti-

ments and ideas of duty which most men think are intuitive are largely the force of their social habits and consist mostly of their folkways. In cases where conscience seems to reveal duties which are unique, a man is probably the victim of compulsive thinking caused by an emotional complex, or is perhaps using his reason.

We do not always follow consciously all the steps of our logical processes. And this is the second sense in which we may use the term intuition. Thus it is said that women and artists are intuitive. Certainly much creative thinking is really intuition. But there is nothing mysterious or sacred about it. Neither does it lead to "higher truths" or possess greater validity than conscious reasoning. A conclusion reached by intuition remains only a shrewd guess until it is verified by reason and experience. Sensible men hold such conclusions to be mere hypotheses, and would never think of demanding general assent to them in advance of verification. Now moral intuitions are no less hypothetical than any others. And when legislation is prompted by moral intuition, it means that the whole community is compelled by force to assent to what a faction, usually an ignorant faction, guesses to be right.

The doctrine of Intuitionism may thus be used to support the claim to moral superiority of the less civilized, and to sanction the tyranny of the majority. In other words, it is the *democratic* doctrine. We see a hint of this, even in the writing of Lecky. He says "It is probable that the triumph of liberty will . . . not only lessen the moral performances, but even weaken the moral capacities of mankind." He thinks the greatest manifes-

tation of the virtues of self-sacrifice and heroism occur among people living under tyranny. As with liberty, so with the advance of civilization. It too may undermine the morals. "It is one of the plainest of facts that neither the individuals nor the ages most distinguished for intellectual achievements have been most distinguished for moral excellence. . . . In some respects the conditions of intellectual growth are not favorable to moral growth. . . . Many of the most splendid outbursts of moral enthusiasm may be traced to an overwhelming conviction rarely found in very cultivated minds." He adds that civilization has been very favorable to the gentler charitable, social, intellectual and industrial virtues, but "it is not in general equally favorable to the production of self-sacrifice, enthusiasm, reverence, chastity."

Rousseau likewise, you will remember, found greatest virtue among the most simple. But have not men who reason in this way a wrong idea of moral excellence? Note that Lecky divides the virtues into two classes, the gentler and the more violent. It is the latter which he finds most prevalent among the less civilized. I agree. But suppose we make another classification, and distinguish the goodness which is positive from that which is negative. It will then be seen that the virtues for which Lecky gives the less cultivated credit are chiefly negative. This emphasis on negative goodness is very characteristic of popular moral intuition, and such negation is also characteristic of moral legislation—"Thou shalt not."

Now there are many who hold that such purely nega-

FREEDOM BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE 293

tive goodness is in conflict with the advance of civilization and of liberty, but that it is so desirable that both these should be sacrificed to it. I do not agree with Lecky that civilization and liberty tend to undermine morals. But it is evident that both are commonly attacked in the name of popular morality, and whoever attacks the one attacks the other. It should be noted that Lecky places civilization, intelligence, and liberty all on the same side of the issue. I agree, and would add that their common enemy is popular prejudice disguised as moral enthusiasm.

Folkways, alleged divine commands, and moral legislation, then, combine to take from the individual moral responsibility. The moral issue, which concerns liberty, does not rest with those who would compel all men to conform to the intuitions of some faction, but with those who would retain intelligence as the guide to conduct and thus preserve responsibility. When the law takes over the responsibility of the individuals we may inquire what moral action is then to be required of them. Here I think we reach the final irony of the attack on freedom in the name of morals. Men have then no longer, to use a phrase of Erskine's, a "moral obligation to be intelligent." They have only a moral obligation to obey the law because it is the law. To just the extent that the control of his behavior becomes a matter of legal regulation, the individual is denied any right of discrimination whatsoever. Thus it has been said that no individual has the right to determine what law shall be obeyed and what law shall be enforced. But this is to make conscience nothing other

than legality. I think this is a dangerous doctrine, and strange indeed in a country which has the historic background of America. It cannot be denied that all men are under *legal* obligation to obey all laws alike. But such a statement is mere redundancy, for law as such commands obedience. Is this legal obligation also always a moral one? This would seem to be the assumption of those who hold that law itself is sacred, and must be obeyed for the very reason that it is the law.

But surely men cannot be serious in advancing this as the sole reason for obeying law. Either our law or our morals must be in a very precarious condition if we are forced to take such a position as this. For it is either an admission that the government is so weak as to be unable to enforce the law so that men must be urged to voluntary obedience, an admission which works havoc with the law; or else it is to suggest motives of conduct which play havoc with men's moral sense.

Lawlessness, always a problem of the government of our rather violent population, has in America, in recent years, reached a crisis which menaces the very foundation of local government, especially in urban centers. Organized gangs of criminals, thanks to their newly-acquired wealth, their corrupt political affiliations, the sentimentality of juries, are able to terrorize and exploit, and, with apparent impunity, to commit acts of violence on a scale which practically amounts to a menace to the existence of ordered society. The criminal class is rapidly on the increase, and perhaps never since the Fifteenth Century in Italy has it been so powerful as to-day. We may well be

FREEDOM BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE 295

disturbed. It is natural also that good men should see this situation chiefly in terms of obedience to law, when in fact the issue is the old, old problem of the extermination of the enemies of human society. This issue can be met only by a government which does the thing for which it was organized. Failing to do this, it is further natural that officers of government should resort to preaching moral obligation to obey law, as if that were the task for which they were elected. It is obvious that such preaching is compensatory, has no effect whatever on those who should be restrained by force, and is, indeed, a phenomenon which might be expected to occur when government, diverted from its proper function of restraining the enemies of society, is burdened with the task of regulating the consciences of people who normally are its main support.

The decent man is law-abiding in regard to such things as theft and murder, but he does not refrain from stealing and killing just because there is a law which forbids such deeds. It is only the potential criminal who is presumed to refrain from acts of violence lest he run afoul of the law. Neither law nor morals can be the gainer by the suggestion that the point of view of the potential criminal be made universal. There are just two reasons why laws should be obeyed. The first is because the government compels obedience; the individual having no choice but to obey, nothing is left of his moral responsibility. The second is that the law has the moral approval of intelligent men, in which case they obey it for reasons other than the mere fact that it happens to be the law.

One suspects that it is only when laws are passed which do not meet with the approval of good and wise men that attempts are made to put such men under *moral obligation* to support these laws for other reasons.

But it will be said, there are probably no laws that some good and wise men do not disapprove, and if the good man has no moral obligation to support laws which his reason and conscience disapprove, the foolish man or crook is equally free from obligation to obey laws which do not meet with his moral approval. But when did we ever wait for the moral approval of fools and crooks before requiring them to obey the law? Moreover, it is not true that the great body of reasonable and necessary law lacks the moral support of any considerable number of intelligent people. The dissent of some occasional good man to some particular law is unfortunate, since he is obliged to render physical obedience without moral approval; and the fact that such dissent is bound to exist, even in necessary legislation, places a very heavy burden of proof on anyone who proposes to increase the number of laws; for nothing is more dangerous to society than that there should be an increasing number of good men who are obliged to render physical obedience without moral assent.

Does not the doctrine that all men are under moral obligation to obey every existing law detract somewhat from the honor due the memory of those men of the past through whose acts of disobedience we have such traditional liberties as the crowd has not yet destroyed? I wonder what John Milton would have thought of this

doctrine as an ethical proposition; or Samuel Adams, or Jefferson and Franklin, or John Brown, or Thoreau. It is moreover difficult to believe that *all* law is sacred when we are almost daily given the spectacle of the all-too-humanness of the law-making branch of our government. Everyone admits that there are many bad and foolish laws, and it would seem that their number is increasing rather than decreasing. Is there not a point at which moral obligation to obedience becomes stultification of intelligence? As has been said, the American citizen has always discriminated among laws because he had to. One wonders what would be the result of an indiscriminating and thorough-going enforcement of all the foolish and insincere statutes and ordinances, which, though remaining unrepealed, have been permitted to drop quietly into oblivion because nobody ever expected to obey them. Would we not give the world a jolly spectacle of a nation which had lost its reason?

Men are repeatedly held to be under moral obligation to give support to laws the enforcement of which can work only injury, until they are repealed. For, it is held, that if a law is wrong the surest guarantee of its repeal is its rigid enforcement. I am at a loss to discover what psychological or historical facts have led to this generalization. The idea is apparently both unpsychological and un-American. It is at least not the way such matters have usually gone in this country. Bad laws are seldom repealed. The statute books are still cluttered with them. They merely become "dead letters" through inability to enforce them or some shift in popular interest which no

longer demands their enforcement. Rigid enforcement of bad legislation is nearly always undertaken at the behest of some powerful faction in the community, and it inevitably results in much brutality, favoritism, suffering and corruption. Rigid enforcement designed to secure the repeal of a bad law could meet with success only by exasperating the public beyond endurance; and as such enforcement invariably attracts to its service large numbers of second-rate men, such a policy encourages these men in resorting to extreme measures, tends to relieve them of responsibility for abuse of power, and gives them a vested interest in the authority they exercise over their fellow men. The assumption that the people will not accept a bad law if it is really enforced has little to support it. People are very likely to do the opposite, for, once enforced, the law is held to be a success; it is an accomplished fact. Mill showed that for this reason various persecutions in the past had succeeded in their aim. It is because bad laws cannot be enforced, rather than because they can, that persistence in them is ever abandoned.

There is so little intelligence in the behavior of men toward one another that it has of late become the fashion among social philosophers to underrate it. Social change is said to be the work of impersonal forces. The future of mankind is optimistically committed to the tender mercies of animal instincts, geographical facts, and the laws of economics and mechanics. No doubt all this encourages the multitude to believe that whatever it does is progress. But there was a time when philosophers, look-

ing upon such an exhibition as men are now making of themselves, would have said that any man who permits religion, popular morality, or even the law of the land, to deprive him of his responsibility, or cause him to act contrary to reason, has failed of the condition of man's true and proper estate. But a generation which is inclined to the self-flattering belief that a schoolboy who can operate a radio set is wiser than Aristotle, who knew nothing about electro-dynamics, apparently gives little thought to what philosophers may have said about man's true estate. I think there is a causal connection between the small rôle which, aside from applied science and commercial cleverness, men assign to reason, and their growing indifference to liberty.

The outstanding moral philosophers have always held that reason is the proper guide to behavior and the basis of freedom. However much they may have differed in other respects, they seem to be in agreement on this point. The systems of metaphysics of three of the greatest moral teachers, though far apart, are in accord in stressing the necessary relations of liberty, morals and reason. I have previously discussed the moral philosophy of Aristotle, and have tried to show that in the mind of this writer the good man, the free man, and the wise man are one and the same. Living at a time when the myths and conventions of his people had become inadequate as guides to behavior, and when a turbulent democracy was destroying itself with foolish legislation he, like other educators of his day, sought to achieve the good life by the unfettered use of human intelligence, and to discover

those principles of wise legislation, under which the thinking few at least might retain their freedom, and all men through their leadership achieve some measure of happiness. Aristotle's *Ethics* is nothing more or less than an account of those virtues and mental traits which necessarily characterize the free man and aid him in the pursuit of the good life. Every trait of character is to be controlled and kept from excess or defect, not by laws imposed from without, but by the exercise of "right reason."

Throughout the *Ethics* the terms liberal and reasonable can be used almost interchangeably, for they mean the same. Hence this book, which is probably the world's greatest classic on the subject of morals, contains no set rules, or moral code, or any commandments, or folkways, which may be set above a man's intelligence or be enacted into law. Aristotle assumes, as did his predecessors, Socrates and Plato, that the very first step in the pursuit of the good life is to emancipate the mind from herd opinion. His thinking on the subject of morals takes place in an atmosphere wholly alien to and aloof from any hint of censorship, prohibition or moral guardianship of the State over the free man. It is the free man who guides the State. At the close of the book, moral legislation is suggested, only to be consigned to the region where it properly belongs. It is unblushingly referred to as a necessary part of the existing system of slavery. Aristotle believed that a large portion of the human race are born with slavish natures, and are hopelessly incapable of liberty or self-government, because they cannot think. These persons, he thought, could never by any pos-

sible method be educated to the point where they could live according to reason. Hence they must be controlled by force. But I do not remember having read in Aristotle's writings any passage which sets forth the principle that the thinking people in the community, and those capable of self-government, must not be permitted themselves to enjoy any degree of freedom which fools and evil men might abuse. It is one of the ironies of history that the attempt in modern democracy to give liberty to everybody results in subjecting everybody to the restraints which Aristotle intended should be imposed only on congenital slaves. But be that as it may, the point is clear that here, in the teaching of one of the wisest men in our cultural tradition, liberty, moral responsibility, and reason stand or fall together.

The same is true of the ethical teaching of the Seventeenth Century philosopher, Spinoza. Spinoza's moral philosophy is thoroughly liberal and rationalistic. It would be well if those who are inclined to restrict liberty out of enthusiasm for religion would pause and read Spinoza's *Ethics*. For his whole system of thought is absorbed in the idea of God. God to him is everything, practically the same as substance, or existence itself. But his profound love of God does not inspire in him an attitude of intolerance, for it is "the intellectual love of God." He has no need of revelation, miracles, sacraments, or commandments. The moral man is the free man. "A free man is one who lives under the guidance of Reason, who is not led by fear, but who directly desires that which is good. . . . I call him free who is led solely by Reason." Men

'are not born free but may become so, only as they attain the life of reason. "If men were born free, they would so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil." The free man is contrasted with the ignorant man. "An ignorant man, when he confers a benefit on another puts his own estimate on it. But the free man desires to join others to him in friendship." Hence only free men are thoroughly useful to one another. "The good will which men who are led by blind desire have for one another is generally a bargaining or enticement," rather than pure good will. "The free man acts . . . always in good faith. The man who is guided by Reason, does not obey through fear, therefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove all hindrances to true knowledge such as hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride." Here again is a classic moral philosopher, the goal of whose ethical teaching is freedom, and the pathway to that goal the exercise of reason alone.

The ethics of Kant is, if possible, even more rationalistic than that of Spinoza. Kant's aim was to remove morals as far as possible not only from the folkways, religious dogma, and legalism, but even from the realm of common sense and the guidance of experience, to the realm of "Pure Practical Reason." The moral law is thus a universal maxim, or logical principle which is valid for all rational beings. Indeed without reason there is no such things as *will*. "The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational." Freedom is a necessary property of such causality. "The will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under

FREEDOM BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE 303

the idea of freedom . . . this idea (freedom) must therefore in practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being. . . . We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom." It is not necessary to enter upon a discussion of the Kantian ethics, in which it would seem to me that the philosopher, still moved by his dislike of both Empiricism and Dogmatism, seeks escape from the skeptical implications of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, by making a rationally conceived law of duty into an eternal and sublime reality. I wish merely to make it clear that Kant as a moral philosopher was a thorough-going rationalist, and that he gave the strongest possible emphasis to responsibility and freedom.

Here then we have three of the outstanding moral philosophers of the world—and I could cite many others to the same purpose—who are in substantial agreement in holding that freedom, morals, and the life of reason are so necessarily related that to destroy any one of them is to destroy them all. Now it would seem that a point so strongly emphasized, and with such unanimity, by the wisest men of all times, ought at least be considered by the well-meaning people among us who propose to enhance by the machinery of legislation the moral welfare of the community. In the light of classic morality, the efforts and whole point of view of our would-be reformers stand condemned. Civilization is too old, our cultural tradition too rich, and the direction in which it points too unmistakable, for the present-day enthusiasts to dismiss it as though it did not exist; and they are hardly to

be taken seriously when they seek to give the impression that all who oppose their programs of restraint are merely selfish people and loose livers, angry because they may not have their beer or legally purchase salacious books.

It is conceivable that there are still men among us to whom the liberty of others is precious, who have attained some measure of civilization of interest and some pride in the exercise of personal responsibility, who have given serious thought to the question how far society can, without danger to itself, afford to let the individual experiment with matters of right and wrong. There are some who still hold that full-grown and self-governing individuals are a valuable asset to any community. They agree with Mill that there are some restrictions on individual liberty which work more harm to society than the evil that in certain matters may result from the abuse of freedom.

Among the worst evils which result from the control of the individual by society are those customs and laws which are aimed to discourage people from ever growing up. There are two kinds of laws, those which represent the dilemmas of wise men and are designed to control the foolish, and those which represent the dilemmas of the foolish and are designed to control the wise. The first kind are designed to protect men from the follies of others, the second to protect people from their own folly. All fool-proof legislation is illiberal, and is usually enacted in the interest of people who are incapable of intellectual maturity.

FREEDOM BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE 305

Our education ought long ago to have had a liberalizing influence on the public mind. The point of view of the philosophers of freedom, about responsibility and the life of reason, might conceivably by this time have become common property. There is nothing in such a point of view which makes it intellectually difficult. But our educational institutions, under the pressure of every kind of popular prejudice, seem to be chiefly occupied in dodging controversial intellectual issues and equipping youth with those attitudes and techniques which promise material advantage. The difficulty in grasping the free man's point of view is not primarily intellectual, but is the result of childish emotions and fixations. Most people, of the generation now in middle life, by the time they reached their adolescence, have had built into them the strongest possible resistance to intellectual maturity. Their parents have spent years in the process of "breaking their wills." They have acquired the habit of accepting their beliefs and opinions on authority. They have been terrified at their own natures by the doctrine of sin which they have learned in religious instruction. Their education, such as it is, has laid chief emphasis on the formation of habits, and very little on the development of insight. They have lived among elders whose own education stopped short long ago, and who persistently resisted everything new, except the superficial. For most people, at the very moment when their physical maturity awakens interest in sex, the whole subject is besmirched with prudery and obscenity. They learn to sustain their self-appreciation and evade admission of failure by taking

refuge in childish fictions. They go through life with a little boy's ideas of religion, morality, patriotism, and liberty. Because such ideas are emotionally satisfying, they are scandalized at anything which would introduce them to the grown-up world. The moment they step out of the family circle, they set up the crowd and its institutions in the place of the parent images, and assume all their lives a filial attitude toward these agencies of control. Conceiving of liberty, then, as furtiveness, or as rebellion, they become suspicious of the freedom of anybody and are easy subjects for the propagandists of illiberalism.

The idea that a people are free merely because they live under laws they may be presumed to have made, is a fiction. The nearest approach we could have to a free society would be one in which a really grown-up minority were not treated like children by their intellectual inferiors.

The long history of the struggle of mankind for freedom is a record of the noblest and most courageous achievements of humanity, with many bright visions doomed to disappointment, many a righteous cause lost in sickening defeat, and every hard-won liberty gained at frightful cost and retained only with tireless vigilance. Such permanent advance as has been achieved has taken place only with the advancement of culture. And this has always been the work of the liberal-minded few. Throughout this history there has been a ceaseless psychological class-struggle between the mentally mature and those who have never grown up. To the majority,

liberty has been, and still is, the removal of restraints to mass action. They can be led to coöperate with liberals in resisting the tyranny which a ruling class may impose upon them from without; but they seem to be defenseless against their own forms of tyranny of the mass. Nor do they often feel that liberty is seriously menaced when the individual and his responsibilities are crushed under the will of the majority. It is the friends of culture, the few who have attained the life of reason, who have kept the cause of liberty alive and have made it the means of the best development of the individual and the advancement of civilization.

THE END

Books that Live

EVERETT DEAN MARTIN

Liberty \$3.00

The Meaning of a Liberal Education \$3.00

Psychology \$3.00

The Behavior of Crowds \$3.00

The Mystery of Religion \$3.00

BERTRAND RUSSELL

Mysticism and Logic \$3.00

Our Knowledge of the External World \$3.00

Sceptical Essays \$2.50

Philosophy \$3.00

H. S. JENNINGS

The Biological Basis of Human Nature \$4.00

JOHN COWPER POWYS

The Meaning of Culture \$3.00

G. ELLIOT SMITH

Human History \$5.00

JOHN B. WATSON

Behaviorism \$3.00

Psychological Care of Infant and Child \$2.00

H. A. OVERSTREET

About Ourselves \$3.00

Influencing Human Behavior \$3.00

JOHN DEWEY

Experience and Nature \$3.00

FRANZ BOAS

Anthropology and Modern Life \$3.00



W · W · NORTON & COMPANY, INC.

70 Fifth Avenue, New York

